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is multidisciplinary thesis is located at the intersection of legal theory and design. It 
synthesises the practical question of how code regulates (using theories including James 
Gibson’s/Donald Norman’s affordance, Don Ihde’s postphenomenology, and Madeleine 
Akrich’s inscription) with a legal-theoretical view of what constitutes legitimate regulation 
(using theories including Lon Fuller’s internal morality of law, Luc Wintgens’ legisprudence, 
and Mireille Hildebrandt’s legal protection by design).  
Proceeding from the notion that code is an a-legal normative order, I argue that even 
(and indeed especially) in the absence of suitable or sufficient legal regulation, the norms of 
that order ought to be legitimated. is is particularly true given the unique characteristics of 
code as a regulator, which include its ruleishness, opacity, immediacy, immutability, 
pervasiveness, and, perhaps most importantly, its production by private enterprise. Having set 
out how code regulates from the perspective of the design theories mentioned above, I explore 
these characteristics from a legal-theoretical perspective, developing the concept of 
computational legalism, a uniquely strong form of the undesirable ideological phenomenon of 
legalism. is is the rst signi cant contribution of the thesis.  
Having set up the parallel between legal and technological normativity, I explore the 
extent to which ex ante mechanisms for ameliorating legalism in the creation of legal norms 
can be translated into the ‘legislature’ of the design environment, to be applied in the creation 
of code-based norms. e motivating idea is that the standards that make legal norms 
legitimate ought mutatis mutandis to be applicable to other normative orders that enable and 
constrain individual behaviour. e literature has so far tended to focus on ex post assessments 
of code’s operation, and to that extent it fails to account for computational legalism and the 
standards that must be met – by de nition during the production process, ex ante – in order 




Taking all of this into account, the second signi cant contribution of the thesis is a 
‘constitutional’ framework of digisprudential affordances that I argue ought to be present in all 
user-facing code, in order to ensure that certain foundational capabilities are provided by the 
design. e affordances I identify are: contestability; transparency of provenance, purpose, and 
operation; choice; oversight; and delay. ey act as a formal mechanism for constraining what 
substantive code can possibly do, imposing ‘thin’ constitutional design standards that ought to 
be met regardless of the ‘thick’ purposes or functionality of the digital artefact. I discuss how 
these might be implemented in practice through an analysis of two contemporary technologies, 
the Internet of ings and blockchain applications. is practical element of the thesis 
connects with the last signi cant novel contribution, namely an exploration of Cornelia 
Vismann and Markus Krajewski’s concept of the programmer of the programmer, and how this 
‘constitutional actor’ can be used to impose digisprudential limits – analogous to HLA Hart’s 






is thesis considers the ways in which the architectures (user interfaces and general operating 
‘rules’) created by computer code regulate behaviour, and how this form of regulation can and 
should be made legitimate. e speci c notion of legitimacy that I adopt comes from the 
literature on legal theory, speci cally in the area of legal rule creation (i.e. legislation). 
I rst describe, using design theory, the ways in which computer architectures enable 
and constrain user behaviour. I then look at these characteristics from a legal theoretical 
perspective, mapping them on to the philosophical concept of legalism. Legalism is concerned 
with the following of rules regardless of their quality or efficacy. It ‘veils’ the reasons behind a 
rule and the sources of power which have caused it to be created. In a similar way, I argue that 
code imposes the following of rules on its users and, because of its private production, the 
processes by which code is produced are also to a great extent ‘veiled’. is leads me to propose 
a theory of computational legalism, which is the rst signi cant contribution of the thesis. 
From that position I then explore how mechanisms that are designed to reduce 
legalism in the traditional legal context might be transferred into the code design context, 
given that in the metaphor I build up the design environment is essentially a type of legislature, 
or parliament, where rules are created. Like traditional legal rules, code rules also enable and 
constrain behaviour, and so they should be held to similar standards of legitimacy. I adopt two 
primary theories from legal philosophy, called the internal morality of law and legisprudence. 
Each of these is to an extent concerned with the form that legal rules ought to have in order to 
prevent their iniquity, and so I use them as a basis to develop similar formal standards for code 
rules.  
is is the basis for the second signi cant contribution of the thesis. e existing 
literature has mostly tended to focus on the operation of code, whereas I argue that we should 
be much more closely concerned with its production. Here I come full-circle to make use of 




(‘affordances’) that legitimate code ought to have. ese characteristics are ‘constitutional’, or 
foundational, meaning they should be present in all user-facing code regardless of its 
commercial purposes. Broadly, the characteristics are: the ability to contest the code in court; 
transparency of the code’s provenance, purpose, and its operation; the ability of the user to 
exercise choice; appropriate delays in the code’s operation to allow the user to understand what 
is happening; and oversight of the code by its designer to x problems or revoke it after launch. 
e framework is complemented by a discussion of ways in which some of its elements can be 
practically integrated into the code development process, to create architectural guides that 
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Given that code is not exactly like law, it is difficult in the realm of code to 
adopt a kind of rule of law (or ‘rule of code’) approach. Yet, we have also seen 
that when a particular code is ‘enacted’, it may be too late to remedy the 
violation of certain rights. is is why the accent should be put on the moment 
of production, rather than on the moment of distribution.1 
1. Introduction 
is thesis is located at the intersection between law and design. It is concerned with 
how the rules, or normativity, that designers embed in the code of technological 
artefacts can be legitimately produced. e question of legitimacy is viewed from a 
legal-theoretical perspective, and the analysis asks whether the standards that make a 
legal rule legitimate might be imported into the realm of design to make a 
computational rule legitimate. Quintessentially multidisciplinary, the thesis contributes 
to knowledge both by deepening our understanding of the connection between law 
and design, and by developing a framework that can be used to critique and guide the 
production of digital artefacts which have a regulatory effect on behaviour. 
Additionally, it considers the constitutional role of those who create the technical 
environments that product designers use to produce code, making the novel argument 
that those environments are one suitable point at which effective constraints on design 
can be imposed.  
Legal analyses of technology often focus on compliance with one or more areas 
of substantive doctrinal law, for example data protection or intellectual property. By 
contrast, I remain agnostic as to speci c areas of doctrine, adopting instead a legal-
                                                 
1  M. Goldoni, ‘ e Politics of Code as Law: Toward Input Reasons’ in J. Reichel and A.S. Lind 




theoretical framing that considers how good law (in any eld) is thought to be made. 
I use the existing literature on legalism and its alternatives to focus on constraining 
form as a mechanism to ensure legitimate substance, whatever the intended goal of the 
latter may be. is illuminates some parallels between the legal and computational 
spheres, parallels that I collectively term computational legalism. is sustained analysis 
of digital architecture through the prism of the literature on legalism is the rst 
signi cant contribution of the thesis. 
Following from that descriptive analysis, I consider how these challenges might 
be ameliorated by the adaptation to the computational realm of two primary theoretical 
frameworks that combat legalism in the realm of traditional rule-making, namely 
Fuller’s internal morality of law and Wintgens’ legisprudence. I review these theories 
alongside the existing literature on ex ante criteria for code production, creating the 
theoretical scaffolding for a synthesis that bridges the gap between legal analysis and 
design practice. at synthesis is the second signi cant contribution of the thesis. It is 
a novel and direct engagement with the design of digital systems whose normative 
architectures exhibit computational legalism, suggesting how a ‘design turn’ in legal 
thinking might be effected in practice. I discuss blockchain applications and the 
Internet of ings, anchoring the discussion in real-world application. I call the 
resulting theoretical and practical contribution digisprudence, based on the idea that 
where Wintgens’ legisprudence is an evolution or extension of jurisprudence within 
the legislative realm, digisprudence is an evolution of legisprudence within the design 
realm.  
1.1 Code 
e starting point of the thesis is expressed in the quote at the beginning of this 
chapter. Code is like traditional law in its regulative capacity, but is also different from 




is ‘enacted’. Code is capable of violating rights, whilst simultaneously resisting the 
aspirations and oversight of the rule of law. And nally, there are two pivotal moments 
at which assessments of code can most fruitfully be made: ex ante at the point of 
production, or ex post at the point of operation. Each of these elements plays an 
important role in the argument I am presenting, which runs as follows.  
When commercial enterprises create digital artefacts, or code,2 they create 
alternative normative orders that are apt to replace traditional institutional law as a 
primary source of behavioural regulation. Importantly, the private commercial contexts 
within which this code is created are not subject to the legitimising procedural 
standards of law-making found in constitutional democracies. is means that in the 
move from public to private rule-making, the resulting effects of that code on 
behaviour risk being illegitimate, whether or not this is intended.3 e question then 
arises of whether formal standards of law-making might be imported into the sui 
generis ‘legislature’ of the commercial design environment, in order to ensure that the 
code it produces is legitimate. Asscher summarises the spirit of the enquiry in these 
terms: 
Code can present constraints on human behaviour that can be compared with 
constraints by traditional laws. We have argued that even though code is not law, 
in some instances it can be useful to ask the same questions about code regulation as 
we do about traditional regulation. Code as law must be assessed by looking at 
the results of regulation in terms of freedom and individual autonomy and 
compared to the balance struck by traditional law.4 
                                                 
2  I further explain my use of the term ‘code’ below.  
3  E. Bayamlıoğlu and R. Leenes, ‘ e “Rule of Law” Implications of Data-Driven Decision-Making: 
A Techno-Regulatory Perspective’ [2018] Law, Innovation and Technology 1, p. 12. 
4  L. Asscher, ‘“Code” as Law: Using Fuller to Assess Code Rules’ in E. Dommering and L. Asscher 
(eds.), Coding Regulation: Essays on the Normative Role of Information Technology ( e Hague: TMC 




e thesis discusses various aspects of this insight, including the regulative capabilities 
of code, the ways in which code differs from law, and how autonomy might be 
maintained in the alternative normative order of code. 
An analogy for the idea of a separate order that is subject to formal standards 
of legitimacy can be found in the millennia-old notion of the scienti c method. 
According to its modern incarnation, a theory will only be accepted if it meets 
prede ned formal standards of observation, hypothesis, prediction, experimentation, 
reproducibility, falsi ability, promulgation, and peer review.5 Even if the putative ‘fact’ 
happens to be true objectively, those formal requirements must be met in order for it 
to qualify as a fact from the scienti c perspective. One can see therefore how legitimacy 
as a concept can be an internal formal requirement in various elds (although the 
precise steps required to achieve it will of course vary).6  
My purpose here in framing code in terms of legal legitimacy derives from the 
point, made above, that it can so readily augment and even supplant law as a regulator. 
ose who create code, whose work is shielded by the private context of its production, 
ought therefore to wield that power legitimately.7 If sovereign legislatures are bound 
by constitutions so that they cannot arbitrarily impose regulations on citizens’ 
behaviour, then neither should this be possible for private enterprise, especially given 
the characteristics of code that render it qualitatively and quantitatively more 
problematic to comprehend and control than text-based legislation. We will see below 
and in Chapters 2 and 3 what those characteristics are and what effects they have. 
                                                 
5  ‘Scienti c Method, n.’ <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/383323>. 
6  Wintgens makes reference to Karl Popper and the concept of ‘theory dependence’ in the natural 
sciences, importing it into legisprudence as part of his principle of coherence. See L. Wintgens, 
Legisprudence: Practical Reason in Legislation (Surrey: Routledge, 2012) p. 253 et seq., and also the 
discussion infra at Chapter 4, section 2.3.3 ( e principle of coherence (PC)). 
7  K. Yeung, ‘Can We Employ Design-Based Regulation While Avoiding Brave New World?’ (2011) 




e term ‘code’ draws on Lessig’s seminal work on the concept of ‘code as law’.8 
His original argument was that individuals are regulated not just by law, but also by 
three other regulatory ‘modalities’, namely social norms, the market, and architecture. 
In ‘cyberspace’, architecture is constituted by software, or code, as opposed to the 
physical architecture of the ‘real’ world. e ‘architects’ of that code therefore have 
signi cant power in cyberspace, and because of the far greater potency of code than 
the other modalities to shape what is and is not possible in that space, the architects 
of code therefore have disproportionate power within the digital realm. Lessig 
summarises his thesis by stating that ‘[a]rchitecture is a kind of law: it determines what 
people can and cannot do. When commercial interests determine the architecture, they 
create a kind of privatized law’.9  
e debate has moved on somewhat since Lessig and his predecessor 
Reidenberg – whose analysis of lex informatica in uenced Lessig’s work10 – rst 
introduced these concepts. e literature was initially concerned mainly with the 
regulation of the amorphous cyberspace as a location that is ‘out there’, i.e. the Internet 
as a ‘place’ and a platform. e discussion has since evolved to consider on the one 
hand the code of individual and/or networked applications, and on the other code that 
facilitates data-driven services based on machine learning. Both forms of code are 
‘algorithmic’, but the distinction between the two is an important one.11  
Broadly speaking, modern data-driven applications are concerned with the use 
of machine learning algorithms and ‘big data’ to facilitate automated classi cation and 
decision-making. Such systems can be unpredictable because they are based on the 
                                                 
8  L. Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006) passim. 
9  Ibid., p. 77. 
10  J.R. Reidenberg, ‘Lex Informatica: e Formulation of Information Policy Rules through 
Technology’ (1997) 76 Texas Law Review 553. 
11  M. Hildebrandt, ‘Algorithmic Regulation and the Rule of Law’ (2018) 376 Philosophical Transactions 




processing of vast, multi-dimensional, contingent datasets using computer-generated 
models that are not readily susceptible to human interpretation.12 is includes a wide 
range of applications, from classifying images for searching to the prediction of 
recidivism.13 Code-driven applications, on the other hand, are tied to the 
predetermined ‘if-then’ logical building blocks that underpin all traditional 
computational systems. Data-driven applications necessarily operate on a level above 
code-driven applications, and indeed are one type of application that requires the 
foundation of the latter to operate. e general-purpose computing infrastructure that 
gathers, transmits, and stores the data that machine learning algorithms process is 
ultimately based entirely on that general-purpose computing infrastructure. e issues 
raised by data-driven applications are distinct from those of code-driven applications, 
and although there are some overlaps, my focus is on the implications of human-
designed code, rather than algorithmically-processed data.14 
As is common in the literature, and taking into account the distinction just 
described, I will hereafter use ‘code’ interchangeably with ‘software’ and ‘architecture’, 
to refer generally to digital systems that have a regulatory effect on behaviour. 
roughout the thesis the term is intended to be contrasted with law as a competing 
regulator. 
‘Regulation’ in the context of the thesis straddles two of the de nitions 
identi ed by Black: (i) the promulgation of rules by government (i.e. traditional laws 
                                                 
12  E. Bayamlıoğlu, ‘On the Possibility of Normative Contestation of Automated Data-Driven 
Decisions’ in I. Baraliuc et al. (eds.), Being Pro led: Cogitas Ergo Sum - 10 Years of Pro ling the 
European Citizen (Amsterdam University Press, 2018); J. Burrell, ‘How the Machine “ inks”: 
Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms’ (2016) 3 Big Data & Society. 
13  On the latter, see J. Angwin et al., ‘Machine Bias’ (ProPublica, 23 May 2016) 
<https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing>. 
14  e digisprudential framework of affordance could be applied in the design data-driven applications, 





and regulatory instruments), and (ii) all mechanisms of social control affecting 
behaviour, of whatever kind from whatever source, whether intentional or not.15 e 
phrase ‘social control’ in the second of these might be viewed as including ‘technical 
control’ or ‘commercial control’. is notion of control is connected with the de nition 
of ‘normativity’ that I adopt, which is to say any mechanism, legal or otherwise, 
through which behaviour is enabled or constrained. As Goldoni puts it, ‘code as law is 
normative in the sense that it regulates and guides human behaviour.’16 is meaning 
is similar to the concept of ‘governance’ in the regulatory literature.17 I discuss 
technological normativity in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
By ‘legitimacy’, I refer to the idea that rules that govern behaviour ought to be 
created according to pre-existing standards that embody values of accountability, 
transparency, and contestability.18 I re ne and deepen this idea in section 3 below and 
in subsequent chapters. Despite a large literature on software as both a target and a 
conduit of regulation, the question of legitimacy is one that has received only minimal 
attention with regard to the normative standards to which the designers who create 
code might be held.19 Few scholars have considered the question directly, and the 
treatment so far has focused more on ex post assessments of code regulation (the effects 
of its operation in the world) rather than on ex ante normative standards (questioning 
                                                 
15  See J. Black, ‘Critical Re ections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1, 
p. 11 (as an aside, Hildebrandt suggests that Black’s de nition has become the ‘canonical reference’. 
See M. Hildebrandt, ‘Radbruch’s Rechtsstaat and Schmitt’s Legal Order: Legalism, Legality, and 
the Institution of Law’ (2015) 2 Critical Analysis of Law 42, p. 61). 
16  Goldoni, supra n. 1, p. 119. See also M. Hildebrandt, ‘Legal and Technological Normativity: More 
(and Less) than Twin Sisters’ (2008) 12 Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 169, p. 173 et 
seq.  
17  C. Reed and A. Murray, Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Cyberspace (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2018) p. 140. 
18  See for example J. Waldron, ‘Can ere Be a Democratic Jurisprudence?’ (2009) 58 Emory Law 
Journal 675. 




how it was, and ought to have been, produced). Although the former are a necessary 
and important element of oversight, the characteristics of computational legalism 
make necessary an additional focus on the application of ex ante standards during the 
production process. e reasons for this are discussed below in section 2, and in detail 
in Chapter 3. 
1.2 Highlighting a tension 
is is of course a legal thesis. I am, however, arguing explicitly that there is a body of 
normativity that operates separately from and in parallel with institutional law.20 In 
doing so my aim is not to follow some cyberlibertarian arguments that welcome, and 
seek to validate, the usurping of the state by private producers of code.21 Indeed, it is 
quite the opposite. We are at risk of nding ourselves mired in a ‘Collingridge 
dilemma’, where by the time consensus has been reached on the need for change (e.g. 
regulation of technology and the business models that push its development in certain 
directions) conditions have become such that implementing any change is expensive, 
difficult, and time-consuming.22  
My aim therefore is rst to acknowledge the reality of this predicament and 
then, by adopting a precautionary approach, to suggest ways in which we might guide 
                                                 
20  R. Brownsword, ‘In the Year 2061: From Law to Technological Management’ (2015) 7 Law, 
Innovation and Technology 1, pp. 10–14; R. Mohr and F. Contini, ‘Reassembling the Legal: “ e 
Wonders of Modern Science” in Court-Related Proceedings’ (2011) 20 Griffith Law Review 994, 
p. 998. 
21  e now-classic expression of this perspective is J.P. Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace’ (1996) <https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence>. For another classic argument 
in this vein see D.R. Johnson and D.G. Post, ‘Law and Borders - e Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ 
(1995) 48 Stanford Law Review 1367. 
22  M.T. Young, ‘Artifacts as Rules: Wittgenstein and the Sociology of Technology’ (2018) 22 Techné: 
Research in Philosophy and Technology 377; A. ierer, ‘ e Pacing Problem, the Collingridge 






the practice of design towards outcomes that are more legitimate, as de ned according 
to the legal-theoretical frame that I later adopt. If designers are going to create code 
that regulates human behaviour, that code ought to be legitimate: ‘[w]hen technologies 
are always in uencing human actions, we had better try to give this in uence a 
desirable form.’23 While I therefore agree with some of the cyberlibertarians’ 
descriptions of code, I expressly disagree with their normative positions on what should 
ow from those characteristics.  
One of the traditional counter-arguments to the cyberlibertarian position is 
that code is readily susceptible to regulation by law. Arguments to that effect – about 
the regulability of code – are well-heeded as far as they go, but they neither adequately 
encompass the characteristics of recent technological developments (e.g. blockchain 
applications) nor address the question of how code is in fact produced. ose scholars 
who have argued against the idea that code is hegemonic have tended to focus on the 
infrastructure of the Internet and the large platforms that own and operate it,24 rather 
than on the individual digital artefacts that constitute our daily lives online. is code 
is often produced by smaller enterprises25 who are less easy targets for traditional 
regulation and who may view the bene ts of traditional compliance as being 
                                                 
23  P.-P. Verbeek, ‘Materializing Morality: Design Ethics and Technological Mediation’ (2006) 31 
Science, Technology, & Human Values 361, p. 370. 
24  Goldsmith and Wu, for example, focus on the physical networks that underpin the Internet, noting 
that they are owned by ‘some of the most regulated companies on earth’. See J.L. Goldsmith and T. 
Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) p. 73. As discussed above, we also saw this focus in the ‘code as law’ literature. 






outweighed by the cost,26 particularly when they lack dedicated legal departments or 
expertise (indeed, a great deal of code is produced by individuals or microbusinesses27).  
Such scholarship has also tended not to engage in depth with the role and 
practices of the designer as the creator of the code-based norms that constrain and 
enable behaviour. Again, another counterargument to the thesis I am advancing might 
be that designers, just like any other legal person, should be the subjects of traditional 
regulative processes and therefore that any illegality in the code they produce should 
be dealt with using traditional ex post legal processes. In the computational context 
this is necessary but insufficient: as we shall see below and in subsequent chapters, the 
ex ante legitimation of code in addition to ex post legal remedial measures is crucial 
because of its sui generis nature as a regulator. Its ruleishness, opacity, immediacy, 
immutability, and pervasiveness, coupled with the overarching problems of privatised 
production, mean that the stakes are both qualitatively and quantitatively higher than 
with other instances of problematic behavioural regulation that can be ameliorated by 
traditional legal processes, for example unfair terms in a contract or con icting 
legislative norms. Whereas a traditional law that is improperly enacted (i.e. does not 
achieve legality, in Fuller’s terms) can be deemed invalid ab initio and therefore ignored 
and/or struck down, the characteristics of code as a regulator admit of no such 
possibility: once it is ‘promulgated’, code’s (il)legality has no bearing on its ability to 
execute and impose its normativity. From the moment of ‘shipping’, the code will 
operate as though it was legitimately ‘enacted’, even where this is manifestly not the 
case. ere is, therefore, a crucial difference between invalid laws and ‘invalid’ code – 
                                                 
26  See for example ‘Study on the Economic Bene ts of Privacy‐enhancing Technologies (PETs)’ 
(London Economics, 2010). 
27  See ‘Developer Survey 2019’ (Stack Over ow) 
<https://insights.stackover ow.com/survey/2019#work-_-company-size> (purportedly the largest 
survey of developers in the world, demonstrating that a quarter of developers work in companies 




with the former, the ‘hermeneutic gap’ that exists between text and action allows for a 
space in which validity can be considered, whereas with the latter there is no such 
opportunity, either to arrest execution or (in many cases) even to observe the invalidity. 
is in turn connects with the question of ex post contest. If the nature and extent of 
the code’s invalidity cannot be observed, traditional mechanisms of legal redress cannot 
meaningfully be invoked. Ultimately, then, we fall into a trap if we assume that 
institutional law is capable of operating with its usual force where code is the subject 
of regulation. 
Power is shifting away from the publicly-accountable legislator onto private 
actors who have pervasive control over the digital products and infrastructures that 
permeate contemporary life.28 e ability of code to supplant law as the dominant 
normative enterprise,29 and the privatised nature of the environments within which 
code is produced, raise the question of how to ensure that that new normativity is 
legitimate. As Lessig puts it, ‘if code is a lawmaker, then it should embrace the values 
of a particular kind of lawmaking.’30 Hildebrandt echoes this, suggesting that ‘if we 
agree on the need for democratic procedures to regulate the enactment of legal 
normativity, technological normativity requires similar democratic legitimacy.’31 
Designers are in effect legislating already, and there is no sign that in a neoliberal 
economy focused on ‘innovation’ that they will cease unilaterally to do so32 (and, 
                                                 
28  R. Brownsword, ‘Lost in Translation: Legality, Regulatory Margins, and Technological 
Management’ (2011) 26 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1321, p. 1324; M.J. Radin, ‘Regulation by 
Contract, Regulation by Machine’ (2004) 160 Journal of Institutional and eoretical Economics 
(JITE) 142. 
29  Bayamlıoğlu and Leenes talk about law being ‘challenged as a normative enterprise’ when 
mechanisms other than reason de ne norms. Although they are focused on data-driven systems, the 
same holds true for other types of code. See Bayamlıoğlu and Leenes, supra n. 3, p. 11 et seq. 
30  Lessig, supra n. 8, p. 328. 
31  Hildebrandt, ‘Legal and Technological Normativity’, supra n. 16, p. 176. 
32  R. von Schomberg, ‘A Vision of Responsible Research and Innovation’ in R. Owen, J. Bessant and 




simultaneously, we of course should not wish societally-bene cial innovation to be 
prevented). As lawyers we must grapple with this difficult reality, and seek to guide 
the work of designers, which will require a shift in discourse ‘from distribution to 
production and [thus a] focus on how the digital environment is created.’33 ankfully, 
a recent turn in the literature – particularly in the sphere of privacy – sees the focus 
shifting toward the direct consideration of design and the production of code.34 is 
thesis contributes to that emerging debate by considering, from a legal-theoretical 
perspective on what constitutes legitimacy,35 the expectations we should have of 
designers and enterprise in their anticipation of the effects of the code they produce. 
1.3 Questions, aims, and methodology 
From the above discussion of the context of the research, we can discern the following 
questions: 
                                                 
M. Hildebrandt and B.-J. Koops, ‘ e Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the 
Pro ling Era’ (2010) 73 e Modern Law Review 428, pp. 456–457. Daly argues that ‘authorities’ 
forbearance from introducing ex ante regulation in situations where there are extant or foreseeable 
problems for user autonomy can also be explained by the in uence of neoliberal trends promoting 
minimalist “light touch” regulation of private economic power.’ See A. Daly, Private Power, Online 
Information Flows, and EU Law: Mind the Gap (Oxford, United Kingdom; Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2016) p. 137. 
33  Goldoni, supra n. 1, p. 129. Interestingly, Young suggests that the tendency in sociological studies 
of technology has been precisely the reverse, namely focusing on production rather than use. See 
Young, supra n. 22. 
34  See for example W. Hartzog, Privacy’s Blueprint: e Battle to Control the Design of New Technologies 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2018); S. Gürses and J. van Hoboken, ‘Privacy after 
the Agile Turn’ in E. Selinger, J. Polonetsky and O. Tene (eds.), e Cambridge Handbook of 
Consumer Privacy (1st edn., Cambridge University Press, 2018). See also P. Nemitz, ‘Constitutional 
Democracy and Technology in the Age of Arti cial Intelligence’ (2018) 376 Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society A 20180089, arguing for a design perspective on the effects that 
arti cial intelligence is having on constitutional democracy.   
35  Cf. A. Murray, ‘Looking Back at the Law of the Horse: Why Cyberlaw and the Rule of Law Are 
Important’ (2013) 10 SCRIPTed 310. Murray retains the orthodox position of viewing code as the 




(1) How does code in fact regulate end-user behaviour?  
(2) To what extent are the characteristics of good law re ected in code as a 
regulator? 
Following Gürses and van Hoboken, I use the term ‘end-user’ to draw attention to the 
individual user’s position at the end of the product design process, emphasising her 
relative lack of agency in shaping its outputs.36 
Taken together, the answers to these rst two questions constitute a ‘diagnosis’ 
of the problem, which I refer to as computational legalism. is is the contribution of 
Chapters 2 and 3. From that descriptive analysis arise the following normative 
questions: 
(3) Can mechanisms for designing legitimate legal normativity be adopted to 
ensure the design of legitimate technological normativity?  
(4) What might such mechanisms look like in the design context? 
e aspiration then is the governance of the design process and its products by 
constitutive principles that are informed by a legal-theoretical perspective on what 
makes normativity legitimate.  
Compliance with substantive doctrinal law (data protection, intellectual 
property, contract, etcetera) is of course important, but as a general aim it overlooks (i) 
the sui generis nature of code as a regulator of behaviour (i.e. it overlooks computational 
legalism), and (ii) how the translation from textual norms to code-based norms 
invariably involves some level of modi cation of the former.37 e precise nature of the 
reality envisioned by legal text is not re ected in the reality constructed by code, partly 
because law itself is (and arguably should be) vague,38 and partly because the two modes 
                                                 
36  Gürses and van Hoboken, supra n. 34, p. 581. 
37  Goldoni, supra n. 1, p. 129; Hildebrandt and Koops, supra n. 32, p. 452 et seq. 
38  T. Endicott, ‘Law Is Necessarily Vague’ (2001) 7 Legal eory 379; C. Reed, ‘How to Make Bad 




of representing meaning (text and software code) are by nature very different, both 
because language is vague where code is precise39 and because words require translation 
into behaviour whereas code is simultaneously ‘words and actions’.40  
is lack of one-to-one mapping of meaning is true not only of attempts to 
interpret and instantiate substantive (textual) legal norms in code but is also 
demonstrated in the unintended constellations of legal and non-legal effect that are 
continually being rei ed by digital artefacts.41 is is what van den Berg and Leenes 
have referred to as ‘techno-effects’,42 or the aggregate normative impact of a technology 
considered regardless of the designer’s intent or any legal impetus behind its use or 
design. ey suggest that while much of the literature focuses on ‘techno-regulation’, 
i.e. the use of technology as a tool to effect legal norms, there has been insufficient 
consideration of the wider spectrum of techno-effects, including a-legal regulation. 
is gap in the literature is an important one, particularly given that ‘[t]he “regulatory” 
potential of technologies – in the broadest sense – is tremendous, and daunting, 
indeed.’43 Not only can it be difficult to discern the intention of the designer, but so too 
is the line between intentional and unintentional normativity difficult to detect – ‘[t]he 
                                                 
39  Golumbia contrasts human language and programming languages thus: ‘Programming languages, 
as Derrida knew, are codes: they have one and one only correct interpretation (or, at the absolute 
limit, a determinate number of discrete interpretations). Human language practice almost never has 
a single correct interpretation [… t]he use of the term [programming] language to describe them is 
a deliberate metaphor, one that is meant to help us interact with machines […]’. See D. Golumbia, 
e Cultural Logic of Computation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009) p. 19. is 
‘representationalism’ is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
40  B. Latour, ‘Where Are the Missing Masses? e Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts’ in W.E. 
Bijker and J. Law (eds.), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change (MIT 
Press, 1992) n. 1. is is discussed infra in section 2.1 and in Chapter 3. 
41  B. van den Berg and R.E. Leenes, ‘Abort, Retry, Fail: Scoping Techno-Regulation and Other 
Techno-Effects’ in M. Hildebrandt and J. Gaakeer (eds.), Human Law and Computer Law: 
Comparative Perspectives (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013). 
42  Ibid., p. 81. 




affected individual cannot discern which part of the normativity (as could be inferred 
from the output) is intentional and which part is merely spin-off in the form [of] 
unforeseen or secondary effects’.44 Whereas law bene ts from delay and processes of 
interpretation that permit application across heterogeneous circumstances,45 the code 
in a digital artefact tends by nature toward a xed con guration of normativity, rather 
than an interpretable standard, which will be applied with unquali ed force in every 
case where the necessary computational conditions exist, regardless of any other 
relevant consideration. e challenge therefore is to require designers to ensure ab 
initio that the xity of their code is as legitimate as it can be (recall the discussion in 
section 1.2 above about the difference between invalid laws and ‘invalid’ code). is 
means that code-makers are quasi-legislators, creating the norms to which the end-
users of their products are subject. As Goldoni puts it, 
on the one side, code can be a norm-enforcing technology, as has been 
outlined several times in the debate; on the other side, code can also be a norm-
establishing technology as well.46 
If both law and code create norms, and we as a society have expectations about the 
legitimacy of the former, then we ought to expect similar standards from the latter. 
Code, however, is not law, it is only law-like; but it is precisely because of the ways in 
which it is not law that this kind of analysis is necessary: code can control behaviour 
more directly than can ‘true’ law, but simultaneously it lacks the latter’s mechanisms of 
ex ante legitimation and ex post remediation.  
e need is therefore all the greater for it to be legitimated ab initio, within the 
design process, and not only in the aftermath of a high-pro le data breach or other 
                                                 
44  Bayamlıoğlu and Leenes, supra n. 3, p. 12. ey refer to this phenomenon as ‘normative opaqueness’. 
45  Endicott, supra n. 38, pp. 382–383; R. Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 
179. 




scandal. e opacity of code means that only the most egregious, conspicuous, and 
high-stakes illegitimacies are ever likely to be exposed; this demonstrates the problem 
of a retrospective focus centred on the operation of code rather than its production.  
Consider, for example, the ongoing controversy surrounding Facebook and the 
sharing of its users’ personal data with third-party application developers, who 
subsequently used it to micro-target election advertisements online. e case is a 
complex (and evolving) mix of business ethics, democratic politics, and doctrinal law, 
but at its heart lie decisions made by designers and concretised in code: a now-
deprecated version of Facebook’s application programming interface (API)47 allowed 
developers to access the data of ‘friends’ of the primary end-user, which enabled the 
large-scale data harvesting that facilitated the voter pro ling that lies at the centre of 
the controversy. Most end-users would be wholly unaware that the code enabled this 
kind of behaviour until it was uncovered and publicised as part of a much larger public-
interest journalistic enquiry.48 is example demonstrates the problem that code’s 
opacity poses for ex post remedial measures: the fact that it took the UK Information 
Commissioner’s Office – an expert regulator – several months to investigate the nature 
of Facebook’s systems suggests it is highly unlikely individual end-users can be 
expected to understand what is actually going on. As Pasquale suggests, ‘[i]t could take 
weeks to fully map the ow of data from something as simple as commenting on 
                                                 
47  APIs enable otherwise unconnected software systems to communicate with one another, allowing 
the combination of systems with different specialities. Examples include the embedding of a 
mapping and GPS navigation system into a bicycle rental application or using a payment platform’s 
API to enable the purchase of virtual assets within a game.  
48  For a technical overview of how Facebook’s system worked and enabled the harvesting of end-users’ 
data, see ‘Investigation into the Use of Data Analytics in Political Campaigns - Investigation 
Update’ (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2018) s. 4.3.1. For one of the press stories which 
broke the scandal, see C. Cadwalladr and E. Graham-Harrison, ‘Revealed: 50 Million Facebook 






Facebook’.49 Furthermore, Facebook is quite clearly a prominent target for regulators, 
and its alleged role in election tampering means the case is of the greatest possible 
public interest.  
e question remains, however, of the extent to which less signi cant code 
infelicities might be operating all around us that are never detected or remedied, 
because the scrutiny and impetus to investigate ex post are relatively minimal or simply 
absent. As Gürses and van Hoboken note, ‘the ideological markers, pools of desirable 
knowledge and practices of technology production that bring these sets of [ex post] 
conditions forth and not others tend to go unquestioned.’50 e effects of 
computational legalism make code resistant to the modulating effects of interpretation 
and ex post remedial measures that are more readily effective in the realm of traditional 
text-based law. It is clear, therefore, that in addition to those traditional ex post 
methods of redress, we should aim for ex ante code legitimacy. In light of these 
observations and the recommendations of a handful of scholars – including Goldoni, 
who I quoted at the beginning of the chapter – I adopt this alternative ex ante focus 
on design and the production of code-based artefacts. 
e legal-theoretical analysis I adapt is based in part on Wintgens’ theory of 
legisprudence, an aspirational framework that considers how legislators can achieve 
formal legitimacy in the process of creating new legislative norms.51 Legal theory has 
in general been concerned more with ex post judicial reasoning and interpretation than 
with the process of legislative creation; as Wintgens notes, ‘the way law is created 
                                                 
49  See his e Black Box Society: e Secret Algorithms at Control Money and Information (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2015) p. 144. For a set of fascinating maps of Facebook’s internal 
algorithms and data ows visualised by a team of media theorists see ‘Immaterial Labour and Data 
Harvesting’ <https://labs.rs/en/facebook-algorithmic-factory-immaterial-labour-and-data-
harvesting/>. 
50  Gürses and van Hoboken, supra n. 34, p. 580 (emphasis supplied). 
51  L. Wintgens, ‘Legisprudence as a New eory of Legislation’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 1. For an 




through the process of legislation does not appear on the screen of the legal theorist’.52 
Legisprudence, on the other hand, is speci cally aimed at the ex ante process of 
legislative law-making. Alongside other relevant theories that consider what makes a 
good rule, such as Fuller’s internal morality of law, legisprudence is therefore an 
interesting platform for carrying out ex ante assessments of other forms of normative 
rule-making. It aims to engender sensitivity to numerous factors in the creation of 
legislation that are presently lacking in the privately-ordered sphere of ‘code-as-law’. 
By adapting and importing the principles of legisprudence into the design context I 
will provide a mechanism through which the creation of a normative order by and 
through code can be made (more) legitimate from the outset, thus limiting the negative 
effects of computational legalism.  
e remainder of this chapter sets out the overarching narrative of the thesis in 
more detail, as well as sketching the proposed synthesis and introducing case study 
technologies which exemplify some of the problems identi ed. Later in Chapter 5 
these will be discussed in practical terms, viewed through the lens of the 
digisprudential framework.  
1.4 Legitimacy vs. ‘compliance by design’ 
e thesis may appear super cially to be concerned with ‘compliance by design’ (CbD). 
Although the term is open to interpretation, I understand it to refer to compliance 
with speci c elds of substantive doctrinal law, for example data protection or 
intellectual property. is is in line with the terminological usage of initiatives like 
‘privacy by design’, expressed doctrinally in Recital 78 and Article 25 of the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation under the rubric of ‘data protection by design’.53 
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is is a clear example of orthodox technology regulation, where the focus is the 
regulation of software by substantive doctrinal law. From the perspective of the current 
thesis, this is a limited and inherently legalistic view that looks upon the law as a set of 
rules that is ‘just there’, to be passively observed and obeyed by the designer of code. It 
also narrows our focus, directing it away from the broader range of techno-effects that 
play as important (and indeed larger) a part in regulating behaviour as does legally-
sanctioned code.54 A perspective of code based solely on this understanding of 
‘compliance by design’ is unsatisfactory, or at least incomplete, because it elides the 
very active role that designers play, consciously or otherwise, in the creation of such 
normative ‘reality’ in and through the code that they produce.55 
Broader views of ‘by design’ that are closer to the focus of the thesis do exist, 
however. For example, Nemitz refers to ‘the principles of democracy, rule of law and 
human rights by design’.56 Similarly, Hildebrandt de nes her concept of ‘Legal 
Protection by Design’ as 
a way to ensure that the technological normativity that regulates our lives: rst, 
is compatible with enacted law, or even initiated by the democratic legislator; 
second, can be resisted; and third, may be contested in a court of law.57 
One can see how Nemitz’s and Hildebrandt’s concepts include more fundamental 
issues than simply compliance with a given area of substantive doctrine. Nevertheless, 
to avoid the possibility of causing confusion, I will avoid attaching yet another concept 
to the already over-burdened phrase ‘by design’. Hildebrandt’s and Koops’ previous 
formulation of ‘ambient law’ comes close to the idea at hand, where what matters is 
not (just) compliance with the substantive law, but the kinds of constitutional 
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safeguards that law as an enterprise is expected to provide regardless of its substantive 
content. ey describe the difference thus: 
ese requirements [democratic enactment and contestability] constitute the 
difference between our concept of Ambient Law on the one hand and the 
technological enforcement of legal rules on the other. Ambient Law 
represents the technological articulation of legal norms as a form of 
democratic legislation, requiring both democratic participation and built-in 
safeguards that guarantee the contestability of the decisions made within the 
legal-technical infrastructure.58 
While the authors are concerned with the re ection of state-sourced law in code, it 
can equally be said that code which embodies normativity that is not state-sourced 
ought also to embody ‘safeguards’ in order for it to be legitimate. In this context, where 
commercial enterprise is the source of the normativity, the requirement of democratic 
participation in the design of code is perhaps unlikely to be achievable by smaller 
enterprises with limited resources.59 Initiatives connected with this goal include 
constructive technology assessment,60 value sensitive design,61 and ideation.62 I 
explicitly do not consider such approaches in the thesis, because their focus tends to 
individualise the idea of ‘constitutional’ standards that I am aiming for, focusing on 
the practices of an individual designer and how they impact on a given design project, 
                                                 
58  Hildebrandt and Koops, supra n. 32, p. 445. See also M. Hildebrandt, ‘A Vision of Ambient Law’ 
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technological xes (Oxford; Portland, Or: Hart, 2008). 
59  Papadopoulos et al., supra n. 25. 
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rather than at the commercial institutional level. Such initiatives seek to legitimise a 
design by the bare fact of having involved stakeholders in decisions as to its substantive 
characteristics. By contrast, the ‘constitutional’ perspective of digisprudence comes 
earlier than the question of whether stakeholders have had their views taken into 
account. Design for all need not require design with all;63 the characteristics of 
legitimacy that I discuss are formal rather than substantive and ought to be present in 
all end-user-facing technologies regardless of their substantive purpose. In that vein, 
then, we can say that digisprudence is to participatory design approaches as 
legisprudence is to the democratic process; they are separate but complementary 
elements in the norm-creation process.  
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1.4.1 Normative relationships online 
To clarify the location of the enquiry further, we can visualise the normative 
relationships in the digital sphere using the vertical model below:64 
Relationship (a) represents the classic compact between the citizen end-user and the 
state (the latter being bound by a constitution), where democratic participation results 
in the state’s promulgation of legal norms through both that relationship and 
relationship (b). e latter represents the traditional understanding of ‘compliance by 
design’, where the state promulgates legal normativity in the form of substantive 
                                                 
64  is model is adapted from the triangular diagram in M. Birnhack and N. Elkin-Koren, ‘ e 
Invisible Handshake: e Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment’ [2003] Virginia 
Journal of Law & Technology para. 119 et seq, adding the constitution, technological normativity, and 
the ‘programmer-of-the-programmer’ (discussed infra in section 1.4.1.2). 




doctrinal laws that tell designers (and enterprise generally) of their duties in the 
creation of products and services. We have seen already how this relationship differs 
from the focus of the thesis.  
1.4.1.1 e commixture of law and code 
e thesis is focused on relationships (c) and (d). In relationship (c), the product 
designer imposes behavioural constraint through a mix of legal and architectural 
normativity. e legal normativity in this relationship can ow from public-order 
norms (legislation of various forms) on the one hand, or private-order contractual 
norms on the other. ese will be operationalised by (i) the traditional force of law, 
operating outside the design of the artefact, (ii) their implementation in and through 
that design, or (iii) a mixture of the two. In scenarios (ii) and (iii), code complements 
law.65 Examples of this include encryption used to implement data protection 
requirements (which ow from a public-order norm in relationship (b)), or a rewall 
containing rules that prevent an employee’s computer from accessing social media 
websites (which ow from a private contractual norm).  
Crucially, while code can complement legal norms, it can also supplant them 
altogether.66 Separately from these architectural implementations of public or private 
legal norms, code can also implement normativity that is purely technological, which 
is to say rules that enable and constrain behaviour outside of any legal requirement, 
public or private, to do so. Here, norms are created, intentionally or otherwise, that 
have a regulative effect on end-users’ behaviour.67  
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Whether or not these assemblages of code rules aim explicitly to 
instrumentalise legal norms, they by de nition exist separately from the law-system’s68 
corpus of rules. Understood traditionally, the legal force of the data protection statute 
or the employment contract applies regardless of either instrument’s implementation 
in or through code. But a corollary arises from this: it is precisely in the separateness 
of the two mechanisms of regulation that the architectural force of code, which 
implements some form of (potentially legally-signi cant) normativity, is able to 
‘supplant the legal infrastructure of the state’.69 Whereas the data protection statute or 
employment contract ‘hovers’, waiting to be interpreted, complied with, and perhaps 
declared (in)applicable by a court, code simply goes ahead and enforces some 
alternative con guration of behavioural constraint which might not comport with 
either the substantive law (the speci c statute, contract, or the whole corpus of legal 
rules) or, if its rules were not designed to implement a speci c legal norm, the standards 
of legitimacy according to which I argue all substantive behaviour-constraining norms 
should be made.  
1.4.1.2 e programmer of the programmer 
Relationship (d) exists between what Vismann and Krajewski term the programmer of 
the programmer70 (‘PoP’) and the product designer. e PoP designs the tools that the 
product designer in turn uses to create the products and services that are ultimately 
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destined for the end-user. Situated at a more ‘constitutional’ level of the product design 
process, the decisions made by the PoP fundamentally impact on what the product 
designer can and cannot do. In this way, the PoP has a crucial power to de ne the rules 
of the design game before it even begins. is idea of ‘technological constitutionalism’, 
which I link with Hart’s foundational concept of primary and secondary rules,71 
suggests one locus for the operationalisation of formal principles that can constrain the 
substantive design of code to encourage legitimacy. is idea will be discussed again 
in Chapter 2, where it is described in greater detail,72 and Chapter 6, where it is 
suggested as a way of implementing the ‘constitutionalism’ of the digisprudential 
framework.73 For now, I continue mapping out the overarching skeleton of the thesis, 
to be eshed out more fully in later chapters. 
2. Code is law(-like) 
As mentioned above, a core element of Lessig’s thesis is that end-users’ behaviour is 
regulated by four modalities: law, social norms, the market, and architecture. His fear 
was that, given the power of code to de ne the rules of behaviour in cyberspace, and 
given the inherent exibility of designers to choose those rules,74 the risk arises that 
they might be captured by state interests mandating (through relationship (b)) 
backdoors and other anti-civil liberty measures.75 His general prescription to avoid this 
risk is a culture of transparency, including actual transparency, in the form of open 
source code.76 Mayer-Schönberger suggests that Lessig’s perspective is too dependent 
on free market orthodoxy, and that a fuller idea of how code regulates requires greater 
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sensitivity to the social embeddedness of technological development.77 He argues in 
favour of a less deterministic approach, and the integration of science and technology 
studies (STS) perspectives. is is echoed by Cohen, who argues that without the 
insights of STS ‘one cannot explain how code regulates.’78 In any event, Lessig’s 
analysis does not include such perspectives, nor does it include the connected topic of 
design practice (all of which is the subject of Chapter 2). Here lies a point of departure: 
whereas Lessig is interested in the abuse of power by the state, my primary interest is 
in the abuse of the power of private enterprise in regulating end-user behaviour, and 
in how design practice can be shaped to avoid this.  
But the question remains – is code law? Vismann and Krajewski refer to the 
‘structural homologies’ between law and computers.79 Code instantiates law in 
technological artefacts, and while those artefacts too are constituted to some extent by 
law (e.g. through contracts, intellectual property, etcetera), the relationship is lopsided. 
ere exists an inherent ‘hermeneutic gap’ between the legal norm printed on the page 
and its instantiation in the physical world via interpretation and behavioural change. 
In the computational context, law is not nearly as powerful as we might suppose, 
because it is subject to the very medium it is attempting to regulate, and the immediacy 
and instrumental power of that medium and the ‘sovereignty’ of the designer in 
shaping its effects tip the balance against law as hegemonic regulator. e written law 
is rendered ‘a paper dragon in the age of the “digital tsunami”’,80 with the social and 
rhetorical power of legal ctions making way for the representationalism of ‘digital 
virtuality’, whereby reality is constituted by and through the machine.81 Adjudication 
                                                 
77  V. Mayer-Schönberger, ‘Demystifying Lessig’ [2008] Wisconsin Law Review 713. 
78  J.E. Cohen, Con guring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice 
(Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2012) p. 27. 
79  Vismann and Krajewski, supra n. 70, p. 92. 
80  Hildebrandt and Koops, supra n. 32, p. 440. 




is thus potentially collapsed into obedience,82 since the rule in the code also represents 
reality for the end-user. Representationalism is a key theme in legalism and is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 3.83 
Fuller de nes law as ‘the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules’.84 As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, code quite clearly subjects 
human conduct to the governance of rules; rules which increasingly constitute the 
‘terms and conditions of existence and action’.85 ey may not be rules as we commonly 
understand them,86 but they are designed by humans with a purpose in mind, and 
should therefore be subject to scrutiny as to their legitimacy. As Lessig puts it, 
‘[a]rchitecture is a kind of law: it determines what people can and cannot do. When 
commercial interests determine the architecture, they create a kind of privatized law.’87 
e power that inheres in those who decide on that privatisation is signi cant: 
e quasi-sovereign power of the computer engineer’s code stems from the ease by 
which posing, implementing, and applying a norm are achieved in technology 
compared with the cumbersome procedures that legal code must pass through. 
e swift effectiveness of a technological code, which cannot, when seen 
through legal eyes, appear as anything other than uncanny, renders any possible 
competition between law and computer pointless.88 
Architectural constitutions supplant legal constitutions; code is not just law-like, rather 
it is both more and less than law. As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, it is more than law 
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because of the instrumental power of design to constitute and regulate end-user 
behaviour. But it is also simultaneously less than law, because as Chapter 3 explains it 
lacks the normative mechanisms designed to keep its textually-bound sister in check. 
is is what Hildebrandt points to when she says that ‘technologies that are 
constitutive for [sic] our interactions may enforce compliance beyond anything that a 
written law can achieve.’89 It is precisely because architectural constitutions are not law 
per se, but nevertheless have law-like power to regulate, that it is necessary to instantiate 
the sorts of constitutional protections I am concerned with. While code constitutions 
are not law as traditionally de ned, if we take a legal pluralist90 perspective we can 
identify, through a comparison of the regulative aspects of traditional law and code, 
which of the checks and balances we expect to be present in the former are absent in 
the latter.   
Whereas traditional regulative norms derive their legitimacy from the 
institutions and traditions of the rule of law within constitutional democracy, code-
based norms do not necessarily have the same democratic connection. As Winner puts 
it, ‘technological innovations are similar to legislative acts [which require] the same 
careful attention one would give to the rules, roles, and relationships of politics.’91 As 
will become clear in Chapter 3, this kind of attention is precisely what traditional 
legalism prohibits. Whereas legal normativity invites the citizen to comply (she always 
has the notional option to interpret the norm, contest it, or to ignore it entirely), 
technological normativity can make compliance a necessity, either in the form of 
imposing a response to a circumstance or by constituting at the outset all the courses 
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of action that the end-user can possibly take. e fact that code is not ‘law’ per se is not 
relevant; as Fuller demonstrates in his discussion of a college dormitory’s parietal rules, 
law-systems exist in many contexts that have no explicit or implicit connection with 
the state;92 what matters is when they ‘subject human conduct to the governance of 
rules.’93 As Le Sueur puts it in relation to automated public administration, ‘we should 
treat “the app” (the computer programs that will produce individual decisions) as “the 
law”… [i]t is this app, not the text of the legislation, that will regulate the legal 
relationship between citizen and state in automated decision-making.’94 Precisely 
because of the supreme efficacy with which code achieves this regulation, what Lessig 
calls ‘perfect control’,95 it is imperative that the creators of private code are, like public 
law-makers, constrained by ex ante standards that ensure both legitimacy during 
operation and the possibility of ex post remediation.  
2.1 e design of behavioural constraint 
How is behaviour in practice enabled and constrained by code? Chapter 2 considers 
three main theoretical perspectives on this question: affordance, inscription, and 
technological mediation. To summarise these, an artefact’s affordances are the ways in 
which it can be used by a particular end-user, determined according to the 
characteristics of both the artefact and the individual.96 Affordances can (and, 
depending on the incentives involved, ought to) be signi ed to the end-user, so that 
she can understand what her behavioural possibilities are. By contrast with the 
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enablement of affordance, the idea of disaffordance – which builds on Lessig’s concept 
of ‘architectures of control’97 – is concerned with the conscious choice of a designer to 
embed mechanisms within the artefact which ‘enforce or restrict certain user 
behaviour’.98 Inscription is the idea of embodying a particular ‘story’ in the design of 
the artefact, dictating the end-user’s behaviour by de ning a narrative (of which 
affordances are the building blocks) of what she can and should do with it.99 Taken in 
aggregate, (dis)affordances and inscriptions are the building blocks of technological 
mediation, the postphenomenological theory concerned with how the end-user’s 
perception and actions, and in turn her agency, are affected by the artefact.100  
e attributes of an artefact are designed with a particular class of end-user in 
mind, and so the code’s (dis)affordances, inscriptions, and mediations are all 
fundamentally affected by the choices made by the designers who produce them. 
Although some effects are emergent or open to (re)interpretation and/or resistance by 
end-users, it is nevertheless the case that design choices embed path-dependent 
‘programs of action’101 in artefacts, thus highlighting the signi cant normative power 
that inheres in their creators. When a designer embeds (dis)affordances in the design 
of her artefact, she affects what it is possible to do with that artefact, either expanding 
or contracting those possibilities.  
is design perspective is complemented in Chapter 3 by a legal-theoretical 
perspective that considers the characteristics of code from the perspective of legalism. 
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2.2 Computational legalism 
One of the central problematics of code from a legal-theoretical perspective is its 
‘ruleishness’, meaning its application of de ned rules in all instances where certain 
xed conditions, speci ed in the code itself, obtain.102 In the technical context this is 
of course a major bene t: even the most complex body of rules can be expected to 
execute in pre-determined ways under what are ideally precisely-de ned and 
controlled conditions, giving a notional predictability that facilitates rapid incremental 
innovation that has played a central role in the development of modern technological 
society. 
In the legal context, however, the rote application of rules is undesirable, at 
least in a society built around the ideals of democracy and the concept of legality. 
Linked with the Kantian categorical imperative, legalism is the jural equivalent of 
software code’s ruleishness. Although it has more than one form in the literature, the 
conception that I adopt, closely connected with legal positivism,103 is seen as an 
ideology under which rules and the strict adherence to them are the proper fundaments 
of social ordering.104 at the state de nes what is legal is enough to legitimise the 
substance of the legal norms it chooses to declare; in constituting the eld of play (the 
legal system), the state legitimises de facto that which it consequently promulgates as 
the rules of the game. Constitutive facts (natural laws, the social contract/constitution, 
or a mix of these) operate prospectively to legitimise any subsequent act of the 
sovereign.105 e citizen is given the imperative to ‘not think about it’; the rule is ‘just 
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there’ and she need only act in accordance with it as written,106 since by virtue of those 
constitutive facts the pronouncement of the sovereign is ‘imputed to [the people], as if 
they were its author.’107 As an outlook, then, legalism tends towards a ‘narrow 
governance of rules, unleavened by the principled approach to interpretation.’108 is 
simplicity implies the notional possibility of abuse: the prioritisation of heteronomy 
militates against critical re ection and the application of other normative principles of 
legality that are aspirational characteristics in a democracy. e freedom of the citizen 
to interpret is seen as a crucial aspect of legality, without which rules become 
‘implements of tyranny’ and legalism a ‘vice of narrow governance’.109  
From this brief summary of legalism (the concept is expanded on in detail in 
Chapter 3110), one can begin to appreciate how code can exemplify these 
characteristics.111 Even in the most tyrannical state there is space to interpret, and 
perhaps to disobey – the hermeneutic gap between the text of a norm on the page and 
its translation into behaviour in the world makes this at least a notional possibility. In 
the environments where code is designed, however, the elision of that gap is not only 
easy to do but is entirely standard, not necessarily through malice or intentional 
obfuscation (although they are certainly a problem112), but simply by the underlying 
characteristics of code, which by nature presents norms to the end-user that ‘just are’. 
Even where the code does allow for choice via changeable settings, the default 
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con guration of code tends to be seen by end-users as ‘a natural and immutable fact’.113 
e hermeneutic gap is thus closed, or at least signi cantly narrowed, because the ‘text’ 
of the ‘rule’ (the source code) constitutes directly the geography of the artefact: they 
are not just isomorphic, they are one and the same. Unlike traditional law, whose 
‘carrier’ has hitherto been the inherently passive medium of text, software code allows 
us to, in Latour’s words, ‘conceive of a text (a programming language) that is at once 
words and actions’.114 is potentially represents the apex of legalism: the normative 
collapses into the descriptive (what was once requested becomes simply what is), and 
there is no choice but to obey the rule as it is expressed by the designer, much less to 
view and contest it, since it by de nition constitutes empirical as well as legal and 
technological reality.115 e characteristics of computational legalism – ruleishness, 
opacity, immediacy, immutability, and pervasiveness, each compounded by privatised 
production – mean that in many cases code is simultaneously more powerful and less 
adaptable than a law-system that is built around the characteristics of delay, exible 
interpretation, and ex post remediation. Code is thus simultaneously more, and less, 
than law.  
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3. Aspiring to legitimacy in code 
If the rote rule-bound heteronomy of legalism is sited at one end of a spectrum, at the 
other end can be found the aspirational concept of legality, which aims to maintain a 
connection between the normative construct of law as a system of behavioural 
constraint and the legitimising principles that underlie the exercise of sovereign power 
in constitutional democracies. While legality is not a wholly settled concept, it has 
received some treatment from technology law scholars, and has a theoretical pedigree 
that includes in uential analyses that t well with the aspirational normative approach 
I adopt. Legality is considered to be of fundamental importance in constitutional 
democracies; Bańkowski goes so far as to say it is ‘something worth living for; 
something worth dying for.’116 Hildebrandt de nes legality by what for her it is not: 
legal certainty, ‘justice’, and expediency on their own are insufficient; the characteristic 
of legality also encompasses the rule of law and the binding of the sovereign to 
constitutional rules in its wielding of legislative power.117 For Brownsword, legality is 
about human dignity and the creation and maintenance of conditions that ‘make moral 
community possible’. Legality, then, is not just about the substance of regulation, but 
also its form.118 is idea of purpose binding speaks to the ex ante, ‘constitutional’ 
nature of the analysis I am advancing. rough the guidance of designers’ production 
of technological normativity, we can help ensure that the negative outcomes toward 
which computational legalism tends are minimised as far as possible. 
3.1 From operation to production 
I have already mentioned brie y the importance of widening our focus to include the 
production of code, in addition to the orthodox ex post assessment of its operation. 
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is relates to the de nitions of legality just set out – one can appreciate the relevance 
of the ‘design’ of a rule to the question of whether it meets those standards. Whereas 
legalism looks only to sources to discern validity, legality is something altogether more 
re exive and rational,119 seeking evidence of certain requirements in the rule-making 
process. ere is a clear alignment here between this view of legality and the shift in 
the literature towards design thinking I mentioned above. 
3.1.1 Fuller’s internal morality of law 
Exploring the legal theory further, this idea of rule production connects with Fuller’s 
seminal theory of the internal morality of law, which he argues is maintained by 
upholding his eight principles of legality.120 ese principles provide an underlying 
substrate which is necessary for the creation of good substantive laws, regardless of 
how reasonable it may be to dispute their substantive content – their ‘external morality’. 
I consider the principles and their connection to code in greater detail in Chapter 4.121 
One question that several of the principles point towards is how best to design a legal 
norm, regardless of what its external morality is or ought to be. Indeed, Fuller uses the 
language of design on various occasions, referring to law-making as a ‘craft’122 and to 
the eight principles as ‘those laws respected by a carpenter who wants the house he 
builds to remain standing and serve the purpose of those living in it.’123 His distinction 
between the internal and external moralities of law is connected with what Goldoni 
refers to as the difference between ‘input’ and ‘output’ reasons for decision-making,124 
and one can also see a connection to Hart’s theory of primary and secondary rules, 
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which separate substantive ordinances from the rules which set out how they should 
be created, modi ed, and extinguished.125 I discuss these concepts in greater detail at 
various points later in the thesis. For now, the second signi cant theory that I draw 
upon is Wintgens’ legisprudence.  
3.1.2 Wintgens’ legisprudence 
Wintgens places an even stronger focus than Fuller on the characteristics that proposed 
norms ought to have, and how guidance of their formal characteristics can have a 
bearing on their legitimacy. e theory is built around the idea that upholding 
individuals’ subjective notions of freedom ought to be a guiding principle of both 
politics and law, and that any limitation on that freedom by rules (legislation) is only 
legitimate if it is justi ed (a standard met according to the requirements of the 
legisprudential framework of principles).126 While delity to rules remains a necessary 
part the legal order, this delity is via a ‘weak’ legalism which, unlike the stronger form 
described above (and in Chapter 3127), requires those rules to be formulated according 
to principled ex ante standards and not simply through the exercise of the sovereign’s 
raw power. Following rules thus becomes acceptable because those rules, if they have 
been legitimated by the application of the principles of legisprudence, cannot be 
arbitrary, and are otherwise legitimated by the framework. e legisprudential 
threshold of justi cation is met when the cumulative requirements of its four principles 
are taken into account in the design of a new legislative norm. In summary, the 
principles are concerned with whether a binary rule is desirable, whether the proposed 
norm is proportionate to the issue the legislator seeks to address, whether its design 
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enables an on-going assessment of its efficacy, and nally whether it is coherent at the 
semantic, temporal, intra-systemic, and extra-systemic levels.128 
As suggested above, computational legalism can represent the apex of strong 
legalism. e impetus to legitimate the exercise of power by designers whose code vies 
with law to regulate behaviour is therefore all the greater. Designers limit individual 
and collective freedom in ways that have not been rati ed by the democratic polity, via 
mechanisms that are technically and socially opaque, and which are not 
straightforwardly susceptible to public contest, redress, and (judicial) review. ey are 
therefore potentially illegitimate exercises of power, and their negative effects are 
difficult to arrest or ameliorate when diffused across potentially millions of devices, 
often with little or no technical means of applying retrospective xes.  
3.2 Towards a digisprudence: the affordance of legitimacy in code-as-law 
Koops suggests that ‘a good place to start looking for criteria for acceptability of 
normative technology is to study criteria for law.’129 My search has taken me to the 
Fullerian and (especially) the legisprudential principles, concerned as they are with 
providing criteria for good law-making. Undoubtedly the two theories do not map 
directly onto the digital context, and so in Chapter 5 I translate them into the language 
of affordance, in order ultimately to set out a framework for ensuring legitimate rule-
making in the commercial design environment.  
Fuller’s principles have to an extent been applied to code before, with mixed 
results. Asscher was the rst consider to them in the context of code, where he adapts 
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them for the digital environment.130 Although his subsequent analysis is far from 
exhaustive,131 it does provide a proof-of-concept for the kind of enquiry I am carrying 
out. Brownsword too considers the principles from the perspective not of design per 
se, but of the policies that are intended to be instrumentalised by it.132 In Chapter 4 I 
discuss in greater detail the literature in this area, including these two analyses,133 but 
for now it can be said that neither application of Fuller to code engages with design 
theory or practice. In terms of legisprudence, to my knowledge there has to date been 
no application of Wintgens’ theory as a principled framework for guiding the design 
of code-based normativity. 
As Chapter 5 sets out, the proposed framework consists of a set of 
digisprudential affordances that translate the principled goals that I distil from the 
literature into concrete suggestions for the design of code. In brief, these cover 
contestability, transparency of provenance and purpose, transparency of operation, 
choice, delay, and oversight.134 e affordances are simultaneously general and 
concrete: they provide a design goal that should be re ected in all legitimate end-user-
facing code, regardless of the form of technology, its substantive functionality, or the 
underlying business model. A corollary to be borne in mind is that certain 
functionalities or business models will therefore be illegitimate a priori.  
ere may be edge cases where the affordances are less easy to envisage or 
implement. However, like the legal-theoretical foundations upon which it builds, 
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digisprudence is aspirational: both legisprudence and the Fullerian principles are 
intended to encourage better (if not perfect) rule-making, and so similarly it is not 
expected that the digisprudential framework will cover every conceivable scenario 
where normative code is being produced. As Fuller suggests, perfect legality is 
‘utopian’;135 Wintgens notes in a similar vein that respect for the legisprudential 
principles is about ‘the aspiration to do the job as well as possible’.136 e same can be 
said of its technological counterpart that I propose in this thesis. 
4. Case studies 
To give the thesis a grounding in contemporary technologies, in Chapter 5 I consider 
the digisprudence framework from the perspective of blockchain applications and the 
Internet of ings (IoT). Before I outline those case studies and their contemporary 
and future relevance, it is perhaps worth giving some historical context by mentioning 
an example that demonstrates many of the issues I am concerned with, namely digital 
rights management.  
4.1 Digital rights management 
As I discussed above in section 1.4, it is important to distinguish between compliance 
with substantive law (copyright, in the case of digital rights management), and broader 
and more fundamental questions of legitimacy. Digital rights management (DRM) 
systems have of course most commonly been concerned with preventing copyright 
infringement, but the term covers a broad range of approaches to code-based 
regulation.137 is is demonstrated by the Sony BMG scandal in the mid-2000s.138 To 
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summarise, the record company Sony BMG included DRM software on several of its 
CD releases that was designed to limit the scope of playback, as well as of end-users’ 
ability to copy the music either to digital les or to a blank CD. e code forced these 
operations to be performed via software on the CD, which installed itself 
surreptitiously on end-users’ Windows PCs without notifying them. Upon insertion 
of the CD, if the code detected CD copying software already installed on the 
computer, it would cease playback and eject the CD.139 Any copies made using the 
system were themselves protected by the same restrictions.140  
ese measures might appear super cially reasonable vis-à-vis the prevention 
of copyright infringement. All was not as it appeared, however. Microsoft researcher 
Mark Russinovich discovered that the DRM system was also contacting Sony BMG’s 
servers, ostensibly to update album artwork and lyrics, and in the process it was 
undermining end-user privacy by sending Sony BMG both the ID of the CD being 
played and the end-user’s IP address.141 e end-user was not informed of this 
functionality or given the opportunity to disable it.142 
We can brie y consider the Sony BMG code through the lens of 
computational legalism. It bears repeating that those characteristics must all be viewed 
in light of the overarching issue of the code’s private production. Not only was Sony 
BMG itself a commercial enterprise, but it outsourced production of the DRM 
systems to two third-party software rms, suggesting that Sony BMG may not have 
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known the full extent of the software’s (mis)behaviour.143 Regarding the other 
characteristics, the system’s code self-evidently imposed rules upon the end-user: her 
use of the music CD on her PC was constrained by policies set by the designer: music 
could be played, but only using the included software; the CD could be copied, but 
only if no other copying software was installed on the PC and again only using the 
included software. e system was opaque in its operation: those rules were not 
transparent, the system installed itself surreptitiously before the end-user granted 
permission (and even if she withheld consent),144 and the full extent of its operation 
was not made clear even in the license agreement, which in any case was inaccurate.145 
While the end-user might reasonably have expected the system’s operation to relate to 
the playing of the music, it is ‘almost certain’ that she would not anticipate that 
inserting the CD would ‘open security backdoors into [her] computers and allow 
remote monitoring of the activities and knowledge of [her] machine con guration’.146 
Similarly, the system’s immediacy was evidenced by the nature of its installation – end-
users without deeper technical knowledge had no opportunity to refuse its installation 
on their machines, despite there being a license agreement requiring notional 
acceptance. Furthermore, the cumulative normativity of the system was felt most by 
those least likely to attempt to circumvent it: infringers were more likely to be 
technically adept and therefore capable of side-stepping the DRM, while lawful end-
users with less technical literacy had their rights and convenience circumscribed despite 
not wishing to engage in unlawful copying. 
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e system’s con guration of functionality, including the ‘phoning home’ 
behaviour, was imposed upon the end-user without consent or choice. e system was 
included on CDs which are impervious to change, and it had no pre-designed means 
of updating the software ex post to provide mechanisms to re-establish protection of 
the end-user’s rights and/or enable her to express her preferences (this is evidenced by 
the release by Sony BMG, after the scandal started to gain prominence, of patches 
purporting to uninstall the software. ese patches in fact caused further serious 
security problems147). As Halderman and Felten note, ‘[i]f a particular version of DRM 
software is shipped on a new CD, that software version may well try to install and run 
decades after it was developed.’148 Lastly, the system achieved signi cant distribution, 
if not pervasiveness: up to two million users were affected,149 and in the fallout of the 
crisis Sony BMG recalled around 7.3 million CDs.150  
As I have already emphasised, these characteristics of the code’s normativity 
can be critiqued separately from its implementation of the substantive norms of 
copyright law.151 As Halderman and Felten note,  
e design of DRM systems is only weakly connected to the contours of 
copyright law. e systems make no pretense of enforcing copyright law as 
written, but instead seek to enforce rules dictated by the label’s and vendor’s business 
models. ese rules, and the technologies that try to enforce them, implicate 
other public policy concerns, such as privacy and security.152 
Precisely because of the formal illegitimacies identi ed above, the ability of the end-
user to be aware of and contest the mis-implementation of substantive copyright law 
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was severely limited. To Halderman and Felten’s suggested public policy concerns I 
would therefore add that of legitimacy, as embodied in the digisprudential affordances. 
By that standard the characteristics of the Sony BMG system were illegitimate 
regardless of substantive legal doctrine, and should not have been designed as they 
were, particularly given that if Russinovich had not uncovered the issues with the 
code’s design – its embodiment of computational legalism – those issues may well have 
continued to operate for some considerable period without being detected and 
remedied. 
As mentioned, DRM is not a case-study per se, but it does give a avour of the 
issues I am concerned with. e next two sections introduce the ‘forward-looking’ case 
studies that will be returned to throughout Chapter 5 as a means of discussing the 
digisprudential framework. 
4.2 Blockchain applications 
e rst case study focuses on so-called ‘smart contracts’ built upon the foundation of 
blockchain technology (later I shift from the term ‘smart contract’ to ‘blockchain 
application’, for reasons I will explain below). Like DRM, smart contracts represent 
another very explicit example of the embodiment of rules that have normative 
signi cance within the fabric of a digital artefact. Blockchain technology is still 
maturing153 – the Bitcoin paper that proposed its initial design was published in 2008154 
and the rst blockchain went live in January the next year155 – but its implications and 
the massive publicity surrounding it156 are the subject of increasing scrutiny from the 
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legal academy. While the publicity given to a particular technology should not in itself 
be enough for it to merit academic attention, the peculiarly ‘legal’ aspects of smart 
contracts raise questions that are of explicit interest to legal scholars.157 Although 
increasing scepticism is being expressed about the practical value of blockchains,158 
these legal issues are worthy of scrutiny if only to con rm various aspects of the 
sceptics’ arguments. 
4.2.1 Blockchain design 
What follows is a summary of the main characteristics of blockchains,159 which it is 
necessary to understand in order to appreciate the relevance of smart contracts, which 
are built upon blockchains, to the thesis. Blockchains are public160 databases (or 
‘ledgers’ – hence the term ‘distributed ledger technology’, or ‘DLT’, a term occasionally 
used instead of ‘blockchain’) which are stored on a number of computers (‘miners’) 
which together constitute a peer-to-peer network. To add to the chain requires 
consensus among the network’s nodes, and so a new ‘block’ of data will only be added 
if a majority of the miners agree that its addition is in accordance with the set of rules 
that govern how that particular blockchain should operate.161 ese rules are known as 
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the blockchain’s ‘protocol’, and they de ne how the blockchain operates and what the 
incentives and costs are for participants. ese include the miners who provide the 
network’s infrastructure, and the end-users who transact through it. Two prominent 
examples of different blockchain protocols are Bitcoin,162 a cryptocurrency and the 
original application of a blockchain design, and Ethereum,163 the rst blockchain to 
support sophisticated automation through the provision of a decentralised computing 
platform (the Ethereum Virtual Machine) which supports various general-purpose 
programming languages. 
e protocol includes a mechanism for the miners to reach consensus on what 
should be included in the blockchain, including both metadata about transactions that 
have taken place and new smart contracts that will be executed by it. e question of 
how to reach consensus among anonymous computers is connected with what is 
known as the ‘Byzantine fault problem’, where the networked nodes each have a 
different understanding of the precise state of the chain (given that there are multiple 
simultaneous copies), but consensus must be reached for the system to be workable. 
Blockchain protocols overcome this using a combination of public key cryptography 
and ‘hashing’.164 e former is a mechanism for uniquely and conclusively identifying 
each node within the network by a public signature (key), while the latter is a method 
for generating a unique signature (hash) from any given volume of data (in this case, 
the existing prior state of the blockchain). Each block is given a unique hash, which is 
generated from a combination of that block’s data and the hashes of all the blocks that 
are already on the chain. is means that, provided the last block in two copies of the 
chain have the same hash, one can be completely con dent that the copies of the chain 
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are identical all the way back to the rst block, and that therefore neither copy has 
been tampered with.  
When a miner solves the mathematical challenge speci ed in the chain’s 
protocol (this is how new blocks are added, for which the miner receives a reward), the 
proposed solution is broadcast to the network for the other miners to verify. ey 
independently generate a new hash from the existing state of the chain and the 
proposed solution broadcasted by the ‘winning’ miner, and if the solution meets the 
requirements of the protocol’s rules, each miner adds the block to their local copy of 
the chain. In this way the copies of the chain are kept identical and up-to-date across 
the many miners that store them. An important corollary of this proposal mechanism, 
particularly its use of hashes that represent the historical state of the chain, is that once 
a block has been added its contents are both immutable165 and veri able by observers.166  
Copies of the blockchain, including both its protocol and the data that it stores 
(e.g. transaction metadata, account balances, smart contract code) are replicated across 
the network, providing resilience through decentralisation.167 Disabling (even 
physically) one of the network’s computers will not delete the blockchain or prevent 
the code it stores from executing. In this way the design is similar to that of 
ARPANET, the precursor to the modern Internet, a communications network 
designed to be resistant to the underlying infrastructural network becoming 
damaged.168 is lack of centralised authority controlling what gets added to the chain 
is part of the ideology behind the technology: provided participants follow the rules 
contained in the protocol, they get the bene ts of a tamper-resistant, ‘trustless’ 
database with no centralised controlling authority.  
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4.2.2 ‘Smart contracts’? 
At present blockchains are probably best-known as the foundation of cryptocurrencies, 
but another related application that is potentially more disruptive from a legal 
perspective are so-called ‘smart contracts’ (SCs). SC platforms provide varying levels 
of sophistication. e Bitcoin protocol provides some very basic programming 
capabilities which can allow very limited SCs to be written. Some other platforms, 
known as ‘sidechains’, provide more sophisticated computation that runs separately 
from the primary Bitcoin blockchain but which rely on its relative stability as the 
ultimate store (ledger) of transaction activity.169 Yet others are completely separate 
from the Bitcoin blockchain, providing both an independent transaction ledger and a 
protocol that is speci cally designed to provide a more sophisticated programming 
foundation for SCs. Of these ‘smarter’ platforms, Ethereum is the most prominent170 
and therefore I focus on it in the following discussion.  
According to the project’s whitepaper, Ethereum is a ‘next-generation smart 
contract and decentralized application platform.’171 What Ethereum seeks to do is 
compliment the powerful architectural characteristics of blockchains with a fully-
edged programming execution environment. Programming languages have been 
specially created172 that can compile code to be executed by the Ethereum platform, 
raising the possibility of supporting computationally-rich functionality with the 
immutability, robust decentralisation, and ‘trustless trust’ of blockchains. e notional 
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result is that the innovative possibilities of software’s plasticity can be undergirded with 
the stability inherent in the ‘anti-plasticity’ of blockchains. 
‘Smart contracts’ combine ‘Turing-completeness, value-awareness, 
blockchain-awareness and state’,173 meaning they can de ne complex conditions, 
execute arbitrary behaviours when certain conditions are met, maintain and monitor 
states over time, and record the outcomes in the immutable blockchain. All of this 
takes place automatically; once conditions are de ned in the ‘contract’ it remains ‘live’, 
awaiting the appropriate change(s) in conditions to trigger the rules it contains. In this 
sense smart contracts are not passive instructions on what the contracting parties should 
do, in the way that traditional legal contracts are, rather they are ‘more like 
“autonomous agents” that live inside of the Ethereum execution environment, always 
executing a speci c piece of code when “poked” by a message or transaction’.174 
Multiple SCs can be bundled together by a central business logic (itself written 
in code and stored on the blockchain) to create a ‘distributed organisation’ (‘DO’)175 
and even a ‘distributed autonomous organisation’ (‘DAO’), which can operate without 
any human input.176  ese artefacts’ logic enables, disables, and manages individual 
SCs, using them as tools to effect external changes according to the rules prede ned 
in the code. A DO could, for example, require a majority vote from its (human) 
members as a condition of a given smart contract being triggered. Again, the 
decentralised and ‘trustless’ nature of blockchain design obviates the need for a trusted 
centralised authority (a traditional board or committee), and so notional governance 
of the organisation can be achieved even where the membership is geographically 
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dispersed, or even unknown.177 A DAO, on the other hand, could consult external 
sources of data, known in this context as ‘oracles’,178 to check for particular conditions 
in the real world, executing predetermined code-based logics when certain thresholds 
are met. is DAO code might then create real-world effects by interacting with the 
APIs of other services. When coupled with a cryptocurrency, it becomes possible to 
effect automated commercial transactions, even using APIs to automatically involve 
human actors, such as so-called ‘gig economy’ personnel,179 or physical devices such as 
drones, for example to deliver goods.180  
e power of such code is intuitively appreciable. When speci c conditions 
that are computationally representable are met, the code self-executes according to its 
internal logic, and the outcomes are enforced regardless of any (relevant) external 
circumstances or considerations. With the outcomes of the code’s execution being 
stored in the underlying blockchain alongside the code itself, what this means is both 
its logic and its results are immutable once they are ‘enacted’, executed, and stored. 
us code, in a very real and legally-signi cant sense, becomes ‘law’, through the 
‘collapsing [of] contract formation and enforcement into a single instrument’.181 is 
coincidence of form and substance mean that when a smart contract is executed, the 
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material effects of that execution are governed by the dictates of pure code, regardless 
of any ambiguity or subjective understanding that might exist in the minds of the 
humans involved. One can appreciate the parallel with the discussion of computational 
legalism in section 2.2 above, noting that code is at once rule and reality; the normative 
collapsed into the merely descriptive. 
4.2.2.1  ‘Contract’ and the problem of terminology 
We saw above in section 1.2 the tension between the goal of regulating code using law 
(i.e. achieving compliance by design), and the idea that it can also be a separate 
normative order that while regulable by law also requires, because of computational 
legalism, additional ex ante formal standards that can guide its development. e use 
of the term ‘contract’ somewhat muddies the waters by implying that SCs are 
traditional legal contracts that have simply been rendered ‘smart’ by the addition of 
some technology, akin to a ‘smart’ electricity meter or a ‘smart’ doorbell.  
However, that an SC is also a legal contract is by no means a given, and the 
use of the term ‘contract’ has served to confuse more than to enlighten. e freedom 
that SC designers have to create normative architecture is not limited by the formal 
rules required for contract formation within the institutional law (e.g. Hart’s secondary 
rules182 or MacCormick’s institutive rules183). While it is possible that the institutional 
law will develop to declare that SCs will be recognised as traditional legal-institutional 
contracts, this is currently by no means a settled question.184 It is potentially possible 
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to automate parts of a traditional legal contract, but the point at which an SC shifts 
from a tool for enforcing a traditional contract to being a legal contract itself lies on a 
spectrum that is currently the subject of discussion across various jurisdictions.185 On 
that spectrum, the extent of automation can be anything from the (minimal) wrapping 
of traditional legal contract text within code in order to facilitate provenance checking 
and to prevent tampering with the text,186 to the (intermediate) inclusion of code 
parameters in a traditional legal contract that facilitate some computational interaction 
with the contract,187 to the (maximal) embodiment of the entire contractual logic 
within code. e latter is of course what SCs aim to do (although work to document 
SC code for natural language intelligibility is ongoing – this is discussed in Chapter 
6). Although some US jurisdictions have attempted to de ne the various terms for 
legal purposes, this has not been unproblematic.188 
At any rate, the technological normativity embodied in an SC in no way hinges 
on it being recognised as ‘legal’ per se. is is, of course, to restate the central argument 
of the thesis: the code in the SC can impose normativity and instrumental effects 
directly, without any consideration of the law’s requirements for validity. is 
confusion of legal/non-legal effect is arguably deepened by the fact that SCs are indeed 
intentionally designed to effect operations that are quintessentially legal, for example the 
transfer of funds or assets between parties. For this reason, Buterin recently lamented 
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adopting the term ‘smart contract’ (originally coined by Szabo in the 1990s189), 
suggesting that a better name would have been something ‘more boring and technical’, 
such as ‘persistent scripts’.190 Similarly, Felten suggests that it is best to think of SCs 
not as contracts but as ‘mechanisms’.191 Noting the lack of consensus on terminology, 
Clack et al. make a useful distinction between on the one hand ‘smart legal contracts’, 
which are traditional legal contracts that are merely expressed in code and are intended 
to operate like their text-based counterparts (whose legal status is, as noted above, not 
yet settled), and on the other ‘smart contract code’, which simply intends to enforce 
the content of the code, regardless of any purported legal status.192 Although these 
differing goals might overlap in future, for now it is useful to view the former as a 
technology for legal practice (i.e. ‘legal tech’), and the latter as the form of ‘a-legal’ 
normative code with which I am concerned. 
One can perhaps appreciate from the preceding discussion the subtleties of 
implementation and terminology that are involved, and the complications that arise 
from using legal language in an ‘a-legal’ context.193 In any event, the moniker ‘contract’ 
(and the outcome of investigations into their legal status) notwithstanding, we can 
view SCs as simply as another species of privately-produced normative code that 
embodies the design characteristics of (dis)affordance and inscription discussed in the 
next chapter. Indeed, Buterin’s alternative name (‘persistent script’) is interesting in 
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193  For an argument in favour of decoupling SCs from legal language to avoid confusion and their 





part because it suggests an unintended connection with the latter concept, which is 
concerned with the guiding ‘stories’ designed into an artefact that determine how it 
might be used – in the case of SCs such inscriptions are particularly strong. Because 
their design has normative effects, they are still therefore susceptible to the application 
of ex ante standards of legitimacy developed later in the thesis.  
Bearing in mind all of the above, I suggest that to avoid bolstering any incipient 
confusion about terminology it might be helpful (i) to expressly think of smart 
contracts as ‘a-legal’ instead of ‘legal’ per se (this helps to frame them as simply another 
species of normative code), and (ii) to use a term other than ‘smart contract’. Clack et 
al.’s ‘smart contract code’ moves in the right direction but still uses the misleading word 
‘contract’, so I propose therefore to use the term ‘blockchain application’ hereinafter. 
is term seems appropriate because, as with other software applications it does not 
imply any inherent legal status, and simultaneously it maintains a connection to the 
underlying blockchain technology that embodies many of the characteristics of 
computational legalism with which I am concerned. 
4.3 e Internet of ings  
Compared with blockchain applications, the Internet of ings (IoT) is perhaps a 
simpler (but no less important) area to conceptualise and analyse. In the early 1990s 
Mark Weiser, a pioneer of what has variously been termed ‘ambient intelligence’194 and 
‘ubiquitous computing’, spoke of the profundity of technologies that ‘weave themselves 
into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it’.195 e US 
Federal Trade Commission has de ned the IoT as ‘devices or sensors – other than 
computers, smartphones, or tablets – that connect, communicate or transmit 
                                                 
194  Hildebrandt and Koops, supra n. 32, p. 430f. 
195  M. Weiser, ‘ e Computer for the 21st Century’ [1991] Scienti c American 94. Weiser was 




information with or between each other through the Internet.’196 is focus on sensors 
and devices other than traditional platforms (computers and smartphones/tablets) 
implies the ‘weaving into daily life’ to which Weiser referred. Indeed, IoT devices are 
designed to do precisely this, both ubiquitously and invisibly, and as such are becoming 
an increasingly signi cant proportion of the total number of devices connected to the 
Internet.197 is is in part due to a ‘chip-centric mentality’, where manufacturers have 
bought into commercial hype suggesting that a connected device is better than an 
unconnected one.198 e results of this are occasionally absurd.199 
IoT devices both illustrate the design theories mentioned above and exemplify 
numerous aspects of computational legalism, especially opacity, immutability, and 
pervasiveness. Because they are intended to be embedded and pervasive, they by nature 
tend towards both minimal affordances and very strictly-de ned inscriptions. e 
Amazon Dash Button, for example, consists of just a single button and an LED 
indicator. Its inscription is thus a simple one of ‘press the button’, and its design affords 
that and little more (‘adhesion’ and ‘throwing’ are perhaps the only alternative action 
possibilities). As I describe in more detail in Chapter 5,200 behind this apparent 
simplicity and minimal interface lies a complex series of technical events that are kept 
hidden from the device’s end-user but which are potentially of great importance to her 
                                                 
196  ‘Internet of ings: Privacy and Security in a Connected World’ (Federal Trade Commission, 2015) 
p. 6. 
197  IDC forecasts a 15.4% increase in spending on IoT devices compared with 2018. See M. Torchia 
and M. Shirer, ‘IDC Forecasts Worldwide Spending on the Internet of ings to Reach $745 
Billion in 2019, Led by the Manufacturing, Consumer, Transportation, and Utilities Sectors’ IDC 
(Framingham, Mass, 3 January 2019) 
<https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS44596319>. 
198  W. Hartzog and E. Selinger, ‘ e Internet of Heirlooms and Disposable ings’ (2016) 17 North 
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 581.  
199  For a frequently-updated selection of examples that demonstrate this, see the Twitter account 
@InternetofShit, available at <https://twitter.com/internetofshit>. 




(imagine the device being mis-used by a young child or pet).201 As with other 
computing systems, the extent to which complex logic should be hidden from the user 
is one which will vary depending on the system in question. Nevertheless, the central 
issue of transparency about what lies beneath the physical device’s ‘tip of the iceberg’ 
is a crucially important one. IoT devices, particularly those that have a single function 
like the Dash Button, generally combine simple physicality on the part of the object 
with complex and opaque computation on the ‘back-end’. ere is therefore signi cant 
scope for dissonance between the end-user’s understanding of the device’s affordances 
and what it in fact does.202 
In terms of immutability, the poor infrastructural provision made for updates, 
coupled with a lack of commitment to long-term oversight, have resulted in many 
examples of IoT devices being used as nodes in bot-nets, being left open to external 
hacking, and other forms of unintended breach.203 is lack of exibility, when coupled 
with the devices’ intended pervasiveness, is potentially deeply problematic.  
ese problems can even combine with those of blockchain applications – as I 
mentioned above, the latter are capable of effecting changes in the physical world via 
IoT devices, such as drones204 and ‘smart’ devices. e combination implies the concept 
of ‘smart property’, where the hybrid IoT-blockchain artefact is autonomous, such that 
the IoT device’s physical functionality is controlled by the logic contained in the 
blockchain application (for example a smart door lock might refuse to open after a 
code-based ‘lease’ expires205). 
                                                 
201  ‘Internet of ings: Privacy and Security in a Connected World’, supra n. 197, p. 22. 
202  A. Matassa and R. Simeoni, ‘Eliciting Affordances for Smart Objects in IoT Era’, Internet of ings. 
User-Centric IoT (Springer, Cham, 2015).  
203  Hartzog and Selinger, supra n. 198. 
204  See references supra n. 180. 




5. Conclusion and recap 
Before moving onto the substantive chapters of the thesis, this section recaps the broad 
argument and how this connects with the analysis that is to come. Firstly, code can 
have regulative effects on behaviour that are more pervasive and direct than law is 
capable of. e various design mechanisms by which it achieves this are discussed in 
Chapter 2. e regulative effects form a corpus of norms that are separate from (and 
indeed may con ict with) institutional law. e characteristics of code – what I call 
computational legalism – mean that in many cases that separate normative order will 
be enforced whether or not it is compatible with substantive doctrinal law. I describe 
the elements of computational legalism in Chapter 3. 
Secondly, in a democratic society, norms that regulate citizens, of any kind and 
from any source, ought to be legitimate. In the legal context this can be achieved by 
the application of ex ante theoretical frameworks such as Fuller’s principles of legality 
or Wintgens’ legisprudence, both of which I discuss in Chapter 4. ese legal-
theoretical approaches are concerned with the form of the legal norm that is created, 
as distinct from its political content. Legitimacy on this account acts as a kind of design 
constraint, which through the binding of the sovereign to the inclusion of certain 
formal characteristics limits to some extent what the substantive content of a norm can 
be.  
irdly, given that in the private contexts where code-based norms are 
designed there are no such formal principles for norm-creation, the question then 
arises of whether the mechanisms of producing legitimate normativity in the legal 
sphere might be transposed into the computational sphere. Some form of ex ante 
legitimation is crucial, because the instrumentality of computational legalism is 
potentially more problematic than illegitimate legal norms that – because of the 
hermeneutic gap between text and action – can be ignored, re-interpreted, or contested 




Fourthly, any such legitimation of a code rule must, by de nition, take place at 
design time because, unlike the institutional law, there is little or no scope for 
reinterpreting the code after-the-fact; code and reality are one from the point of 
distribution onward. I therefore adapt the ex ante frameworks of legitimation from the 
legal world for their application to code, taking into account design theory and the 
ways in which code actually regulates. In bringing these various theoretical strands 
together I set out the framework of digisprudential affordances in Chapter 5, and 
consider their application to the two case studies. Chapter 6 discusses potential avenues 
for operationalising the digisprudential framework, including aspects of the design 
environment, the constitutional role of the programmer of the programmer, and how 
contestability can be provided for. e thesis then concludes in Chapter 7, 
summarising the research ndings and some opportunities for further work that I have 










A design perspective: code is more than law1 
e computer programmer, however, is a creator of universes for which he 
alone is the lawgiver… [n]o playwright, no stage director, no emperor, 
however powerful, has ever exercised such absolute authority to arrange a stage 
or a eld of battle and to command such unswervingly dutiful actors or troops.2 
 
e swift effectiveness of a technological code, which cannot, when seen 
through legal eyes, appear as anything other than uncanny, renders any 
possible competition between law and computer pointless.3 
1. Introduction 
is chapter sets out, using the literature on design theory, how code has a concrete 
and direct effect on the behaviour of end-users. is contribution is then picked up in 
Chapter 5 where I use these same concepts to formulate the novel framework of 
digisprudential affordances. e engagement of the legal literature with these theories 
has until recently been minimal; the tendency has been to treat design only in the 
abstract, without a concerted engagement with the theory on what things actually do, 
and how they do it. Without such engagement the legal view of technology is limited 
to that of an outside observer, rather than one that can engage with the processes of 
material production from which the effects of code ow. As I suggested in the 
introductory chapter, and will consider in greater depth in Chapter 4, a focus on 
production is crucial if the aspiration of legitimacy is to be realised in the 
computational paradigm. 
                                                 
1  Signi cant parts of this chapter were published in L. Diver, ‘Law as a User: Design, Affordance, 
and the Technological Mediation of Norms’ (2018) 15 SCRIPTed 4. 
2  J. Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation (San Francisco: 
Freeman, 1976) p. 115. 




roughout the thesis I refer to the concept of technological normativity. 
Borrowed from Hildebrandt,4 I use the term because it usefully implies a contrast 
between code’s normativity and the concept of legal normativity that lawyers are more 
familiar with. Her de nition of it is also closely linked to the theory of affordance, 
which I explore in detail in section 2 below. She de nes technological normativity as 
‘the way a particular technological device or infrastructure actually constrains human 
actions, inviting or enforcing, inhibiting or prohibiting types of behaviour.’5 ese 
effects can be intentionally or unintentionally imposed by the designer, and can be an 
immediate or emerging characteristic of the code she creates. Hildebrandt also makes 
a useful distinction between regulative and constitutive normativity, which I discuss 
below in section 3.5.1, and again in the legal-theoretical context in Chapter 3.6  
e remaining discussion in this chapter sets out three primary and 
interconnected theories: affordance, inscription, and the technological mediation of 
perception and action. Taken together, these theories provide us with the conceptual 
tools to consider the behavioural effects of a particular artefact’s design. From a 
normative perspective, they also provide a theoretical backdrop for thinking about how 
consciously to choose and re ne those effects in the process of producing code, in order 
to meet the standards of legitimacy that the thesis proposes. 
2. Affordance 
e facilitation by an artefact’s design of a particular action or behaviour for a particular 
individual is known as an affordance. e concept was originally developed in the late 
1960s by the perceptual psychologist James Gibson, who de ned affordances 
                                                 
4  M. Hildebrandt, ‘Legal and Technological Normativity: More (and Less) than Twin Sisters’ (2008) 
12 Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 169 passim. 
5  Ibid., p. 173. 




collectively as what an artefact ‘offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for 
good or ill.’7 e theory of affordance was later developed and introduced into the 
design sphere by Norman, who de nes the concept as ‘a relationship between the 
properties of an object and the capabilities of the agent that determine just how the 
object could possibly be used.’8 As an example, a common representation of the 
concept of affordance compares two doors, one with a panel for pushing, and another 
with a handle that can be pulled:9 
For an able-bodied person, the door on the left can only be pushed – i.e. it only affords 
pushing – because there is no part of it that affords pulling (unless one manages to grip 
the edges of the panel). e handle on the door on the right affords both pulling and 
pushing – the ability to grasp it readily enables the end-user to pull the door towards 
                                                 
7  J.J. Gibson, e Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Classic Edition, New York: Psychology 
Press, 2015) p. 119 (emphasis supplied). e concept originated in J.J. Gibson, e Senses Considered 
as Perceptual Systems (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). 
8  D.A. Norman, e Design of Everyday ings (Cambridge, Mass; London, UK: MIT Press, 2013) 
p. 11. 
9  Norman discusses this ibid., p. 15. See also W. Hartzog, Privacy’s Blueprint: e Battle to Control the 
Design of New Technologies (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2018) p. 13. 
Door only  
affords pushing 
Door affords pulling 
(and pushing) 




her (assuming of course that the door’s hinges afford pulling in that direction). e 
door on the right has at least two affordances (again for an able-bodied person): one 
of pulling, and another of pushing. 
Individual affordances can be both positive and negative, which is to say 
bene cial and injurious to the end-user, each to varying degrees. Gibson is careful to 
avoid the value judgements suggested by the terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, stating 
instead that such descriptions can be applied objectively if their meanings are ‘pinned 
down to biological and behavioral facts’.10 So, for example, a re can afford the warmth 
that is necessary to life, but it can also afford burning, which can mean injury and 
potentially death.11 e extent of the bene t or injury will depend on the organism in 
question. Affordances are therefore not objective physical properties of the artefact, 
but rather they arise through the relationship between it and a particular individual, as 
governed by those properties. Gibson illustrates this relationship through the 
examination of a hypothetical walking surface: 
Note that the four properties listed – horizontal, at, extended, and rigid – 
would be physical properties of a surface if they were measured with the scales 
and standard units of physics. As an affordance of support for a species of 
animal, however, they have to be measured relative to the animal. ey are 
unique for that animal. ey are not just abstract physical properties. ey are 
unity relative to the posture and behaviour of the animal being considered. So 
an affordance cannot be measured as we measure in physics.12 
us, a surface that affords support to a domestic cat (i.e. it is ‘stand-on-able’13) may or 
may not afford the same to an adult elephant; the particular mix of physical properties 
and the size and weight of both animals will determine which capabilities are afforded 
                                                 
10  Gibson, supra n. 7, p. 129. 
11  Ibid., pp. 128–129. 
12  Ibid., p. 120 (emphasis supplied). 




to each. It can be seen, then, how the concept highlights the inherent and simultaneous 
objectivity and subjectivity of an artefact’s potential effects in the world. As Norman 
puts it,  
[t]he presence of an affordance is jointly determined by the qualities of the 
object and the abilities of the agent that is interacting… [w]e are used to 
thinking that properties are associated with objects. But affordance is not a 
property. An affordance is a relationship. Whether an affordance exists 
depends on the properties of both the object and the agent.14 
With these de nitions in mind, it can be appreciated that designers must include the 
necessary properties in the artefact in order for the desired relationship between it and 
the organism (end-user) to arise. is is inevitably a contingent exercise – the designer 
cannot anticipate the properties of every conceivable end-user; nevertheless, a central 
aspect of the design enterprise is having an audience in mind whose properties will 
imply the properties that the code must have in order to bring about the affordance 
relationships the designer wishes there to be.15 
2.1 Real and perceived affordance 
Importantly, an affordance need not be perceived in order to exist; it is an objective 
fact about how the properties of the artefact and the organism relate to one another.16 
Affordances are potentials that may not be within the organism’s awareness and may 
never be realised, but nevertheless the relationship is always present and ready to be 
                                                 
14  Norman, supra n. 8, p. 11. 
15  J.R. Maier and G.M. Fadel, ‘Affordance-Based Methods for Design’, Proceedings of DETC 
(Chicago, Illinois: e American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2003) p. 4. 




acted upon for as long as the properties necessary for it are extant in both the artefact 
and the organism.17  
is is what Norman refers to in later work as real, as opposed to perceived, 
affordance.18 For example, a particular fruit may afford nutrition to a particular species 
of animal, but if the animal is unaware of this the relationship will never be acted on, 
despite its extant potentiality. Perceived affordances are those which the organism 
‘picks up on’, which, as the example just given demonstrates do not necessarily 
represent the full range of relationships that exist between it and the artefact in 
question. e distinction is important in the digital context, because as Norman puts 
it, ‘in graphical, screen-based interfaces, the designer primarily can control only 
perceived affordances [because] the computer system already comes with built-in 
physical [i.e. real] affordances’.19 e potential discrepancy between real and perceived 
affordances is perhaps even more marked in the screen-less devices that are 
proliferating as part of the Internet of ings (this will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 520). 
Norman’s comment hints at an important truth about the power of the 
designer to control end-users’ perceptions through the choices they make in 
constituting an artefact’s interface. e corollary of this is that in controlling those 
surface perceptions of what is possible, other underlying (real) affordances can be 
hidden from sight (for example the ability to view and alter source code, or to submit 
false details to a registration system to avoid being tracked), or their hypothetical, 
imagined possibility supressed altogether (for example where end-users 
                                                 
17  See P. Nagy and G. Neff, ‘Imagined Affordance: Reconstructing a Keyword for Communication 
eory’ (2015) 1 Social Media + Society p. 3 and S. Faraj and B. Azad, ‘ e Materiality of Technology: 
An Affordance Perspective’ in P.M. Leonardi, B.A. Nardi and J. Kallinikos (eds.), Materiality and 
Organizing: Social Interaction in a Technological World (Oxford University Press, 2012) pp. 250–251. 
18  D.A. Norman, ‘Affordance, Conventions, and Design’ (1999) 6 Interactions 38. 
19  Ibid., p. 39. 




unquestioningly accept the default settings of a system without enquiring as to how 
the available options might better suit their preferences or interests. is is an issue 
discussed below, and again in Chapter 321). 
2.1.1 Signi ers 
e design of the artefact can incorporate signi ers which communicate to the end-
user the affordance that is present and how it should be used (this is an important part 
of the artefact’s normativity and is connected to technological intentionality, discussed 
below in section 3.4).22 For example, returning to Figure 2 above, the panel on the 
door on the left signi es where to push, while the handle on the door on the right 
signi es where to grasp (which in turns signi es pulling). Of course, in order to act as 
a signi er, that element of the artefact must be perceived by the end-user (it can, 
however, be ambiguous – the hinges of the door with the handle might also afford 
pushing, despite the handle signifying the affordance of pulling). e presence of 
signi ers is an important element of communicating to the end-user how the artefact 
works, but a signi er’s utility is also contingent on its accuracy, honesty, and 
completeness.  
e fact that function x is signi ed to the end-user of course does not entail 
that function y is also signi ed – the right functions must be signi ed at the right 
moment. e question of what to signify and when to signify it is therefore extremely 
important in helping her form an accurate mental model of the system;23 designs often 
afford functionalities without signifying them, perhaps to hide complex functionality 
from novice end-users who may not understand it, or perhaps to provide the 
functionality required by some external force (regulation, ethics) without actively 
bringing it to the attention of the end-user because its use might harm the commercial 
                                                 
21  Infra, section 3.5, and Chapter 3, section 3.3.1 (Default con gurations), respectively. 
22  Norman, supra n. 8, p. 13 et seq. 




interests of the provider. An example of this is the complex cookie preference notices 
that have appeared following the coming into force of the GDPR. While these often 
provide an interface for ne-grained control over which cookies are set on the end-
user’s computer (i.e. they afford control), the means of accessing this interface (a 
textual link) is usually much less prominent – less clearly signi ed – than the option to 
accept all cookies. If the end-user selects the latter this is of course commercially 
bene cial because it enables behavioural advertising which is more lucrative for the 
website’s providers. is type of adversarial design is an example of a ‘dark pattern’, 
which will be discussed in the next section. In sum, one can appreciate how important 
signi ers are in assisting the end-user to develop an appropriate mental model of the 
system she is using.24 
3. Infusing code with normativity 
As we have seen, affordances are relationships that arise according to the objective 
characteristics of an end-user and an artefact. In many cases they exist simply by virtue 
of those properties, as in the example of the surface that can bear the weight of – i.e. 
afford support to – an elephant. Affordances can of course also be consciously designed, 
however, making otherwise inert artefacts ‘usable’ for a certain class of end-user.25 
From the perspective of behavioural regulation, the conscious choices about how to 
make an artefact useful can develop into mechanisms that actively constrain or suggest 
particular courses of action, thus infusing the design not just with usefulness but also 
with regulative effect. at is the subject of this section. 
                                                 
24  e appropriate use of signi ers for achieving digisprudential legitimacy is discussed further in 
Chapter 5, section 3.2 (Opacity). 





Gibson’s notion of the positivity or negativity of affordances, discussed above, is 
concerned with the outcome occasioned by the affordance (e.g. a re warming and 
organism vs. burning it). is should be distinguished from both (i) the objective fact 
that interaction is prevented and the relationship therefore does not exist – what 
Norman terms an ‘anti-affordance’26 – and (ii) the subjective misapprehension as to 
the existence of the affordance, where the end-user misinterprets the information she 
is receiving and believes there to be a particular relationship between herself and the 
artefact when in fact there is none (or not the one she believes there to be). As an 
example of the latter, both Gibson and Norman provide the example of a glass pane 
covering an opening, which gives the end-user the erroneous impression of the 
affordance of passage. Norman’s ‘anti-affordance’, on the other hand, points simply to 
the objective fact that there is no such affordance, whether the end-user is aware of 
this or not (a blind individual, for example, is simply not afforded passage, regardless 
of her inability to see the glass and interpret what the opening might afford her).27 
ese two ideas can of course overlap – in the case of the glass pane the end-user 
misperceives the existence of an affordance of passage which is, in fact, not there. 
Drawing on Lessig’s discussion of ‘architectures of control’,28 Lockton takes 
the notion of ‘anti-affordance’ further, adding the element of intention that is less 
evident in Norman’s discussion. Lockton de nes architectures of control as ‘features, 
structures or methods of operation designed into any planned system with which a user 
interacts, which are intended to enforce or restrict certain user behaviour.’29 He 
discusses disaffordance in the context of DRM, including the Sony BMG scandal that 
                                                 
26  Ibid., p. 11. 
27  Gibson, supra n. 7, pp. 133–134; Norman, supra n. 8, pp. 11–12. 
28  L. Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006) ch. 4. 
29  D. Lockton, ‘Architectures of Control in Product Design’ [2006] Engineering Designer: e Journal 




was discussed in Chapter 1.30 Both Gibson’s ‘negative affordance’ (which is concerned 
with the ‘ill’ that is offered, provided, or furnished by the artefact) and Norman’s ‘anti-
affordance’ (which is concerned with the bare fact of the absence of a particular offering, 
provision, or furnishing by the artefact) are concerned with the ex post outcome of the 
affordance’s operation.  
‘Positive’ for Lockton means the philosophical sense of what is actually in 
existence, i.e. what is ex ante permitted by the norm-giver, versus what is not – there 
is a positive affordance of a particular action. e corollary for Lockton is that ‘negative’ 
affordance is about the engineering of obedience.31 He is concerned with the intent of 
the designer, which connects with my central theme of code’s production. Lockton 
suggests the term ‘disaffordance’ to describe designs that have ‘functionality 
deliberately removed… or with the functionality deliberately hidden or obscured to 
reduce users’ ability to use the product in certain ways, or a combination of the two.’32 
us, disaffordances are ‘deliberate, intentional, and strategic’, as opposed to 
inadvertent or the result of incompetent design. ey therefore embody a conscious 
value in a way which Gibson explicitly, and Norman implicitly, avoid. e term 
‘disaffordance’ has gained only modest traction,33 but it is instructive in encapsulating 
the idea of how an artefact can conceal, discourage, or forbid the possibility of certain 
behaviours as a result of conscious design decisions. In aggregate, one can appreciate 
the role played by disaffordances in constraining end-users in their interactions with 
an artefact. As Longford puts it,  
                                                 
30  Chapter 1, section 4.1 (Digital rights management). 
31  D. Lockton, ‘Disaffordances and Engineering Obedience’ 
<http://architectures.danlockton.co.uk/2006/10/22/disaffordances-and-engineering-obedience/>. 
32  Ibid. 
33  See D.E. Wittkower, ‘Principles of Anti-Discriminatory Design’, 2016 IEEE International 
Symposium on Ethics in Engineering, Science and Technology (ETHICS) (IEEE, 2016) p. 2 




[t]he recon guration of the terms of cybercitizenship which these 
technologies effect is achieved via a gradual process in which new habits, 
expectations and practices on the part of web users are cultivated and/or 
inculcated through subtle mechanisms of inducement, coercion, and reward 
designed into the very experience of cyberspace.34 
When disaffordances are designed that are contrary to the end-user’s interests, they 
are sometimes termed ‘abusive design’, and examples that exploit commonly-used 
design conventions for negative purposes have come to be known as ‘dark patterns’.35 
Such practices demonstrate the power of the designer to exploit the end-user for 
purposes which may not be in her interests; Conti and Sobiesk describe the ‘intent on 
the part of the designer to deliberately sacri ce the user experience in an attempt to 
achieve the designer’s goals ahead of those of the user.’36 ey set out a taxonomy of 
approaches used in malicious web interfaces, and provide representative examples that 
most end-users will be familiar with. ese include making form elds mandatory 
(coercion), use of double or triple negatives in questions (confusion), advertising 
(distraction), delaying access until an advert is watched (forced work), covering desired 
text with popups (interruption), hiding access to the free version of an application deep 
within a website’s navigation (manipulating navigation), reducing the contrast of 
closure buttons on adverts (obfuscation), and designing adverts to appear to be news 
content (trickery).37  
                                                 
34  G. Longford, ‘Pedagogies of Digital Citizenship and the Politics of Code’: (2005) 9 Techné: Research 
in Philosophy and Technology 68, p. 77 (my emphasis). 
35  ‘Deceived by Design: How Tech Companies Use Dark Patterns to Discourage Us from Exercising 
Our Rights to Privacy’ (Consumer Council of Norway (Forbrukerrådet), 2018) 
<https:// l.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-06-27-deceived-by-design-
nal.pdf>. 
36  G. Conti and E. Sobiesk, ‘Malicious Interface Design: Exploiting the User’, Proceedings of the 19th 
International Conference on the World Wide Web (Raleigh, North Carolina, USA: ACM Press, 2010) 
p. 271. 




A recent example that exhibited some of these characteristics was the popup 
GDPR acceptance screen shown to Facebook users following the Regulation’s coming 
into power in May 2018. e interface showed the well-known friends, messages, and 
noti cations icons in the usual top-right position behind the popup, but two of these 
had red circles superimposed, implying that there were messages and noti cations 
waiting. Unlike Facebook’s usual interface, however, the red circles did not contain a 
number, which would usually signify how many messages or noti cations the end-user 
had. When the end-user had gone through the GDPR acceptance process, the 
interface returned to normal, under which the red circles either disappeared if there 
were no messages or noti cations waiting, or were displayed including the actual 
number. e purpose of displaying the ‘blank’ red circles during the GDPR interface, 
therefore, was to incentivise the end-user to accept the terms as quickly as possible in 
order to gain access to the messages and noti cations that were purportedly waiting 
for her.38 e crucial point is that the circles appeared whether or not the end-user 
actually had any messages or noti cations, strongly implying a manipulation on the 
part of Facebook. Conti and Sobiesk note how such design practices can increase 
frustration and even render parts of the Web inaccessible for certain classes of end-
user, and that their primary aim is generally to increase revenue for website operators.39 
Stepping back from individual artefact-end-user relationships of 
(dis)affordance, the eld of postphenomenology and its theory of technological 
mediation provides another useful way to conceptualise the broader relationships that 
arise between code and end-users. is is the subject of the next section. 
                                                 
38  ‘Deceived by Design: How Tech Companies Use Dark Patterns to Discourage Us from Exercising 
Our Rights to Privacy’ supra n. 35, p. 29. is report gives a detailed account of the desktop interfaces 
Facebook used to communicate their GDPR update, which included numerous examples of dark 
patterns and manipulative design. 




3.2 Postphenomenology and code’s mediation of reality40 
Postphenomenology is an area of Science, Technology & Society (STS) studies that 
explores the relationships between individuals and artefacts, with an emphasis on the 
material qualities of particular artefacts per se.41 e focus is therefore on speci c 
aspects of an artefact’s design and how it creates reality for its user, as opposed to the 
position of a broadly-conceived ‘technology’ within a grander social or political 
narrative.42 Peter-Paul Verbeek describes postphenomenology as the analysis of the 
‘role played by speci c technologies in speci c contexts’,43 which asks what the 
normative effects are of their materiality on the mediation of the relationship between 
humans and reality. A central claim of postphenomenology is that technologies are 
neither wholly neutral nor wholly deterministic, and the ways in which their designs 
mediate reality place them somewhere between those two poles.44 e relationships 
between humans and artefacts are grouped into those of perception – what the 
individual thinks she can do with the artefact – and those of action – what she can 
actually do with it (recall the discussion above about the distinction between real and 
perceived affordances). Technological mediation is the ongoing construction and 
manipulation of these two relationships by and through artefacts, the result of which 
is the co-constitution of reality for the end-user. e end-user and the artefact, in 
                                                 
40  ere are various subtleties in the literature in this area that can occasionally be difficult to follow, 
particularly where similar concepts are referred to using different terms. My aim here is to 
demonstrate the normativity of code without becoming mired in those nuances. For a very useful 
clari cation of the relations between the various terms used in the literature, see P.-P. Verbeek, 
‘Materializing Morality: Design Ethics and Technological Mediation’ (2006) 31 Science, Technology, 
& Human Values 361, particularly at p. 368. 
41  P.-P. Verbeek, What ings Do: Philosophical Re ections on Technology, Agency, and Design (Penn 
State Press, 2005) p. 3. 
42  Ibid., ch. 1. 
43  Ibid., p. 7. 




bringing together their particular characteristics, constitute a new reality through their 
relationship. We can conceptualise the relationship as in Figure 3 below: 
One can appreciate the parallels with the theory of affordance; indeed, affordances are 
the individual building blocks that in aggregate make up the totality of technological 
mediation between a particular artefact and a particular end-user.45 As discussed above, 
designers play a central role in de ning what affordances a given artefact provides, and 
thus the reality created by the artefact’s mediation of perception and action is to a 
signi cant degree determined by choices made by the designer. is connects with the 
idea of constitutive normativity built into the architecture of an artefact, a topic 
discussed below in section 3.5.1. 
3.3 Code mediating perception 
Perception is mediated by technology through the ampli cation or reduction of aspects 
of the world.46 is relates to the signi ers discussed above: their design can draw the 
end-user’s attention to the possibility of a particular use, or perhaps ward her off or 
                                                 
45  A.H. Kiran and P.-P. Verbeek, ‘Trusting Our Selves to Technology’ (2010) 23 Knowledge, 
Technology & Policy 409. 
46  For an in-depth discussion of the various forms of perceptual mediation that goes beyond what is 
necessary for my purposes see D. Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth (Indiana 
University Press, 1990) p. 72 et seq. 




distract her from perceiving it. Signifying by itself has no direct coercive effect on the 
end-user, but by mediating her perception it does play an important role in shaping 
her comprehension of an artefact and her ability to form an accurate mental model of 
how it works and what she can and should do with it.47 is ability to transform reality 
as it is experienced by the end-user is one aspect of the power of design, particularly 
when it goes beyond what she can perceive of reality to include how she can and cannot 
act. is ability to determine how reality is experienced, both perceptually and in terms 
of behavioural agency, demonstrates ‘an important aspect of the non-neutrality of 
technology’,48 and points to the signi cant power that inheres in the designer who 
exercises control over the nature of those mediations. 
3.4 Code mediating action 
Whereas the technological mediation of perception ampli es or reduces what can be 
comprehended of reality, the technological mediation of action invites or inhibits speci c 
behaviours. is form of mediation is instrumental, in the sense that it exerts a 
physically or logically compelling force on the behaviour of the end-user, rather than 
merely a signal to comply. It is here, then, that the regulative nature of code is most 
apparent: the coercion of action by code (its ‘moreness’, to reference the title of this 
chapter) can be contrasted with the mere signal provided by a textually-bound legal 
norm. is important distinction, between the constitutive nature of code and the 
regulative nature of textual rules, is discussed further below at section 3.5.1, and again 
in Chapter 3.49  
                                                 
47  Norman, supra n. 8, pp. 26, 31. See also Hartzog, supra n. 9, p. 278. 
48  Verbeek, supra n. 41, p. 131. Verbeek speaks of perception being ‘transformed’, while Latour talks 
of action being ‘translated’. See B. Latour, ‘Where Are the Missing Masses? e Sociology of a Few 
Mundane Artifacts’ in W.E. Bijker and J. Law (eds.), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in 
Sociotechnical Change (MIT Press, 1992) p. 174 and passim. For my purposes, the difference in 
terminology is not materially relevant, hence the use of ‘transformations’. 




Code embodies a particular idea of how the designer intendeds the artefact to 
be used. is is what Latour calls a ‘program of action’,50 which like the script of a lm 
or play describes how the designer intends the artefact to be used or what its envisaged 
effect in the world ought to be. Akrich makes explicit use of this metaphor in her 
important analysis of inscription: ‘like a lm script, technical objects de ne a framework 
of action together with the actors and the space in which they are supposed to act.’51 
Designers envisage these elements of the ‘script’ when they design the artefact’s 
(dis)affordances: the framework for behaviour, the actors involved (both human and 
non-human52), and the space for action.53 e various constituents of the script will be 
determined according to the envisaged uses of the artefact and the business model the 
designer aims to uphold.54 
To give an example, a speed bump in a road has the inscription of ‘slow down 
when you approach me’,55 and its physical properties invite in the strongest terms a 
particular action – slowing down – on pain of serious damage otherwise being done to 
the vehicle.56 Latour might also say that the imposition of that action is ‘delegated’ to 
the speed bump (indeed, the description of the latter as ‘sleeping policemen’ implies 
                                                 
50  Latour, supra n. 48. See also M. Akrich, ‘ e De-Scription of Technical Objects’ in W.E. Bijker 
and J. Law (eds.), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change (MIT Press, 
1992). 
51  Akrich, supra n. 50, p. 208. See also Verbeek, supra n. 40, p. 362. 
52  Actor Network eory (ANT), whose literature Akrich and Latour are central contributors to, 
explicitly avoids creating a hierarchy between humans and non-humans, instead using the model of 
a at web to describe the in uences operating between disparate ‘actants’. See generally Latour, supra 
n. 48. 
53  Akrich, supra n. 50, p. 208. Latour terms this anticipation ‘preinscription’. See Latour, supra n. 48, 
p. 172. 
54  B. van den Berg and R.E. Leenes, ‘Abort, Retry, Fail: Scoping Techno-Regulation and Other 
Techno-Effects’ in M. Hildebrandt and J. Gaakeer (eds.), Human Law and Computer Law: 
Comparative Perspectives (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013) p. 76. 
55  Verbeek, supra n. 40, p. 366. 




this re-assignment of the task from a human to a non-human agent).57 is coercion 
of action by the speed bump can be contrasted with the merely signifying effect of a 
speed limit sign, whose inscription only describes, rather than physically mandates, the 
required action.58  
In other work, Latour describes the example of the Berliner lock, whose design 
means that once its end-user is inside the room, if she wishes to close the door she is 
forced also to lock it.59 e inscription in the lock’s design thus limits the possible 
states that the end-user can leave the door in to one of either (i) open, or (ii) closed 
and locked; there is no in-between state permitted by the design of the lock (i.e. closed 
and unlocked). is is a physical example of the binary ‘ruleishness’ of code, a core 
element of computational legalism discussed in Chapter 3.60 
Akrich’s and Latour’s concepts of inscription, programs of action, and 
delegation are closely related to the postphenomenological idea of technological 
intentionality. Some examples from the latter eld can serve to further illustrate the 
normative power of the designer to guide the end-user’s behaviour. First, Ihde 
contrasts the technological mediations of a fountain pen and a word processor.61 e 
former implies a slower pace of action that inclines the writer towards taking time and 
considering her sentences before putting pen to paper, while the latter permits 
something closer to the speed of the spoken word, with additional facilities that allow 
the text to be edited, moved around, and refactored with ease and speed. Neither the 
                                                 
57  Latour, supra n. 48, p. 157f and passim. See also Verbeek, supra n. 41, p. 159f. 
58  e connection of these concepts to the legal notions of constitutive and regulative norms and the 
jurisprudential concept of the internal and external perspective of norms is discussed infra in section 
3.5.1 (Constitutive and regulative normativity). 
59  B. Latour, ‘ e Berlin Key or How To Do Words with ings’ in P. Graves-Brown (ed.), Matter, 
Materiality and Modern Culture (London: Routledge, 2000). See also Latour, supra n. 48, p. 172 et 
seq. 
60  Chapter 3, section 3.1 (Ruleishness). 




pen nor the word processor conclusively predetermine the mode of writing – both 
permit writing that can be anywhere between slow and considered, or fast and careless 
– but their respective designs do ‘promote or evoke a distinct way of writing.’62 Second, 
and towards the more overtly political end of the normativity spectrum, Verbeek 
describes how the mayor of the Romanian city of Cluj had the municipal gardeners’ 
rakes shortened so that they could no longer lean against them, thus promoting harder 
work through the discouragement of ‘laziness’. As Verbeek describes the situation, 
Action had to be taken because the rake, en passant, made possible an entirely 
different practice, one that was not anticipated but that arose only in the 
practice of raking. e rake mediates the relation between the workers and the 
public gardens; it is not merely a means but plays an active role in the way this 
relation takes shape.63 
Winner’s oft-quoted discussion of Robert Moses’ bridges on New York’s Long Island 
suggests a similar politicisation of artefacts. In that case, the bridges were reportedly 
designed intentionally to be too low for public buses to pass beneath them, thus 
preventing those reliant on public transport (which at the time meant to a 
disproportionate degree the poor and racial minorities) from accessing the public 
beaches to which the road that ran under the bridges led.64  
Each of the examples above demonstrates the rst postphenomenological sense 
of ‘intention’, where through the provision of ‘a framework for action, [artefacts] do 
form intentionalities and inclinations within which use-patterns take dominant 
shape’:65 the speed bump intends to slow drivers down; Moses’ bridges intend to prevent 
                                                 
62  Verbeek, supra n. 41, pp. 114–115 (emphasis supplied).  
63  Ibid., p. 115 (emphasis supplied). 
64  L. Winner, ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’ [1980] Daedalus 121. Although Winner’s account has since 
been questioned (see B. Joerges, ‘Do Politics Have Artefacts?’: [2016] Social Studies of Science), his 
example nevertheless demonstrates the concept effectively. 




access by the poor and minorities to public beaches; the Berliner lock intends that a 
closed door always be locked; the rake handles intend to prevent leaning and to 
promote work; word processors intend the efficient (re)composition of text. is rst 
sense refers to ‘a certain directionality, inclination or trajectory that shapes the ways in 
which [artefacts] are used’,66 and is of course intimately connected with what 
(dis)affordances the designer embodies in the design. 
e second sense of intentionality refers not to a property of the artefact but 
rather to the end-user’s intention, and how the artefact mediates her relationship with 
the world by dictating what she can and cannot do.67 e end-user’s sense of her own 
agency, and of the possibilities in the world which that agency can interact with, are 
mediated by the artefact, thus blurring the line between subjectivity and objectivity.68 
When she sets about to achieve something, her perception of what she can do and 
what the world permits are mediated by the artefact, and thus so too are her 
understanding of her self and her world co-constituted through the lens of that 
mediation.69 ‘ e world’ here is not an external truth; rather it is constituted by the 
particular individual who lives in it, as she is by it. e operation is mutual and bi-
directional – she makes her world and her world makes her, and that ‘making’ is 
nudged this way or that by the artefacts’ technological mediation, as comprised by its 
(dis)affordances.  
                                                 
66  Verbeek, supra n. 41, p. 114. 
67  Ibid., p. 116; Ihde, supra n. 46, p. 25. 
68  Shedding the ‘modern’ dichotomy of subject/object is a prime goal of postphenomenology, and of 
Actor Network eory. See Verbeek, supra n. 41, p. 161 et seq. See also Faraj and Azad, supra n. 17, 
pp. 237–238. 
69  Verbeek, supra n. 41, p. 116. is echoes Cohen’s suggestion that ‘as we struggle to shape our 
technologies and con gure our artifacts, they also and quite literally con gure us’. See J.E. Cohen, 
Con guring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice (Connecticut: Yale 




Contextual changes result in different con gurations of mediation, of both 
perception and action. is is what Ihde terms the multi-stability of an artefact: it can 
facilitate different acts depending on the context of use, the individual using it, and 
the con guration of the artefact itself. As Verbeek puts it, ‘[a]rtifacts can only be 
understood in terms of the relation that human beings have to them.’70 Artefacts exist 
for the purpose of doing something, but that something is not determined entirely by 
the artefact itself but also by how a particular user approaches it at a particular time 
and within a particular context.71 Moses’ Long Island bridges demonstrate this 
contextual dependency: over time their normative effect has lessened as those who were 
intended to be excluded have become wealthier and less reliant on public transport. 
Multi-stability refers to how differing contexts can result in different concrete uses of 
an artefact, the sum of which implies the absence of an ‘essential’ purpose. Akrich 
makes a similar argument in relation to inscription: while the designer will envisage 
some kind of role for the end-users of the code she creates, and it is from this image 
of the end-user that the inscription of the design is ultimately derived, in practice the 
domain of action is not absolutely predetermined and will to some extent be adapted 
‘in the wild’.72 
Although the absence of an essential purpose implied by multi-stability means 
that the mediating effect of an artefact is not entirely within the ex ante control of the 
designer, she will nevertheless ‘inscribe scripts and delegate responsibilities’ in and to 
the artefacts she designs.73 ere is also the logical necessity that in creating one 
particular con guration of normativity – even one that is multi-stable – the designer is 
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Matrix for the Technological Mediation of Morality’ (2012) 18 Science and Engineering Ethics 157. 




making a decision that a priori excludes at least some others.74 To a greater or lesser 
degree, the design of an artefact will ‘“groom” the user’,75 shaping her perception and 
her scope for action in ways that may not be legitimate according to any external 
standard. As Akrich notes, while ‘the designer not only xes the distribution of actors, 
he or she also provides a “key” that can be used to interpret all subsequent events. 
Obviously, this key can be called into question – consumer organizations specialize in 
such skepticism.’76 is key is the inscription that is embodied in her design, and I am 
of course engaging in a kind of scepticism too – one that is informed by a legal-
theoretical framing of what constitutes a legitimate exercise of power over end-user 
behaviour. 
An unavoidable part of the designer’s job, then, is in de ning the thresholds in 
the spaces for action created by the artefact’s design between what is strictly inscribed 
and what can be (re)interpreted by the end-user. us, the very existence of an artefact 
means a priori that these choices have been made, inadvertently or otherwise. e 
extent to which inscription predetermines what behaviour is possible relates to the 
spectrum of technological normativity, discussed further below in section 3.5. Before 
turning to that discussion, it is worth summarising the relevance of the relationship 
between affordance theory and technological mediation. 
3.4.1 Affordance and technological mediation  
Considering the discussion above, we can now comprehend affordances as the 
underlying building blocks of inscription and technological mediation.77 ey are a 
powerful unit of analysis for identifying and critiquing the inscriptions of code which 
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75  Akrich, supra n. 50, p. 218. 
76  Ibid., p. 216. 




come together in aggregate to mediate the co-constitutive relationship between the 
end-user and the world. 
Both real and perceived affordances are evidence of the second form of 
technological intentionality, where the artefact mediates the individual’s 
understanding of what she can do in the world as she perceives it.78 is connects 
closely with the concept of multi-stability, where a congruence between the artefact’s 
perceived and real affordances provide a margin of opportunity within which the end-
user might adapt her response to the predetermined script of the artefact. Unless the 
artefact embodies real affordances that lie outside the designer’s intended inscription, 
the end-user will by de nition be unable to do anything with the artefact that the 
designer did not intend. In such a case her behaviour vis-à-vis the artefact will be 
constituted entirely according to the decisions made by the designer. e corollary is 
that where the designer leaves ‘space’ for creative interpretation and action – through 
the conscious (or unconscious) provision of real affordances and their signi ers – the 
end-user will be able to express her autonomy (within the wider constraints of the 
artefact’s mediation). 
Real (dis)affordances are the bread and butter of the rst form of technological 
intentionality: to inscribe a particular programme of action in the artefact, its design 
must afford that course of action for a particular (class of) end-user; similarly, to 
proscribe a particular course of action, the designer must disafford it for a particular 
(class of) end-user, as in the cases of the Long Island bridges, the Berliner lock, or the 
shortened rake handles. e existence of an affordance is an objective fact about the 
relationship between a particular artefact and individual in a particular context, which 
when taken in aggregate with any other (dis)affordance results in a particular 
normative assemblage of technological mediation. And, as discussed above, 
affordances are not xed attributes of an artefact, rather they come about as relations 
                                                 




between particular artefacts and particular individuals in particular contexts, albeit that 
(as we saw above) designers will anticipate what these are likely to be when they are 
considering the inscriptions they want to embed in the artefact. 
3.5 A spectrum of technological normativity 
We have seen how inscriptions and affordances as their building blocks exist on a 
spectrum, from ‘harder’ implementations that admit of no choice to softer ones whose 
normativity is suggestive rather than coercive.79 e former conception of normativity 
sees the script of the artefact as ‘wired-in’, where the end-user has no choice but to 
follow a succession of code norms as they are presented to her.80 is is the most 
‘ruleish’ and immediate aspect of technological normativity: the rule is clearly de ned 
(in code, if not necessarily for the bene t of the end-user) and it is applied immediately 
at runtime with no opportunity for further consideration. ese characteristics of code 
(ruleishness, opacity, and immediacy) are central elements of the concept of 
computational legalism that I develop further in the next chapter.  
Less strict are code-based suggestions which ‘nudge’ the end-user towards a 
particular course of action, whilst permitting her to express choice or to ‘disobey’ the 
default con guration by choosing between two or more options. Despite this notional 
scope for exercising autonomy, various biasing effects have been shown to operate that 
render the default setting very ‘sticky’, implicitly discouraging the end-user from 
making any change.81 One approach to minimising this effect is to force a choice at the 
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Fogg’s discussion of ‘tunneling’ users in Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change What We 
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moment of installation or setup, without any preferred option being suggested.82 As 
we have seen in the section on disaffordance above, however, enterprise will often 
interpret even strict regulation requiring the protection of user autonomy in ways that 
subtly (or not so subtly) favour its interests over those of the end-user – post-
implementation GDPR privacy notices are a good example of this. is connects with 
the contemporary evolution of design practices, such as the adversarial interfaces 
mentioned above, which may provide notional choice but which in reality are targeted 
at capturing end-users’ attention (often using psychological research to re ne the 
interface’s affordances in order to maximise attention capture through ‘operant 
conditioning’83). e extent to which such approaches have moved beyond the 
‘libertarian paternalism’ of nudging (intended as it was to strike a balance in the civic 
sphere between the individual’s freedom to choose and better societal outcomes84) and 
into the realm of manipulation and even the cultivation of ‘tech addiction’85 is an 
emerging topic in both the academy and civil society.86 
                                                 
82  Microsoft were forced to do this when the European Court of Justice found in Microsoft Corp. v 
Commission of the European Communities (Case T-201/04) that the company’s inclusion of its web 
browser Internet Explorer as the default in the Windows operating system was an abuse of its 
dominant market position. e agreed solution was to provide end-users with a ‘ballot’ screen asking 
them to choose from a randomly-ordered range of browsers. See J. Brodkin, ‘EU Fines Microsoft 
€561 Million for Not Giving Users a Browser Choice’ (Ars Technica, 6 March 2013) 
<https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/03/eu- nes-microsoft-e561-million-for-not-giving-
users-a-browser-choice/>. 
83  Fogg, supra n. 80, ch. 3 and passim. See also van den Berg and Leenes, supra n. 54, p. 71f. 
84  C.R. Sunstein and R.H. aler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron’ (2003) 70 University 
of Chicago Law Review 1159; van den Berg and Leenes, supra n. 54, p. 72f. 
85  See for example S. Parkin, ‘Has Dopamine Got Us Hooked on Tech?’ e Observer (4 March 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/04/has-dopamine-got-us-hooked-on-tech-
facebook-apps-addiction>. 
86  For examples see, respectively, J. Williams, Stand out of Our Light: Freedom and Resistance in the 
Attention Economy (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 




Towards the more open end of the spectrum of normativity, the code’s 
inscriptions can provide space for interpretation, reinvention, and ‘resistance’ by the 
end-user (albeit that once she is using an artefact, such resistance will always be limited 
to the space left for it within the inherent boundaries of its geography87 – this point is 
discussed further below). In many cases the distinctions here will be on the level of the 
interface, where the end-user’s interactions with the system are guided to varying 
degrees. ere, the role of signi ers is particularly relevant: the end-user cannot avail 
herself of an affordance if she does not know it is there (recall the discussion of the 
nutrition-providing fruit in the discussion above). e business model underlying the 
design of the artefact will determine the extent to which it is multi-stable. For example, 
if the inscription in a smartphone application such as Instagram is one of ‘upload 
photos and videos to be viewed by other end-users’ (which in turn is made possible by 
a set of affordances for selecting a le, perhaps editing it, transferring it to a remote 
server, providing a title and tags, and publishing), no amount of ‘resistance’ can rewrite 
that inscription to enable the calculation of a tax return. However, there might 
nonetheless lie within that inscription some scope for reinterpretation, for example 
using the particular layout that galleries have within the application to imagine new 
expressive possibilities such as creating a set of images that connect to one another 
visually, like stills from a lm.88 In this case, the gallery feature of the application is 
multi-stable in that it provides both the simple function of attaching multiple images 
to a single post but also and simultaneously a means for the end-user to reinterpret the 
structure of the system to express herself in a novel way not anticipated by the designer. 
Although this is a rather frivolous example, it does demonstrate the scope of 
behavioural possibilities that code can provide. We can see how the spectrum of 
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normativity moves from the most ‘ruleish’ of code norms to the least, with the overall 
‘density’ of the constraints on the behaviour of the end-user lessening from one point 
to the next.89 e placing of the thresholds between these represent crucial choices in 
the process of designing an artefact. Affordances can thus be distinguished according 
to their normative effect.90 Davis and Chouinard, for example, suggest that affordances 
exist on a six-point spectrum, from ‘request’ to ‘refuse’. ey give the example of a set 
of stairs that might afford easy or difficult climbing depending on the angle of their 
construction. is is in opposition to the ‘classic’ concept of affordance, which would 
have it that the stairs either simply do or do not afford climbing for a particular 
individual.91 ey go on to suggest that affordances can be characterised as one of six 
mechanisms: request, demand, allow, encourage, discourage, and refuse. Adding one 
of these modi ers adds useful depth to the bare concept of affordance, enabling a more 
intuitive understanding of a given individual-artefact relationship. For the example of 
the stairs above, then, they might allow the able-bodied to climb, discourage careless 
climbing (if they are particularly steep), and refuse climbing to those who require a 
wheelchair. Here we get an immediate sense of three normative affordance 
relationships that exist between the artefact and three hypothetical classes of end-user. 
Considered through these affordance mechanisms, it becomes easier to discern 
the particular makeup of a given artefact’s normativity, and from the preceding 
discussion we can see how wired-in function tend towards the ‘harder’ mechanisms of 
request, demand, allow, and refuse, while the mechanisms of encouragement and 
discouragement are more likely to be found where the artefact’s affordances are 
designed around nudging and multi-stability. As previously mentioned, it is important 
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to note that the design of an artefact will always embody some mix of these 
characteristics, because as soon as code is laid down choices have been made and some 
con guration of normativity – be it open or closed, strictly ruleish or multi-stable – 
has come into existence. As Lessig puts it, ‘there is no choice that does not include 
some kind of building. Code is never found; it is only ever made’.92 
3.5.1 Constitutive and regulative normativity 
is spectrum of normativity connects with the theoretical distinction between 
constitutive and regulative rules.93 Whereas constitutive rules de ne how a state of 
affairs may be brought into being (e.g. a valid game of chess, or a marriage), regulative 
rules merely request action or inaction on the part of an individual or class of individuals 
(e.g. a speed limit on a road, or a rule asking employees to turn out the lights in an 
office). If the requirements of a constitutive rule are not met, then the state of affairs 
does not and cannot obtain; the mere assertion that a couple is married is insufficient 
to make it so in the eyes of the relevant order from which the concept derives, i.e. the 
legal system. At the same time, although a regulative rule can request some (in)action 
from the individual (e.g. do not drive above 70mph) it has no ability directly to impose 
that requirement – the individual must acquiesce and alter her behaviour accordingly.94  
A similar distinction applies in the design sphere – both constitutive and 
regulative normativity can be created by code, and the decision of where to draw the 
line between the two is within the gift of the designer. As Hildebrandt notes,  
it makes sense to discriminate between socio-technical arrangements that are 
constitutive and those that are regulative of our interactions, if only to make 
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clear that technology does not necessarily rule out choice in comparison to 
law.95 
As we have seen, the (dis)affordances and inscriptions embodied in the artefact’s 
design can be constitutive or regulative of the end-user’s behaviour.96 Of course, the 
very existence of the artefact and its functions are the subject of a core of constitutive 
affordances, e.g. that it can be seen, that it can be touched, opened, executed, etcetera. 
e boundaries of the artefact represent a set of a priori foundational ‘rules’ which 
de ne its very nature ab initio – the form of its interface, the platforms it can run on, 
its physical dimensions, etcetera. Operating above this lower-level sense of constitutive 
affordance, however, are the speci c (dis)affordances and scripts that constitute the 
behaviour of the end-user when she is interacting with the artefact. As with the 
example above, she may wish to calculate her tax return using Instagram, but the code’s 
constitutive norms do not permit such a use. e possibility is simply not within the 
‘constitution’ of the code. Although the designers of those platforms have (presumably) 
not consciously made the decision not to include tax calculation functionality, the 
example underlines the point that design always involves the privileging of one 
con guration of normativity – one ‘technical constitution’ – over the near-in nite 
alternative possibilities that could otherwise have been built in code.97 is speaks to 
the plasticity of code – ‘programmers can implement almost any system they can 
imagine and describe precisely’,98 but, of course, that very precision will necessarily 
exclude a huge range of other possibilities. 
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From the perspective of regulative normativity, some measure of choice is left 
open to the end-user in how she behaves within the geography set up by the code – 
for example, she is free to choose from a palette a highlight colour for her social media 
pro le, and to attach up to ve photos (or indeed no photo at all) to her social media 
post. Such regulative latitude, however, always operates within constitutive outer 
boundaries beyond which choice is unavailable, for example there is no freedom to 
choose colours that are not included in the provided palette, or to attach a PDF or 
spreadsheet le to the social media post. 
All of these behavioural (dis)affordances are contingent on the choices made 
by the designer. She can enable a particular functionality or close it off entirely, or 
perhaps hide it from view. In each case she has exercised her private power to constitute 
the range of behaviour that the end-user can engage in.99 She might also opt for 
affordances that are merely regulative of behaviour, using one of the less ruleish 
mechanisms above to allow the end-user to change the con guration (defaults) of the 
code or reinvent the space it opens up in ways unforeseen by the designer (multi-
stability). ese possibilities will be returned to in Chapter 5, particularly in the context 
of the case studies. 
3.6 Technological constitutionalism 
e discussion above has explored how the normativity embodied in an artefact’s 
design enables and constrains the behaviour of the end-user, focusing on relationship 
(c) of Figure 1 in Chapter 1.100 But there is, however, another aspect through which 
the designer is herself made to comply. Further back in the production chain, product 
designers are made to comply with normativity created by other designers creating 
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more fundamental elements of architecture. is is relationship (d) in Figure 1.101 Not 
only are end-users subject to the effects of (dis)affordance, inscription, and mediation, 
but so too are ‘end-designers’, within the environments that they in turn use to create 
artefacts intended for end-users. From this perspective, the product designer is herself 
rendered a type of end-user by those in the position of the programmer of the 
programmer (‘PoP’). Vismann and Krajewski describe the PoP in these terms: 
e programmer of the programmer, designing the tools and methods of a 
coding language (such as the compiler, code syntax, abstract data types, and 
so on) maintains the ultimate power because he or she, as the constructor of 
the programming language itself, de nes what the “normal” programmer, as 
a user, will be able to do. Both types of programmers establish the conditions 
for using the computer, and, as such, they behave like lawmakers or, rather, 
code-makers. Implemented within the CPU and the hierarchy of the le 
system is the law governing communication with and through the computer. 
In this respect, code and law maintain a relationship of more than structural 
homology. e code is a law – as Lawrence Lessig pointed out when he 
described “code” metaphorically as a synonym for the conditions under which 
the computer runs.102 
What is fascinating here is the view of the product designer herself as an end-user. in 
the hierarchy thus developed, she is beholden to the (dis)affordances and inscriptions 
in the design environment that are themselves chosen and designed by the PoP. 
Product designers do not operate in a vacuum, developing their products and 
services each time as if from a tabula rasa. To do so would in many cases involve 
‘reinventing the wheel’, which would be costly, inefficient, and even potentially 
dangerous, because it would invite mistakes and bugs that have otherwise been re ned 
out through decades of the reuse and incremental improvement of fundamental but 
complex computing mechanisms. An example would be encryption, whose crucially 
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important algorithms have been developed and improved across the decades to a point 
where they can reasonably be relied upon. If these were to be (re)implemented on a 
project-by-project basis, the result could be disastrously unstable. Designers utilise 
hardware, programming languages, libraries, and habitual development practices that 
are in place well before they embark upon the development of new code – this model 
of incremental improvement and sharing is the cornerstone of the open source 
movement, from which proprietary business models also draw.103 e result is often a 
bricolage of the old and the new, brought together with the ‘glue’ of a particular 
designer’s skills, knowledge, and interpretation of the design brief. Designers are 
situated within a context of decades of this prior art, and their approach to their work 
will to a greater or lesser extent be guided by all those practices that have gone before, 
and the technological mediations that bear upon their ability to solve the problem at 
hand. Before she considers her immediate task, then, she is starting out within an 
architecture that is itself replete with inscription and (dis)affordance, which mediates 
how she can and does go about her work.  
At this point we can recall again the model of normative relationships in Figure 
1 in Chapter 1.104 We begin to see a parallel between on the one hand the top-down 
arrangement of constitutive rules that bind the state ‘to the mast’ in its promulgation 
of legislation,105 and on the other a bottom-up framework of constitutive normativity 
that enables and constrains the scope of generativity available to the product designer. 
e (dis)affordances and inscriptions created by PoPs creates a kind of constitution, 
delimiting the framework within which the day-to-day ‘parliamentary’ work of the 
product designer creating technological normativity takes place. e normative power 
of design is thus deeper than just that of the product designer; it extends into the 
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technical ‘constitution’ that makes up the foundation of the design process itself. Like 
a legal constitution, this technical foundation has implications for the artefacts built 
upon it in the higher levels of the technical ‘stack’. One of the most important tools 
through which the PoP exercises this constitutional role is the integrated development 
environment, or IDE. 
3.6.1 Integrated development environments 
Integrated development environments (IDEs) are software tools ‘intended to assist the 
software lifecycle processes’.106 IDEs vary in complexity and sophistication, from 
applications that are essentially simple text editors with some added programming-
speci c functions, to large-scale programming suites with in-built 
compilers/interpreters, build-automation tools, version control, debuggers, code 
hinting tools, etcetera. According to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE), IDEs assist software lifecycle processes through (i) a reduction in 
cognitive load, (ii) the automation of repetitive, well-de ned actions in order to enable 
creativity, (iii) a reduction in administrative load through the support of particular 
software engineering methods (for example object-oriented programming), and (iv) 
better systematisation of the software development process.107  
e extent to which these goals are achieved is contingent on what the design 
of the IDE affords the product designer.108 Kline and Seffah discuss numerous usability 
issues prevalent in IDE designs, including hiddenness of assistive features, memory 
overload through overcomplicated interfaces, unhelpful error messages, lack of 
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contextual feedback, and insufficient assistance in preventing obvious mistakes.109 
What this demonstrates is how the design environment affects the product designer’s 
work in myriad ways, some subtle and some potentially more profound. As Graham 
puts it, programming languages and tools are ‘not just technologies, but habits of 
mind.’110 is accords with the idea of inscriptions settling over time;111 the more the 
designer is subject to the (dis)affordances of a particular IDE the more reinforced the 
guidance of its inscriptions will become for her.112 is is true even though ultimately 
all mainstream programming languages are Turing-complete and are therefore in 
principle capable of precisely the same range of computational operations. Despite this, 
some languages are tailored towards solving particular forms of problem or creating 
particular forms of application, all within the framework of a particular ‘habit of mind’. 
For example, some languages (e.g. LOGO or Smalltalk) are designed to mirror human 
mental models of how computation works and so they afford, ab initio, a form of 
transparency113 that is absent in more complicated languages that require a greater 
pivot away from conventional ways of thinking. Other approaches, such as Knuth’s 
‘literate programming’ paradigm and the WEB language built around it, aim to 
prioritise human ways of thinking above computational logic, with the latter adapting 
to the former rather than the converse as is commonly the case with mainstream 
languages.114 e normative effects of these languages and paradigms are in place 
before the designer actually writes any code; the design choices of the PoP thus 
necessarily facilitate a particular set of conditions, from the off, which condition the 
environment in potentially crucial ways. 
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I have here brie y described the power of the PoP in creating an underlying 
normative framework within which the product designer carries out her work. Later 
in Chapter 6 I invert this descriptive perspective to consider how the privileged 
position of the PoP enables the imposition of limits on the product designer that can 
be leveraged for normatively-desirable purposes, binding the work of the latter so that 
the code she produces exhibits the qualities of legitimacy that I set out in later chapters. 
In this way, just as a constitution binds the work of a legislature ex ante, so too can the 
design environment contribute to the creation of legitimate code. 
4. Conclusion 
e discussion above used the theories of affordance, disaffordance, inscription, and 
technological mediation to set out the ways in which code regulates the behaviour of 
end-users. is demonstrates the power that designers have to constitute and regulate 
end-users’ behaviour. I will pick up that analysis again in Chapter 5, where I apply 
aspects of the theories set out above to shed light on how the subjects of the case studies 
impose normativity on end-users. Designs that embody more constitutive normativity 
mean that the balance of power favours the designer and behavioural constraint is 
potentially more absolute. is is how one might say that code is more than law. It is, 
however, possible for code to embody regulative rather than constitutive normativity, 
in order to shift (some) power back to the end-user. Striking an appropriate balance 
between constitutive and regulative normativity is an important part of the 
digisprudential perspective that I later develop.  
is chapter also considered how design environments themselves have a 
regulating effect on the work of product designers, which paves the way in Chapter 5 
for a consideration of how the production of user-facing affordances might be guided 




with Hart’s jurisprudential concept of primary and secondary rules115 – what I am 
describing is in effect their equivalent in the design realm, where it is the normativity 
of code that is constitutionally constrained, rather than the normativity of legal rules. 
A guiding element of this thesis is the eshing out of the analogy between the two 
orders on that basis. 
e next chapter builds upon the design theory presented here to deepen the 
theoretical connection between law and design and to propose the concept of 
computational legalism as a foundation for the thesis’ ultimate contribution.
  
                                                 








A legal theory perspective: code is less than law 
e alternative to legality is not anarchism, it is legalism… ‘not thinking about 
it’, if left to its own devices, tends to take over the entire social world, or at 
least cyberspace.1 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I used design theory to describe how the code of artefacts 
operationalises behavioural regulation. at was the rst task in setting out the 
theoretical grounding of the thesis, demonstrating the directness of code-based 
regulation. is chapter’s contribution is an analysis of code’s regulative characteristics 
from a legal theory perspective, from which I develop the concept of computational 
legalism. is idea is borne of the parallel I observe between code’s ruleishness – its 
reliance on strict, binary logic instead of interpretable standards – and its conceptual 
equivalent in the jural realm, known as legalism. Legalism is a perspective that eschews 
a holistic interpretation of legal norms, instead requiring that citizens merely follow 
legal rules as they are presented to them, without enquiring as to their efficacy or their 
legitimacy beyond the question of where they come from. Code’s characteristics 
exemplify a particularly strong form of legalism, and therein lies the problem of 
unlegitimated code-based regulation, and the claim that it is less than law. As 
Wintgens puts it in relation to traditional legislation, ‘[r]ule creation is a matter of 
choice, and this choice is legitimated because it is based upon the democratic character 
of the regulating process’.2 It is not at all clear that such aspirations are re ected in the 
production of code, according to which end-users are ‘induced, habituated and, if 
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necessary, compelled, to accept the norms of commercialized cyberspace’,3 all of which 
often takes place outwith democratic debate and legal processes of interpretation, 
contest, and remediation. As Longford puts it,  
[W]hereas the terms and conditions of political citizenship in liberal 
democratic states are, relatively speaking, subject to free, open and transparent 
deliberation and negotiation, the codes governing the citizen in the digital era 
are invisible and opaque, thanks to certain features of the technologies 
themselves and to the proprietary nature of many of the codes increasingly 
mediating our lives.4 
e purpose of this chapter is not to suggest that designers harbour a legalistic 
ideology. Rather, the intention is to demonstrate how certain characteristics of a 
legalistic mentality are closely reproduced in the material architectures of code – the 
ideological ought of legalism becomes the technological is of code. If we proceed from 
the starting point that legalism is an undesirable thing in a democracy, then the 
mechanisms for mitigating it in the traditional legal sphere might also have an 
ameliorating effect in the analogous context of code-based ‘legislation’.  
In drawing a parallel between the legalistic outlook in the orthodox legal 
context on the one hand, and intensi ed legalism of code on the other, the stage is set 
for an analysis of the ways in which its mitigation in the former can be imported into 
the sphere of the latter, strengthening the conceptual relationship between 
foundational legal theory and the computational paradigm. e aim is to investigate 
the ‘new forms of interaction’ that Bańkowski and Schafer suggest are necessary to 
‘promote the bene ts of legality, and to prevent the disadvantages of legalism.’5 is 
chapter explores the latter, setting out how it is characterised in the literature before 
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demonstrating how it is that code, when it operates as an enforcer, mediator, and 
generator of legal reality, can be a particularly extreme incarnation of this ideological 
perspective. As Wintgens notes, ‘long decades of legalism in legal reasoning [have 
meant that] the dominant views in legal theory… have barred the way for questioning 
the position of the legislator’.6 Questioning the position of the designer, qua legislator, 
is precisely what this thesis aims to do. 
2. What is legalism? 
ere are numerous conceptions of legalism in the literature, with the term 
occasionally being used interchangeably with different concepts such as legality and 
the rule of law – Bańkowski and Schafer, for example, note that legalism is ‘often 
confused with legality, an altogether more re exive and rational concept’.7 
MacCormick contended early on that legalism is ‘a prerequisite of free government’,8 
but this seemed for him to amount essentially to the ex post doctrine of nulla poena 
sine lege (‘acts of government however desirable teleologically must be subordinated to 
respect for rules and rights’9), and is therefore different from the stronger version of 
legalism with which I am concerned. Indeed, MacCormick explicitly distinguishes 
between that conception of legalism and the ‘stronger’ conception10 that comes from 
the work of scholars including Shklar, Bańkowski and Schafer, and Wintgens. 
MacCormick’s conception of legalism is akin to Wintgens’ idea of ‘weak’ legalism, 
which forms a part, rather than the whole, of the legisprudential conception of 
legitimacy that I make use of in Chapter 4. At any rate, this intermediate position, 
later adopted by MacCormick himself in work written alongside Bańkowski, views 
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some measure of legalistic rule following as a necessary element, but not the whole, of 
a functioning legal order. is accords with the normative position I develop, whereby 
rules are the correct basis for regulating behaviour, but the process of their 
development is constrained so as not to be arbitrary. is idea is embodied in the Greek 
legend of Odysseus, in which the eponymous captain has himself bound to the mast 
of his ship so that he cannot succumb to the enticement of the Sirens. e legend’s 
metaphor of a sovereign consciously limiting itself in order to avoid the temptation of 
iniquity is one that has been considered by various scholars in their discussions of 
constitutionalism in the computational context.11 Hildebrandt contrasts legality and 
legalism thus: 
Legality, in this sense, refers to justice (proportionality), to legal certainty (the 
legal ground in positive law, with the necessary safeguards) and purposiveness 
or expediency (the legitimate aim of the intervention, the requirement of 
effective remedies). Legalism, instead, reduces all this to the correctly enacted 
legal ground, which may or may not offer any protection, leaving the subject 
of government interventions dependent on a rule by law instead of the Rule of 
Law. Even if the sovereign that rules by law is the nation or the Parliament, 
legalism leaves individual subjects without effective remedies against arbitrary 
rule.12 
One can see here the implication in the concept of legality that the rules promulgated 
must be designed to re ect certain ideals (proportionality, safeguards, the substantive 
legitimacy of the norm itself). Legalism, by contrast, is concerned only that the rule 
has been promulgated by a legitimate institution, and cares not what its content or 
substantive effects are.  
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Hildebrandt’s characterisation of legalism, where there is an absence of 
protection against arbitrary rule, matches the stronger variant of the concept. For 
example, in her seminal text on the subject, Shklar de nes legalism as ‘an ethical 
attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral 
relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.’13 For her and other 
theorists, legalism is a deontological perspective, which is to say it is an ethical 
perspective built around the duty to follow rules, as opposed to (for example) a 
consequentialist outlook focused on achieving normatively desirable outcomes, or a 
virtue ethics perspective aimed at ‘living well’.14 is kind of outlook – termed the 
‘morality of duty’ by Lon Fuller15 – has a long pedigree in moral philosophy, perhaps 
most evidently in the work of Kant16 who, according to Bańkowski and MacCormick, 
was the ‘high priest for a rule based morality’.17 Without delving into the detail of this 
seminal pillar of Western philosophy, one can say in brief that such an approach has 
moral force because it results in a normalisation and systematisation of behaviour 
across society, which in turn begets the kind of behavioural predictability that has been 
argued is a desirable goal in the development of a stable (capitalist18) society.19  
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Heteronomy, the condition of being dominated by an external force (in this 
case rules), is antithetical to aspirations of reasoned interpretation and action.20 It is 
exempli ed in what Wintgens calls the ‘strong’ variant of legalism, which he 
characterises as a normative historical strategy21 – recall the distinction mentioned in 
this chapter’s introduction between the ideological legalism of the legal realm and the 
more descriptive legalism of the computational realm. On the other hand, it is also 
often thought that some measure of legalism (i.e. respect for rules qua rules, or ‘law as 
law’) is necessary for society to operate, and indeed that legalism should be understood 
normatively not as being in opposition to legality but rather as a necessary element of 
it.22 is accords with Wintgens’ concept of ‘weak legalism’, a viewpoint necessary for 
his theory of legisprudence, according to which rules remain the proper mechanism of 
behavioural regulation, but the potential for their arbitrary de nition is simultaneously 
constrained. Strong legalism undermines legality, whereas weak legalism is a necessary 
(although insufficient) component of it. For Bańkowski and Schafer, legality properly 
understood requires a complementary combination of adherence to rules (legalism) 
with thoughtful interpretation of what is being commanded by the rule, with the 
correct approach varying depending on the circumstances.23 For them, it is sometimes 
appropriate to be mindless in following a rule – for individuals to ‘act like automata’ – 
while at other times it is necessary to act autonomously, considering what the rule asks 
of us before deciding how to act. Strong legalism implies only the former approach, 
where weak legalism is the rule-based element of the broader concept of legality. 
is strong conception of legalism is very relevant to a descriptive analysis of 
code, because as we shall see the latter exempli es its characteristics, and indeed 
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ampli es them far beyond what Wintgens and other theorists describe. As Bańkowski 
and Schafer observe in the computational context, ‘[code’s] unrestricted anarchism in 
the absence of the state has indeed resulted in the most absolute form of legalism 
possible.’24  
Subsequent references in this chapter to ‘legalism’ are to its strong variant, 
unless otherwise speci ed. e remainder of this section sets out the theory of legalism 
and its approach to law-making, with a view to setting the stage for a comparison 
between it and code. 
2.1 Solipsism and positivism 
Legalism is rooted in a solipsistic view of law as a system of rules and practices that 
operates separately from the social contexts within which it is embedded. Law is 
viewed as a ‘clean’ system, ‘self contained and autogenerative’,25 that subsumes the 
outputs of the ‘dirty business’ of politics26 (i.e. legislation) and applies them according 
to its own sui generis processes, institutions, and vocabulary. Already we have the rst 
glimpse of the parallel with code.  
Two important consequences ow from these characteristics. First, legalism 
seeks to insulate itself from forces which might invite questions as to why a particular 
rule should be followed in a particular circumstance. Second, in order to maintain its 
maxim that regulatees act unthinkingly, legalism must avoid any lacunae in the body 
of rules it provides – there must be a rule to deal with every circumstance that might 
arise, otherwise the agent will be left without guidance as to which course of action to 
follow. 
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‘Legislation is a matter of politics, and politics is a matter of choice’, and so the 
‘truthiness’ of law requires that it remain separate from anything so contingent.27 Law 
is viewed as a scienti c practice which identi es and works with ‘truths’, which are the 
product of sovereign legislators. e content of those truths is not to be questioned: 
from the perspective of the law and legal practice the truth ‘just is’, it is handed down 
from the political realm where it is the sole province of the legislator to debate the 
substance of the norm. e lawyer has no valid interest in what goes on there; politics 
is about choice, and therefore it does not deal in ‘truth’ because competing choices can 
never be objects of true knowledge.28 Once the legislature chooses between the various 
possible options and crystallises its preference into a law, it becomes an item of ‘true’ 
knowledge relevant to the science of law, whose objective (extra-legal) quality is 
irrelevant to the legal ‘scientists’ who, from that point onward, take it as a datum for 
application within their eld. 
In this way, legal thinking becomes ‘fenced off’ from ‘all contact with the rest 
of historical thought and experience’.29 e result is a positivist view that the law is 
‘just there’, and it is not the task of citizens or practitioners to enquire as to how it got 
‘there’.30 What matters is whether it is a valid law, and not whether we agree with its 
substance or not. e ‘truth’ (‘is-ness’) of a given legal norm derives from the validity 
of its creation vis-à-vis actors and processes, and the question of whether its substance 
is desirable or not (its ‘ought-ness’) is properly to be viewed as separate from this.31 e 
preoccupation with the ex post examination of what should and should not be 
                                                 
27  L. Wintgens, ‘Legisprudence as a New eory of Legislation’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 1, p. 5. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Shklar, supra n. 13, p. 3. See also Bańkowski and MacCormick, supra n. 17, p. 182, and Fuller, in 
his response to Hart in their now-classic debate on morality and legal positivism: L.L. Fuller, 
‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 630, p. 
635. 
30  Bańkowski, supra n. 16. 




considered ‘law’ is of course a core characteristic of analytical legal positivism. Strong 
legalism is connected with positivism in its drive to classify rules according to those 
that are internal to the legal system and those that are external.32 
us, from a legalistic (and analytical positivist) perspective, ‘what ought to be 
done is con ned to the knowledge of the rules that contain rights and duties. 
Following rules is a matter of knowledge, while their enforcement is a matter of 
application.’33 Legal practitioners take that knowledge, provided from somewhere ‘out 
there’, and use it as a tool to achieve a given legal aim. eir practice is ‘neutral’ as to 
the substance of these materials (rules), and they become technicians whose task it is 
to manipulate those rules according to the mechanisms of legal reasoning.34  
2.2 Legalism according to legisprudence 
e preceding discussion set out how strong legalism is concerned with the application 
rather than the construction of rules.35 In his comprehensive historical discussion of 
the origins of legalism, Wintgens discusses the theoretical mechanisms of legitimation 
in both natural law and analytical legal positivism, before identifying a set of speci c 
characteristics of which the phenomenon of strong legalism is a ‘conjugation’, namely 
representationalism, a-temporality, concealed instrumentalism, etatism (the belief that 
the only true source of law is the state), and the scienti c study of law.36  
e orthodox source of a rule’s legitimacy differs depending on the source of 
sovereignty – broadly, natural law or the social contract: respectively, that source is 
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either a transcendent set of natural law norms, or a social contract which founds a 
sovereign law-making institution. In the case of a natural law perspective, this is 
because the source of its substantive content is the ‘background’ knowledge of 
‘jusnaturalistic’ (natural law) principles which are inherently true: such representational 
laws are ‘a concretisation of natural law, or re ect a natural law conception that in its 
turn legitimises positive law’.37 In the case of the sovereign, this is so because the social 
contract legitimises such pronouncements as a descendent of some original founding 
contractual act of the people that set up the institution to represent them38 (perhaps a 
document with constitutional status, although the social contract can also be a 
hypothetical moment rather than a real instrument39). at the state de nes what is 
legal is in itself enough to legitimise the substance of the legal norms it chooses to 
declare; in constituting the eld of play (the legal system), the state legitimises de facto 
that which it consequently promulgates as the rules of the game. One can detect in 
this hierarchical idea of legitimacy Hart’s concept of the ‘rule of recognition’, or 
Kelsen’s Grundnorm.40 e outcome in either case is the same, namely a legitimated 
foundational source from which laws can be promulgated that are themselves de facto 
legitimate as a result of the a priori legitimacy of the source, and that therefore ought 
to be followed.41  
Wintgens describes this as ‘one-shot’ legitimation, operating continually 
thereafter to validate prospectively any norms promulgated according to the ex ante 
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framework that it sets up.42 Drawing on Hobbes and Rousseau, this is what he 
describes as the ‘proxy model’ of legitimation,43 according to which the initial 
legitimation of the external decision maker, described above, permits it to act on behalf 
of the people (i.e. as a proxy) from that moment onward, despite the inability of either 
the sovereign itself or the people it represents to foresee all the rules, or ‘limitations on 
freedom’, that will in the future be imposed.44 e citizen is given the imperative ‘not 
to think about it’; she need only act in accordance with the rule as it is given to her,45 
since by virtue of those constitutive facts the pronouncement of the sovereign is 
‘imputed to [the citizenry], as if they were its author.’46 is legalistic idea of minimal 
interpretation is connected with the positivistic view of textual interpretation, perhaps 
most famously articulated in Hart’s discussion of the ‘core’ and ‘penumbra’ in the 
interpretation of the meaning of individual words, the former being deemed to be 
settled and uncontested, and the latter being where controversies of interpretation 
arise.47 is is discussed below in the section on rules in computational legalism. 
In the commercial realm, society essentially gives the designer of code a one-
shot ‘legitimation’ of this kind when we (i) endow her with the plasticity of code to 
create a near-in nite number of conditions which enable and constrain behaviour 
through technological normativity, (ii) we protect her privatised practices through 
(legally-sanctioned) commercial secrecy and a general absence of scrutiny, and (iii) we 
submit to the sui generis opacity of code. Each of these characteristics is discussed 
further in section 3 below. 
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Wintgens’ discussion of the metaphysics of strong legalism is densely 
theoretical and goes into greater historical detail than is necessary for my purposes, 
which is unsurprising given that his aim is to situate the modern practice of legislation 
and rule-following within a fully-rendered picture of the historical and philosophical 
development of the state. However, the parallels between certain elements of his 
schema and the characteristics of code-as-law are striking. e most salient 
characteristics of the conjugation (representationalism, a-temporality, and concealed 
instrumentalism) are set out in the remainder of this section, before section 3 goes on 
to consider them directly in relation to code. 
From a computational perspective, perhaps the most relevant element of strong 
legalism is representationalism. is is the view of law as a representation of reality, 
either through the latter’s reproduction (in the case of natural laws that require to be 
interpreted by human positive law) or its construction (in the case of laws based on a 
founding social contract).48 Wintgens embarks on a rich discussion of the philosophies 
of Hobbes and Descartes, covering the relationship between realism and nominalism 
and how these, despite their seemingly fundamental differences, can both result in the 
‘naturalisation of positive law’, according to which law is deemed to be a representation 
of objective reality.49 What the law states is therefore held to be true, either because 
natural laws are hypostatically true or because the social contract is true and therefore 
so too are the rules that are based upon it.  
e salient connection with the computational context is that there 
representationalism is even more concrete than in the ideology of strong legalism: 
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whereas proponents of the latter hold the belief that the rule presents reality, in the 
computational context this is much more than mere belief because, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, code does not just represent reality but actively constitutes it. I talked 
about constitutive versus regulative technological normativity in the previous chapter, 
and will return to that theme in section 3.2.1 below. 
e next salient component of strong legalism is a-temporality, which ows 
from the belief in law as a representation of reality. Because either the social contract 
or natural law represent reality ex ante, anything that ows from them is believed also 
to be true, since they are the genuine and true foundation of political space. at 
foundation is a-temporal because it is believed to be the universal principled basis for 
public law, something that is valid separately from man’s recognition of it.50 
Contingent laws built upon this foundation are deemed to ‘uncover’ the general will, 
rather than proactively to re ect it (those who disagree with a particular legislative 
proposition are in error as to what the general will is, rather than in disagreement per 
se). e general will exists at all times, ready to be uncovered and recognised by 
contingent legislative acts. us, ‘acts of will then take on the appearance of 
timelessness’.51 Admittedly, this is a difficult metaphysical proposition that might 
appear more relevant to Wintgens’ historical analysis of political philosophy than to 
the current argument regarding code. Despite this, the idea of timelessness does 
connect with the immutable character of code, discussed further below, and the 
approach that Wintgens develops to cope with timelessness in law-making – the 
legisprudential principle of temporality – does become relevant as a practical 
consideration (this will be considered in Chapters 4 and 5). 
e nal relevant aspect of strong legalism is concealed instrumentalism. is is 
the idea of a ‘veil of sovereignty’, behind which the values or ends of the legislator are 
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hidden. It is evidenced in analytical positivism and textualism, where the policy goal 
of the legislator is less important than formalistic reasoning from the text. e ction 
of timelessness previously discussed combines with this instrumentalism to form a 
strategy for converting the messy and contingent political into the clean and scienti c 
legal.52 is concealment nds its analogue in the legal and economic veils that protect 
code: enterprise is protected by trade secrets and anti-circumvention laws, while faith 
is placed in the market to curb any excesses. is is discussed further below in section 
3.5. 
As previously mentioned, whereas strong legalism and analytical positivism are 
concerned primarily with the validity of a norm’s source, legisprudence suggests that 
this is a necessary but insufficient condition for legitimacy. Not only must the sovereign 
be ‘bound to the mast’, but so too must it actively legitimate the norms that it proposes. 
is is a type of validity that to an extent crosses the line between formal and 
substantive legitimacy – the substantive content of the norm is constrained according 
to certain formal qualities that are embodied in the principles of legisprudence. As 
Wintgens argues:  
e basic idea of the rule of law or the Rechsstaat, that both the ruler and the 
ruled are bound to rules, can be interpreted in two ways. e rst 
interpretation is the path to strong legalism. According to this approach, the 
ruler’s being bound to rules is tantamount to his ‘not violating’ them. is is 
both a necessary and a sufficient condition for rules to be valid and legitimate. 
Under the second interpretation – which is adopted by legisprudence – the 
idea of following rules by a sovereign counts only as a necessary and not as a 
sufficient condition for rules to be valid. Legal validity on this view is distinct 
from legitimacy. Legitimacy for its part can only be obtained through 
legitimation.53 
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For him, then, the achievement of legitimacy requires an additional active step of 
legitimation, which means the sovereign is not just subject to the same rules as 
everyone else (i.e. the rule of law, or the Odyssean ‘binding to the mast’), but also that 
the rules which it seeks to promulgate re ect certain formal characteristics, which in 
turn logically limit the breadth of possible content that those norms can legitimately 
have.  
Despite its simplicity, then, the strongly legalistic worldview is clearly open to 
abuse: the prioritisation of heteronomy militates against critical re ection and the 
application of the underlying principles of legality that are characteristic of 
democracies. e freedom to interpret is a crucial aspect of legality, without which 
rules become ‘implements of tyranny’ and legalism a ‘vice of narrow governance’.54 
By contrast, in addition to a formally-valid source of the rule, legisprudence 
requires the legitimation of the proposed legislative act through its justi cation. is 
justi cation is achieved according to the principles that legisprudence sets out, which 
guide the conduct of the ruler regardless of the political content of the norm she is 
making: ‘though his ruling activity, while following rules, the ruler must supply reasons 
for his choices.’55 One can thus see how legisprudence represents a form of 
constitutionalism. I discuss the principles of legisprudence in greater detail in Chapter 
4. For now, I turn to the parallel between legalism and code, to develop the concept of 
computational legalism. 
3. Computational legalism 
Where legalism requires that citizens ‘not think about it’ and simply follow the rule, 
so too does code when it enables and constrains behaviour. ere is a difference of 
degree, however, since the legalistic mindset is at least something that can be 
                                                 
54  Bańkowski and MacCormick, supra n. 17, p. 194. 




challenged by a rational individual, and in any event the hermeneutic gap by de nition 
creates a space between the promulgation of the norm and any acquiescence to it. 
Code, by contrast, admits of no opportunity for challenge: some measure of 
normativity is inherent in its very existence – the boundaries of the eld of play, as well 
as the rules of the game, are determined from the outset, and there is little or nothing 
the end-user can do to change them, if she is even aware of what they are to begin with 
(which as we shall see is far from a given). us, not only is she made to ‘not think 
about it’, she is in many cases not given the opportunity to apprehend what it is that 
she is not thinking about. 
Returning to the characteristics of legalism set out above, we can think about 
how they apply in the context of code, creating what I term computational legalism, the 
particular species of legalistic obedience that ows from the sui generis nature of code. 
Firstly, we saw how legalism concerns itself with rules that are to be followed as 
written. Code presents us with an extreme form of ‘ruleishness’, where conditions are 
hard-edged and admit of no latitude for interpretation. Secondly, legalism views those 
rules as a representation of reality. We saw in the previous chapter how the code of 
digital architectures constitutes, not merely represents, the empirical and legal realities 
that the end-user is presented with (and indeed those she cannot perceive). irdly, 
under legalism rules are seen as a-temporal, or timeless – they re ect background 
truths, and they ‘just are’. Similarly, code in a sense ‘collapses’ time, through a 
combination of the immediacy of its execution, its immutability, and the cumulative 
normativity of its pervasiveness. Fourthly, the source of the sovereign’s power is 
concealed so that the policy reasons behind the normativity it promulgates are ignored, 
those norms being treated as simply ‘there’, to be followed without question. e 
opacity of code, and the privileging of commercial practices and trade secrets, set up a 
similar concealment in the computational context – the ‘sovereignty’ of those who 




e remainder of this section considers these characteristics in more detail, 
demonstrating how the computational form of legalism is particularly strong, making 
the application of measures for mitigating it all the more important. 
3.1 Ruleishness 
Hildebrandt discusses the historical consequences of the embodiment of law in text, 
where there is a choice as to whether to take a legalistic interpretation or not, unlike 
with code where there is no such latitude. Writing about interpretation, she observes 
that texts and textual norms have lives of their own: 
Absent ostensive reference, the author is never sure how her text will be 
understood, while the reader cannot take for granted what the author meant 
to say. is provides for an inevitable latitude in the use of texts and turns law-
making (enactment of legal codes as well as their application) into a creative 
process rather than a mechanical application.56 
is characterisation of law cleaves to the aspirational view of legality, where the slow 
iteration of interpretation of norms across heterogeneous circumstances builds towards 
a body of law that is simultaneously exible and stable.57 As we have seen, this is at 
odds with strong legalism’s binary application of rules qua rules.58 is ‘ruleishness’59 is 
one of the most salient homologies between jural and computational legalism. Taking 
the orthodox spectrum that at one end has absolute rules that admit of no 
interpretation, and at the other has more exible standards that specify broader 
outcomes but not the detailed means by which they should be achieved, code is very 
                                                 
56  M. Hildebrandt, ‘Legal and Technological Normativity: More (and Less) than Twin Sisters’ (2008) 
12 Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 169, p. 172. 
57  Ibid., pp. 171–172. 
58  Bańkowski and Schafer, supra n. 1, p. 34. 




much located towards the rule end.60 Code execution represents the mechanical 
application of rules par excellence; in Zittrain’s phrasing, ‘execution is exquisite’.61 
Simultaneously, code’s creation (an ‘enactment of legal codes’) does not admit of the 
latitude of interpretation referred to in the quote from Hildebrandt above. e rule as 
laid down by the designer is the rule that will be followed. Whereas traditional laws 
are purposefully created for ‘offline’ application, where inefficiency and delay permit 
consideration of exceptional circumstances or evolving social norms, code ‘requires 
extreme precision and rigor not resident in analog law.’62 
3.1.1 ree consequences 
ere are therefore three fundamental consequences that ow from code’s ruleishness. 
First, the rules speci ed ex ante in the code will be applied in all instances where the 
conditions they require are present, regardless of any ex post considerations (although 
of course inputs at run-time, from the end-user or some other source such as a sensor 
or an oracle, will in many cases be required for the ex ante speci cations of the rules to 
be met). In the technical context this is of course a major bene t: even the most 
complex body of rules can be expected to execute in pre-determined ways under 
precisely-de ned and controlled conditions, giving a notional predictability that has 
facilitated the rapid innovation that society has enjoyed over the past several decades.  
is is connected with the automated nature of code, which means that once 
it is released into a production environment, it can repeat the same set of operations 
millions or billions of times with little or no marginal cost and with no human 
intervention beyond the maintenance of computing and energy infrastructure and any 
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end-user input necessary for its operation.63 Again, provided the conditions speci ed 
in the code are met, the code will execute automatically, regardless of any other 
consideration, provided that it is formally valid. Indeed, this point about formal 
validity is one of the problems of code’s instrumentalism: the machine will execute 
semantically correct commands faithfully and with no regard to their consequences 
which, depending on the behaviour and the pervasiveness of the code in question, can 
be catastrophic.64 Back in the legal realm, this is quite evidently undesirable. Even the 
most ‘ruleish’ of textual legal norms requires interpretation in order to move from the 
page to behavioural instantiation, and even where the rule is one of strict liability (for 
example a speed limit for drivers), enforcement still requires an active process of 
interpretation, in the course of which justi catory or excusatory reasons may come to 
light which modulate a strongly legalistic application of the original rule (e.g. the driver 
was rushing to get her injured passenger to hospital).65 
Secondly, as long as the precise conditions speci ed in the rule do not exist, it 
will never be executed. No matter how closely the code-based rule matches the 
circumstances that arise in operation, if the two do not match then the code will sit 
inertly, doing nothing. Taken together with the rst characteristic, there is therefore 
in code an emphatic absence – and indeed impossibility – of Hart’s concept of the 
‘penumbra of doubt’:66 there can only be the core of meaning, except that the core 
                                                 
63  Grimmelmann, supra n. 59, p. 1729. See also Yeung, supra n. 60. 
64  H. Surden, ‘Values Embedded in Legal Arti cial Intelligence’ (Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network, 2017) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2932333 p. 5 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2932333>. For a recent example that continues to affect both 
hardware and software at the most fundamental level of execution, see ‘Meltdown and Spectre’ 
(2018) <https://meltdownattack.com/>. 
65  Shay et al. use the example of speed cameras in their discussion of the practical difficulties inherent 
in transposing a textual norm into code. See supra n. 62. 
66  Hart, supra n. 47. Connected is Dworkin’s idea of integrity, and the background in uence on 
interpretation of guiding principles behind the enterprise of law. See R. Dworkin, ‘Law as 




expressed in the code re ects the subjective understanding of the designer, and not 
necessarily the settled meaning understood by the legislature, courts, or society more 
generally.67 As Grimmelmann notes, the ‘hard edges’ of software rules are not 
susceptible to blurring, no matter how complex the set of rules is that is being applied68 
(which, in the modern computing context, will invariably be staggeringly complex). 
Whereas a human’s ability to apply simultaneous rules might result in less precision as 
the set increases, there is no such limitation for code (save perhaps that speed of 
execution might decrease). 
irdly, and as a corollary of the above two characteristics, code’s ruleishness 
limits by de nition the conditions that it will respond to. is limiting of possibilities 
is put in place by the designer, who of course is interested in solving a particular 
problem by a particular set of technical means, each of which is considered from the 
perspective of the underlying business model. In so doing, however, she may fail to 
consider the other possibilities that were relevant to the situation, thus reducing the 
world to a limited set of conditions and responses. From her perspective, she intends 
that in the operation of the system conditions A, B, or C will arise, and the system 
should respond with one or a combination of X, Y, or Z. ese conditions comprise 
the ontology of the code,69 which once it is de ned is rigid and cannot (without the 
code being altered70) be made to be sensitive to, for example, conditions D or G, or 
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responses W or Q. What this means is that the designer’s predetermined view of the 
code’s operation (conditions A, B, and C, and potential responses X, Y, and Z) is 
rei ed, and while that rei cation may not re ect the empirical reality of the world, or 
the requirements of substantive law or some other relevant normative value such as 
legitimacy or the rule of law, this fact will pose no barrier whatsoever to the execution 
of the code on the basis of the ontology predetermined by the designer.  
As Grimmelmann puts it, ‘[w]hen a programmer creates a program, she 
predetermines its responses to every possible input – to every possible “case” it may 
adjudicate. e algorithm is the rule.’71 is connects with Hart’s discussion of the 
open texture of language, where he argues against attempts to regulate unambiguously 
in advance: 
If the world in which we live were characterized by only a nite number of 
features, and these together with all the modes in which they could combine 
were known to us, then provision could be made in advance for every 
possibility… Everything could be known, and for everything, since it could be 
known, something could be done and speci ed in advance by rule. is would 
be a world t for ‘mechanical’ jurisprudence. Plainly this world is not our 
world.72 
Code makes this vision a reality, although not in the way Hart imagined. It goes 
further by imposing such ‘mechanical jurisprudence’ on a contingent and complicated 
world, reducing its complexities to the set of features that the designer chose to include, 
whether or not those features are sufficient or even appropriate for the context in which 
the code will operate. 
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Bańkowski makes an early connection between legalism and code-based 
regulation in his description of a hypothetical system for controlling the borrowing of 
e-books from a university library.73 Although he does not use the term, what he 
describes is what we would now call a DRM system. His description shows how the 
transition from an ‘offline’ manual library system to an automated system affects the 
rules that governed the former. ose rules state that:  
(1) borrowers must complete a separate form for each volume borrowed, 
(2) books should be returned before the due date,  
(3) borrowers have a limited number of loans that must not be exceeded,  
(4) no further books will be loaned to borrowers who have overdue loans.74  
e above regulations are automated by their transposition into code, which governed 
the release of an ebook that would ‘self-destruct’ after the appropriate borrowing 
period.75 is is an archetypal DRM system, where ex ante constraints on media use 
de ne its availability and are embedded in and enforced by the artefact itself. e 
computational legalism of such a system becomes evident when we consider what 
happens to the textual rules listed above, which previously under the manual system 
were interpreted and applied by the human librarian. e rules are bright lines that 
admit of no interpretation – once the borrowing limit is reached, if no appeal process 
is built into the code then no further books can be borrowed, regardless of any 
extenuating circumstances (recall the third consequence of code’s ruleishness discussed 
above). Once the borrowing period is reached, the book ‘self-destructs’, again 
regardless of any extenuating circumstance that might have moved a human librarian 
to make an exception (e.g. a combination of illness and exams).  
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In sum, then, there is no room for discretion, ambiguity, or subversion,76 and 
nothing outside the realm of rules can be implemented internally within the machine. 
Digital systems are thus ‘crude and in exible, often brutal and not open to critical 
reason.’77 Returning to the example above, the speed camera detects two conditions 
(the car is travelling below the speed limit; the car is travelling above the speed limit) 
and it has two responses (do not take photo; take and process photo). In spite of the 
legalism of such a system, there is nevertheless an ex post buffer to enable some 
interpretation – a human may interpret the photo and, upon realising the vehicle was 
an ambulance, override the automated decision. e decision to include such oversight 
(i.e. a ‘human in the loop’78) is a design choice and is by no means a given – there is no 
technological barrier preventing a speed camera and penalty system being fully 
automated with no ex post adjudication.79 Such scenarios demonstrate how the three 
elements of ruleishness can come together to amplify legalism in the computational 
context, especially when they are combined with the automation and immediacy of 
code.  
3.2 Representationalism 
Representationalism is a key aspect of strong legalism – in both natural law and 
positivist accounts, law is held to represent reality. As discussed above, for the former 
its validity comes from the underlying truth of nature, while for the latter it comes 
from the founding social contract, rule of recognition, etcetera. If the underlying 
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natural norms or the founding political act are true, then the rules which ow from 
them must also be true.80  
e way in which code constructs a rule-based normativity is not the same as 
law’s approach. Law is limited by its instantiation in the technology of the script (text), 
which creates a hermeneutic gap between what the text requests and how the 
addressee(s) of that text interpret its terms and choose to re ect them in their 
behaviour.81 e instantiation of code rules, on the other hand, is not so limited – 
technological normativity, as we saw in the last chapter, can have a direct effect in a 
way that legal normativity that is constrained by its textual embodiment does not.82 
One crucial way in which code is less than law is that it does not promulgate 
rules in the basic sense that it provides citizens with a set of guides that they can nd, 
interpret, and follow (such promulgation is Fuller’s second principle of legality83). Nor 
does an appreciation of code’s representationalism require any metaphysical wrangling 
to connect its rules with the underlying empirical reality. e rules in code work in a 
different way – they are not commands to be followed, rather they are instrumental 
tools that crystallise behavioural possibilities from the outset, instead of requesting 
particular behaviour from the citizen. e result is that the hermeneutic gap that exists 
between the text of a legal rule and its effect on behaviour in the physical world 
collapses. Vismann and Krajewski note that while traditionally the law was the 
ultimate arbiter of reality via its use of rhetorical ctions, it now has to compete with 
‘digital virtuality’ in the constitution of reality.84 More and more, this competition is 
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being lost: ‘the virtual is a mode of reality that evades the space-time categories of the 
law.’85 
e extent to which the hermeneutic gap collapses is profound; its effacement 
is not only easy to do but is standard practice, not necessarily through malice or 
intentional obfuscation, but simply by the very nature of the technology. e 
hermeneutic gap can so easily be collapsed because the ‘text’ of the rule (the code) 
constitutes directly the geography of the artefact: they are not just isomorphic, they are 
one and the same. Unlike law, whose ‘carrier’ has hitherto been the inherently passive 
medium of text, software code allows us to, in Bruno Latour’s words, ‘conceive of a 
text (a programming language) that is at once words and actions’.86  
However, even within our analysis of code we can think at varying levels of 
abstraction. Asscher draws a distinction between rules on the ‘conceptual level’ and the 
‘technical commands within a certain computer language’.87 While this is perhaps to a 
degree necessary when we are dealing with higher-order rules with legal relevance, we 
must not discount the concrete materiality of the technical commands that are the 
building blocks of the normativity that makes up those rules operating at that higher 
level of abstraction. For efficiency’s sake it might not always make sense to enquire into 
the minutiae of a code’s behaviour, it is important to nd an appropriate abstraction 
threshold between individual commands and the technological normativities that they 
collectively bring into being.  
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Leenes and Koops argue that the negligent production of privacy-eroding code 
can be viewed as akin to a rule stating that privacy is not important or is less important 
than other values. ey write that 
[a]lthough this is perhaps stretching the term ‘rule’ rather far, we are inclined 
to think that the development and application of code that negligently fails to 
take privacy effects into account can indeed be seen as the embedding of a 
‘rule’ in the technology, namely that privacy is unimportant and secondary to 
other values that the code primarily serves. Such technology does indeed serve 
to guide or control (what is perceived as) proper and acceptable behaviour, 
since privacy-infringement is considered an acceptable outcome of its use.88 
One can appreciate how abstracted this view is from the idea of viewing individual 
code commands as rules. In this case, the broader functionality of the code is 
interpreted as a rule. Here we can see a connection with the design theories discussed 
in the previous chapter. Leenes’ and Koops’ analysis might have been framed in such 
terms, whereby the (dis)affordance of a particular privacy protecting functionality is 
taken to be a de facto rule embodied in that particular code. From this level of 
abstraction,89 we can appreciate the normativity the code imposes without having to 
look directly at the underlying commands, providing a useful bridge between the idea 
of a rule and the normativity of the code. I discuss this topic further in Chapter 4.90 
In any event, in code we nd the collision of rules (at whatever level of 
abstraction) and reality, where ought becomes is. In this way, representationalism nds 
its apex: no appeal to metaphysical thought or belief is required to see how computer 
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code not just represents reality, but by de nition constitutes it. Behavioural possibilities 
are thus constituted by the rules, not merely regulated by them. 
Returning to the library borrowing system described by Bańkowski, we can 
appreciate how in the transition to code the substance of the rules becomes merely 
descriptive rather than regulative. e tracking of library users and their loans is 
obviated by means of swipe-card authentication (rule 1 collapses); the end of loans and 
the ‘return’ of ebooks is automated by code, thus rendering rule 2 a description; and 
rule 3 merely describes the state of the system that rule 4 enforces (again, 
automatically). e simple if-then instantiation of rule 4’s logic simply does not allow 
the subroutine of ‘issue book’ ever to take place. As Bańkowski describes the system: 
What we see then, is how the normative has become the descriptive. is gives us 
an example of rule following which has the machine-like quality of 
heteronomy: we ‘don’t think about it’.91 
e library’s rules, which were once normative, have become descriptive – they are 
simply how the system is. One can appreciate how this representation sees the code 
rule constituting reality, with no gap or space between the rule and its imposition. is 
connects deeply with the theory of constitutive and regulative rules, discussed next. 
3.2.1 Constitutive and regulative rules 
We saw in Chapter 2 the distinction between constitutive and regulative technological 
normativity.92 Hildebrandt speaks of the difference between legal rules that are 
constitutive of other (institutional) facts or rules, and those that aim to regulate 
behaviours which can take place independent of the rule’s existence.93 For example, the 
institutional fact of marriage cannot exist independently of a constitutive rule which 
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creates it, while it is possible to drive at 100 miles per hour even though there is a 
regulative rule which prohibits it.94 Regulative rules are therefore aimed at regulating 
existing activities, while constitutive rules ‘create the very possibility of certain 
activities.’95 In a sense, then, constitutive rules are creative, or generative,96 while 
regulative rules are limiting. Searle gives the example of chess: the rules of the game 
do not regulate what was already happening (i.e. it is not a common activity to idly 
push around miniature carved gurines representing kings, queens, knights, etcetera 
on a chequered board); rather, the rules in fact constitute the game. e game of chess 
does not exist outside of its constitutive rules – if people ignore them, they may be 
playing something, but it is not chess. e constitutive rules are thus creative in their 
bringing about (i) the general institution of ‘chess’, and (ii) the contingent institutional 
fact of any given particular game of chess.97 
is idea of an ‘institutional fact’ stems from the distinction between facts that 
are socially constructed, and ‘brute facts’ which exist ‘out there’.98 Examples of 
institutional facts include ‘money’ (specially-designed pieces of paper that have 
exchange value) or a ‘doctoral thesis’ (a detailed and novel analysis of a speci c topic 
usually somewhere between 60,000 and 100,000 words in length). Examples of brute 
facts include the distance between the earth and the sun at this very moment, or the 
amount of force I am currently exerting on my laptop’s keys. ‘Money’ and ‘doctoral 
thesis’ are institutional facts, while the distance and the force are brute facts. An 
‘institution’ in this sense does not refer to the more common usage akin to the concept 
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of an ‘organisation’, but rather to the less common meaning of ‘an established law, 
custom, usage, practice, organization, or other element in the political and social life 
of a people’,99 as in the game of chess above. 
Because institutional facts are social, which is to say they are created by humans 
and do not simply exist ‘out there’ in the physical world, they must be brought into 
being. is is the creative work done by constitutive rules. One can appreciate the 
tension here between legalism on the one hand, which does hold that the constitutive 
rules of law (a quintessential system of institutional facts) are ‘out there’, and less 
positivist viewpoints which seek to question the design of those constitutive rules (as 
this thesis does). 
From a legalistic perspective, constitutive rules can be arranged in a hierarchy 
which creates the underlying framework (itself an institutional fact or set of facts, 
sometimes termed a ‘constitution’) within which other rules can be made. is is 
Wintgens’ proxy model, discussed above, where the legitimacy of a given legal rule 
ows from some founding act which operates in the background to give validity to 
those subsequently promulgated norms.100 As previously stated, the idea is connected 
with various accounts of law that culminate in a notional foundational legal rule.  
As with the institution of chess, in law constitutive rules are necessary to create 
valid legal institutions, and the institutional facts that are created as instances of them. 
is is the basis of MacCormick’s theory of law as institutional fact.101 For example, 
‘marriage’ is a legal institution de ned by the requirements laid down in certain 
constitutive rules, and a marriage is a legal institutional fact that has come into being 
by following those rules.102 To speak of a couple being ‘married’ outside the 
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institutional framework (in both senses of ‘institution’) does not make sense, or at least 
does not point to a legally-recognised institutional fact.103  
How does this relate to code? Whereas the institutional facts created by legal 
constitutive rules are always only ‘real’ within the law’s own ‘regime of veridiction’104 
(i.e. they are not brute facts about the physical world105), code-based rules are in a great 
many cases ‘brute’ in the sense that they are ‘just there’ and part of the ‘physical’ fabric 
of the system. As Hildebrandt puts it, they are ‘constitutive of our behaviour’.106 In 
including, excluding, and de ning the limits of behaviour within the ambit of the 
system, they limit end-user freedom in material ways. e qualitative difference is that, 
with code, these limits are not merely regulative, where the end-user, already engaging 
in some activity online, is ‘requested’ to amend her behaviour this way or that (this is 
the equivalent of the speed limit which can only ‘request’ that the driver travel at less 
than 70 miles per hour). Rather, the limits are constitutive, in that the salient features 
of the behaviour are themselves de ned (i.e. constituted) by code. Whereas the chess 
player can use the architecture of the artefact (the board and its pieces) in ways that 
are outside the rules of the game, for example to play a simpler game like checkers with 
a young child, the architecture of code sets the rules in place ex ante, and does not by 
default allow them to be so adapted according to the discretion of the end-user.107 To 
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quote Lessig in one of his earliest works on the subject, ‘one obeys these laws as code 
not because one should; one obeys these laws as code because one can do nothing 
else.’108 e constraints and enablements of code are ‘like laws of nature, like the world 
as we nd it’;109 they are simply ‘there’, with the crucial difference between code and 
law being that rather than suggesting an ‘ought’, as law always does, code can simply 
impose an ‘is’.110 e three traditionally-conceived of phases of regulation (direction, 
detection, and correction)111 are thus susceptible to being collapsed into a single step.112 
It is, as we shall later see, possible for code rules to be regulative so that the 
end-user is in fact invited to behave in certain ways, and of course many digital systems 
do allow a range of behaviours in end-users’ interactions with them. Social networks, 
for example, give end-users fairly wide latitude on the volume and content of the text, 
images, and videos that they can upload. But even within this seemingly unlimited 
freedom to upload there are nevertheless constitutive limits – the code will accept only 
text, images, or video les (not PDFs or Word documents, or images/videos in formats 
the platform does not recognise), and only a certain volume of data can be uploaded. 
For most usage these boundaries will never be approached, and so the end-user is 
unaware of their existence, but they are nevertheless there. is connects with 
Brownsword’s concept of levels of technological control: in one sense the end-user is 
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free to submit whatever she likes (level 0), but simultaneously she is constrained both 
by the ‘physical’ limitations of the technology (only plain text or image/video les can 
be submitted; level 2) and by normative signals as to what content is acceptable (i.e. 
graphic images or hate speech are liable to be reported and removed by a moderator; 
level 1).113 
In many cases, then, the normativity embodied in code is more constitutive 
than regulative of the practice in question.114 e more constitutive a digital system is 
of a practice, the more control the designer has in de ning that practice, which in turn 
means that it will in many cases be commercially attractive to limit the ‘regulative 
latitude’ given to the end-user in her interactions with the system. Even on a purely 
practical level, building in or enlarging the contingent regulative space, at the expense 
of constitutive certainty, requires anticipation of more conditions, which in turn 
requires more code and therefore more expense, lending further commercial impetus 
to take a constitutive approach to design.  
3.3 Immediacy 
Code’s immediacy refers to the temporal aspect of execution. As discussed above, the 
hermeneutic gap between text and behaviour is collapsed, but not only does text 
constitute both rule and reality, but the application of it is arranged prior to, and 
imposed immediately at the point of, execution. e conditions speci ed in that prior 
arrangement are imposed without delay and without consideration of alternative 
actions that might have been appropriate. ere is no scope to ‘hesitate well’, as in 
Latour’s description of how judges work;115 linear time becomes compressed, further 
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distancing the character of code’s operation from the role that law’s more measured 
pace plays in the stabilisation of societal expectations.116  
Grimmelmann refers to this characteristic as code’s immediacy, where the ex 
ante nature of code means that ‘[s]oftware cannot – as law can – adapt its response in 
light of later-available information or a later determination that such information is 
relevant.’117 As we have seen, whereas law as a prospective regulator is inert in the 
absence of the will to re ect its terms in real-world behaviour, the enablements and 
constraints of code, put in place by the designer, have latent efficacy even before the 
system is operational. Recalling the discussion of the library system above, the end-
user is simply presented with the de facto ‘ruling’ of the code: she may not borrow any 
more ebooks, the ebook on her system will cease to be accessible at a speci c time, 
etcetera. e code’s swiftness is brutal and entirely impervious to external reason.118 
3.3.1 Default con gurations 
Immediacy is embodied in code even where the design includes the possibility of 
altering its con guration. End-users tend to accept as a ‘natural and immutable fact’119 
code’s pre-de ned con guration when it is rst supplied to them. ey are also 
susceptible to ‘automation bias’, whereby the con guration and responses of a machine 
are given greater credence than a human equivalent.120 For these reasons, the designer 
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has signi cant power in choosing one pre-con guration over another. As Tien notes, 
‘default settings may seem “normal” because the equipment is common, or have 
become “legitimate” as people have grown accustomed to the situation presented by 
the equipment.’121 Simultaneously, the ‘is-ness’ of default settings militates against 
enquiring as to whether other con gurations might be more suitable for the end-user 
– instead the defaults are accepted as immutable facts, and alternatives (should they 
even imagine them) as impossible or even unreasonable.122 For many end-users, the 
assumption will in many cases be that the designer knows best (known as the 
‘legitimating effect’123). Furthermore, they might lack the technical sophistication to 
investigate all the possible customisation options,124 or they might not have the time 
to do so,125 much less to think critically about what intentions might lie behind a 
particular choice of defaults and how these may have evolved over time according to 
the technical or commercial imperatives motivating the designer’s choices.126 As Tien 
notes, the behaviour-guiding quality of default con gurations is often stripped away 
by the perception that they are ‘mere design features’127 – in other words, as with 
legalism, that they are part of what is ‘just there’. Even where end-users care about the 
underlying values that are impacted by the default con guration of the design – and 
presumably a value such as legitimacy would qualify, for many if not most end-users – 
                                                 
121  L. Tien, ‘Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms’ (2004) 7 Yale Journal of Law 
& Technology 1, p. 16. 
122  Kesan and Shah, supra n. 119, pp. 596, 601; L. Diver, ‘Law as a User: Design, Affordance, and the 
Technological Mediation of Norms’ (2018) 15 SCRIPTed 4, p. 11. 
123  Kesan and Shah, supra n. 119, p. 603. 
124  Ibid., pp. 611–612. 
125  Ibid., p. 598 et seq. 
126  Tien, supra n. 121, p. 16. An example of this is Facebook’s then-controversial move to the ‘news 
feed’ layout as the default for all end-users. See J. Leyden, ‘Users Protest over “creepy” Facebook 
Update’ e Register (9 July 2006) 
<https://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/09/07/facebook_update_controversy/>. 




unless they are aware of the possibility of choice they will accept the default, even if it 
is injurious to the value.128  
Furthermore, the designer must make a choice as to how to balance the number 
of defaults (that is, options which the end-user can change) against the amount of ‘pre-
wired’ functionality: too many options or a confusing interface can confuse the end-
user, undermining the value of the choice.129 Indeed, providing con gurable options 
within interfaces that are antagonistic to exercising that choice is one means by which 
some unscrupulous (or perhaps just negligent) enterprises can argue that they are 
respecting end-users’ autonomy whilst simultaneously undermining their interests in 
favour of commercial expediency. A recent example is the design change in Google’s 
Chrome browser that obfuscates the circumstances in which end-users are logged into 
Google’s services, even when they have enabled the ‘block third-party cookies’ 
preference that would normally prevent this kind of behaviour (and indeed still does 
in other browsers).130 Such practices, sometimes termed ‘dark patterns’, were discussed 
in the design context in Chapter 2. It is worth noting, too, that the ‘block third-party 
cookies’ preference itself is not the default setting on any mainstream browser, and thus 
its privacy-enhancing mechanism is something end-users must manually enable, which 
requires rst that they are aware of the option and what it means.131 
Kesan and Shah describe three concepts from behavioural economics which are 
relevant to the impact of defaults: bounded rationality, cognitive biases, and the 
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legitimating effect. If the end-user is not made aware of the underlying code’s 
behaviour and the possibility of exercising agency to con gure it, she will effectively 
see the system as xed, even if she would otherwise be interested in making a change, 
and is to that extent disempowered from exercising her rationality to choose.132 
Cognitive biases operate in three ways.133 Under the ‘status quo bias’, the end-user 
favours ‘inertia over action’, meaning she accepts de facto the ‘is-ness’ of the system. 
e ‘omission bias’ operates to discourage end-users from actively making a change, 
because it is believed that worse effects (i.e. breaking the system) are likely to result in 
doing something (i.e. changing a setting) rather than nothing. e last bias, the 
‘endowment effect’, sees individuals ascribe higher value to settings that they perceive 
to favour them, thus biasing them against switching to an alternative. Lastly, the third 
concept from behaviour economics which Kesan and Shah discuss is the legitimating 
effect. is sees end-users interpret defaults as normative signals as to what they should 
do; they assume defaults to be ‘reasonable, ordinary, and sensible’ because if this was 
not the case the designer would have made another setting the default choice.134 
From this discussion we can see how easily the design of defaults can contribute 
to a minimisation of end-users’ comprehension of code and, conversely, the increase 
of its regulative effect on their behaviour. 
3.3.2 Pervasiveness 
e pervasiveness of code is not difficult to appreciate. Digitalisation is all around us, 
and increasing at ever-greater speed. Cisco estimates that by 2020 there will be 250 
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‘things’ connecting to the Internet every second, up from 80 per second in 2013.135 
ey suggest further that the total volume of devices is expected to reach 1.8tn in 2020, 
with an annual growth rate of 3%.136 IoT devices are being integrated further into daily 
life through the development of more sophisticated low-power infrastructure137 and 
the diversi cation of connected applications.138 Similar trends are also in evidence for 
the blockchain artefacts that increasingly govern and make use of the data that ows 
from IoT devices. 
3.3.3 Immutability 
Surden notes how the subjective value judgements of designers, and the resulting 
effects of the rules embodied in their code, can be magni ed when the systems are 
distributed and adopted widely.139 e choice of rules becomes xed in the code, 
enabling its exponential magni cation as its effects compound with successive 
execution.140 Bamberger notes similar risks in his discussion of ‘systemic effects’ – 
whereas at production time the designer has great freedom to choose how the code 
should behave, this plasticity is to a great extent ‘locked down’ once production has 
ceased.141 is is what Winner terms the ‘initial commitments’. For him,  
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…technological innovations are similar to legislative acts or political 
foundings that establish a framework for public order that will endure over 
many generations. For that reason, the same careful attention one would give 
to the rules, roles, and relationships of politics must also be given to such 
things as the… tailoring of seemingly insigni cant features on new 
machines.142 
ese observations strengthen the impetus to focus on ex ante production of code 
rather than ex post assessments of it. Goldoni summarises why this is so: 
Given the nature and the logic of architectural regulation, the emphasis on 
output legitimacy is misplaced for several reasons. First, since technology is 
often irreversible – once it is developed and applied in society, it is difficult to 
change it or remove it from society in those applications – the process which 
develops code as law becomes a key concern when normativity is at stake. In 
fact, it may well be too late when a particular version of a technology appears 
or is adopted… [t]he difficulty of reversing embedded code is often evident 
and makes it fundamental to focus on the procedure and the actors involved 
in [its] development.143 
Without some ready means of altering the code after it is produced, the normative 
import of the ‘initial commitments’ is all the greater. Even where the code can be 
updated, its immediacy means its normative effect is in place before this happens, and 
so it is important that the design is produced in a legitimate fashion from the outset. 
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We saw in the previous chapter how design operates in ways which are not always 
within the conscious apprehension of the end-user. is opacity forms another 
cornerstone element of computational legalism and the requirement that end-users 
‘not think about it’: if the end-user cannot comprehend the rules to which her 
behaviour is subject, she cannot possibly consider whether and how to respond to 
them. is foundational issue is problematic in traditional processes of democratic law-
making. Waldron, for example, notes that ‘those interested in democracy will have a 
direct interest also in this opacity itself – that is, in the sheep-like ignorance of the 
nature of the law one is ruled by’.144 So too in the computational context, except that 
there the extent to which end-users-as-citizens are rendered ‘sheep-like’ is qualitatively 
and quantitatively greater.145 As Goldoni notes, ‘given the opacity of architectural 
regulation, to be aware of how technology is directly or indirectly impacting upon 
agents’ behaviours may prove to be too difficult in many cases.’146 Although focused on 
source code and the web, Longford’s observations are apposite: 
A central feature of new media design, in fact, is that the source code for any 
particular application or program which structures an end-user’s experience is 
hidden from them… HTML, IP addresses, and web browser software are 
exemplary of code’s self-concealing character. HTML conceals the textual 
information which is ultimately responsible for the graphical web pages 
presented to surfers. 
Whereas most browsers have a ‘view source’ option that makes HTML relatively 
accessible (if not necessarily comprehensible, despite its human-readability147) to the 
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end-user, the compiled code that implements speci c rules in other digital artefacts is 
generally both inaccessible and inscrutable because of its translation into machine-
readable ‘object code’. Regardless of the programming language used, however, end-
users face difficulty in comprehending the totality of the system before them. e basic 
point is as Winner put it, as far back as 1977: end-users ‘are unable to give an adequate 
explanation of man-made phenomena in their immediate experience. ey are unable 
to form a coherent, rational picture of the whole.’148 As a result, ‘all persons do and, 
indeed, must accept a great number of things on faith.’149 e user interfaces of digital 
artefacts are inherently limited in their communication of the myriad operations taking 
place behind-the-scenes. Even the apparently simplest of operations, for example 
clicking a hyperlink on a webpage, involves a host of unseen technical processes.150 
Most of the time obscuring all of this is bene cial, because the cognitive load of having 
to comprehend all that is really going on would quickly overwhelm. As mentioned 
above, it would be undesirable to enquire into the detail of every rule being followed 
in every computational operation, since the burden of comprehension is too great. e 
task then is to give information and control ‘over the right things at the right time’.151 
is obfuscation of actual behaviour can however be used both for good and bad; the 
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ability to hide the complexity of standard technical behaviours for the sake of the end-
user can also be used to obfuscate technical behaviours that are not in her interests.152  
We have seen on the one hand how end-users tend to show deference to 
defaults, while on the other the immutable aspects of a system’s architecture situate 
the end-user within an assemblage of behaviour-constraining rules that might admit 
of only minimal, if any, interpretation – a fait accompli, ‘achieving compliance by 
default rather than through active enforcement’.153 As Hildebrandt notes, whereas  
[l]egal norms do not rule out disobedience, contestation of the technological 
defaults that regulate our lives may be impossible because they are often 
invisible and because most of the time there is no jurisdiction and no court.154 
e normativity of code is in no way contingent on it being intelligible to those whose 
behaviour is regulated by it (or indeed even those who created it). ere is no 
requirement that its rules be made public or available, much less in a form that can be 
understood by humans. Indeed, the complexity of code rules is such that they rapidly 
become unintelligible, even to the experts who created them. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, it thus becomes extremely difficult (and in most cases impossible) for 
the end-user to scrutinise the rules to which her behaviour is subject. We therefore 
have the blindest of legalistic ‘blind rule following’.155   
3.4.1 Code as legal positivism 
e discussion above aims to demonstrate the sheer ‘isness’ of code; its ‘positivism’ is 
of a form that is deeply challenging to a vision of law as a reasoned enterprise that 
re ects the democratically-expressed outlook of a society, from and according to which 
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its norms are developed and applied. As Vismann and Krajewski note, code’s ‘virtuality 
challenges the law’s core concepts: corporeality, nitude, and authentication, concepts 
that are fundamental to any claim of territorial sovereignty as well as to imputations 
and rules of evidence’.156 
is ‘positivism’ removes the possibility of deliberation on the part of the end-
user, resulting in a kind of instrumentalism that strips individuals of their ability to 
take part in the moral community, even where they disagree with the substance of the 
rules. End-users have no choice but to obey the rules, but simultaneously they have no 
standing in their formulation.157 As Brownsword – a ‘card-carrying natural lawyer’158 – 
notes, design simply ‘by-passes practical reason to eliminate all options other than the 
desired pattern of behaviour.’159 One of the effects of this is to ‘demoralise’ citizens, 
blunting their sensitivity to social norms and thus their capacity for self-control and 
for doing good.160 is latter point connects with Fuller’s discussion of the morality of 
aspiration, and how it con icts with a legalistic morality of duty where the rule 
constitutes the entirety of what is required of regulatees, with no further 
expectations.161 For Bańkowski, this minimal expectation is not enough; legalism and 
positivism collapse the aspirational aspect of legality and reduce the guiding normative 
value of social practices, because the presence of a ‘critical morality’ that invites self-
scrutiny becomes displaced by a rote rule-bound approach to the direction of citizens’ 
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conduct.162 In other words, by not needing to consider what a proper course of action 
would be, our ability or habit of raising such questions becomes atrophied. 
Brownsword suggests that a community fully reliant on such forms of (state) regulation 
which obviate the possibility of moral deliberation is ‘no longer an operative moral 
community.’163 In other words, we require the opportunity to choose to do good, in the 
face of at least the possibility of doing otherwise, if we are to continue to exercise 
practical reason as moral actors. Waldron makes a similar point about the ‘dignitarian’ 
aspect of legality: we aspire to a law which ‘conceives of the people who live under it 
as bearers of reason and intelligence’, even if the price of this is a ‘diminution in law’s 
certainty’.164 Computational legalism demonstrates the most certain of certainties, but 
simultaneously hides it under the veil of opacity from the end-user’s comprehension. 
As we will see in Chapter 5, the provision of spaces for the exercise of such reason and 
choice is not just about providing more choice, but is about providing the right quality 
of choice within the geography of the code.165 
3.5 e veiling of code’s production  
Wintgens discusses the ‘veil of sovereignty’ that shrouds the work of the legislator, 
shielding it and her from the gaze of the legal philosopher and the legalistic citizen.166 
Legislative sovereignty is perceived as a black box,167 a concept that is apposite in this 
context given its staple use in Science, Technology and Society studies (STS) 
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analyses.168 e ultimate source of sovereignty is not in question and the mechanisms 
by which its outputs are arrived at are not to be questioned by jurists. Boyle noted this 
obscuring function early on when he suggested that ‘[t]he technology appears to be 
“just the way things are”; its origins are concealed, whether those origins lie in state-
sponsored scheme or market-structured order, and its effects are obscured because it is 
hard to imagine the alternative’.169  
In the computational context, the ‘sovereignty’ of the designer is protected by 
two ‘veils’ – one technical and the other legal. e rst is the code-based opacity 
discussed in the previous section: this veil is one of technical inscrutability, which the 
ordinary end-user is usually ill-equipped to lift, if that is even a possibility. e second 
veil protects enterprise by, for example, trade secrecy and anti-circumvention laws, 
which limit the scrutiny their development practices are put under, strengthening their 
quasi-sovereignty.170 e prevailing neoliberal economic outlook sustains this second 
veil by shifting sovereignty away from the state and onto the market,171 while 
simultaneously unfettered technological innovation is prioritised as a good in itself.172 
us the private ‘sovereignty’ of the pro t-seeking enterprise is black-boxed unless and 
until a real-world harm is detected, which might never happen, owing to the technical 
veil. It is the task of the market and not the state to respond to the enterprise’s designs 
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in order to ascertain their correct value and desirability. e commercial entity is free 
to exercise its imperative for pro t, while the market is trusted to curb any excesses. 
As Schulz and Dankert put it, ‘code is essentially a resource through which the ones 
designing the code can pursue their interests’.173 Similarly, Bańkowski and Schafer note 
that  
[f]or the individual, more often than not, the absence of government is not 
experienced as liberating, but as subjugation to commercial interests which 
effortless [sic] project, and indeed magnify, their offline powers into 
cyberspace.174 
Herein lies a paradox of commercial computational legalism: as discussed above, 
legalism is ideologically attractive in part because it helps establish a baseline of 
certainty which is advantageous to capitalist enterprise.175 As those enterprises have 
developed into promulgators of code-based rules, however, their need for certainty has 
circumscribed the liberty of the ordinary citizen through the development of an 
imbalance of regulative power between government and commerce,176 and by the lack 
of incentives to ensure that their design processes and the products of them embody 
values of legitimacy and legal protection that are intrinsic to that liberty. Hildebrandt 
and Koops suggest that cost, convenience, the difficulty of controlling risk, and the 
power imbalance between government and commerce all combine in the context of 
privacy to ‘favour privacy-threatening technology far more than privacy-friendly 
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“code”’.177 In the absence of incentives to create the latter, code which is supportive of 
commercial interests but detrimental to end-users’ interests is likely to win out; the 
features of computational legalism make it easy (and ‘rational’, from a neoliberal 
perspective) to take that route. e same is true for the more fundamental form of 
user-antagonistic code I am concerned with. Looking more broadly than just 
substantive privacy, this refers to code which constrains behaviour according to 
commercial imperative but has not been legitimately produced, that is its ex ante 
design neither takes into account its legitimacy at runtime nor provides sufficient ex 
post mechanisms for redress.  
4. Conclusion 
To summarise, we have seen how the characteristics of code come together to 
demonstrate a form of legalism that is signi cantly stronger than even that envisaged 
by Wintgens. With code we have the apex of legalism: from the end-user’s perspective, 
code’s architecture is simply ‘just there’, while simultaneously its constitutive nature 
de nes what practices are possible, by de nition ruling out all the possible alternatives 
that the plasticity of the code might otherwise have allowed. We therefore have not 
just representationalism, but realism: code does not just represent reality, it actively 
constitutes it. e behaviour of the end-user is to a great extent bound ex ante, and 
since she will in most cases not be aware of that binding she is, through no oversight 
or mistake on her part, forced to acquiesce blindly to the rules that are inscribed in the 
code:178 she is deprived of even the possibility of choosing whether or not to, in 
Bańkowski’s terms, ‘think about it’. e code does not just represent reality, it constitutes 
it, and there is little the end-user can do to query that constitution.  
                                                 
177  Ibid. 




e hard edges of code rules admit of no interpretation or latitude beyond what 
the designer has had the foresight (and incentive) to implement. ese are 
strengthened by the immediacy of code: it executes without delay, imposing those 
potentially harmful rules without deliberation. While the end-user may in some cases 
have the opportunity to alter the default con guration of the rules, the literature shows 
that they tend not to do this, deferring instead to the perceived knowledge and 
expertise of the designer. In any event, the provision of an option is contingent on both 
the designer deciding to do so and the interface making it clear what the options are 
and what they mean. Here are a-temporality and concealed instrumentalism in 
evidence. 
Finally, the veil of sovereignty is widened, covering veils of both technical 
inscrutability and neoliberal market protection. e opacity of digital architectures 
militates almost fatally against end-users understanding the incentives and rules to 
which their behaviour is subject and the possible functionalities that were left aside in 
the designer’s choice to render the system as it is. is takes place in the context of an 
economy which hitherto has promoted unfettered innovation over regulation, leaving 
any negative effects of the fruits of the process to be dealt with according to market 
signals. 
Taken together with the design analysis in the previous chapter, the discussion 
here has set up the concept of computational legalism, strengthening the theoretical 
parallel between code and law as normative orders whose rules can be created in ways 
that are legalistic to varying degrees. By developing this parallel, I set up the foundation 
for an analysis that imports the measures designed to reduce or avoid legalism in the 
legal sphere into the design sphere. Before I embark on that synthesis, the next chapter 
sets out the two primary legal theories from which I develop the digisprudential 










Normative criteria for producing {law, code} 
Translating the paradox of the ‘Rechtsstaat’ into digital code – using a 
technology to protect us against undesired consequences while regulating its 
use – would thus require two things. First, the use of code must be legitimized 
in democratic procedure and second, the implications of automatic application 
must be faced and mitigated.1 
 
…it is perfectly fair to ask regulators to justify both their purposes and the 
instruments (the rules or the designs) that they have adopted.2 
1. Introduction 
e previous chapter looked at the characteristics of strong legalism, before 
considering how they are evidenced by code, in order to posit the concept of 
computational legalism, a species of ‘legalism’ that exempli es and ampli es those 
characteristics. is chapter takes a similar approach in its structure, looking rst at 
the traditional legal sphere before moving into the computational realm. e rst part 
discusses various scholars’ understanding of legitimacy, before going on to set out two 
normative frameworks of criteria for the creation of traditional legal norms, namely 
Fuller’s internal morality of law, and Wintgens’ legisprudence. e chapter then shifts 
focus to review the existing literature on normative criteria for code-making. From this 
discussion we gain a sense of the kinds of concerns around computational legitimacy 
that are displayed in the literature, and what considerations are missing or less fully 
analysed: the most obvious limitations in the current literature concern private code 
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production, and the unintended creation of technological normativity. ese gaps are 
then considered in the development of the digisprudence framework in the next 
chapter. 
2. Normative criteria for law-making: the aspirations of legality 
e strong legalism we saw in Chapter 3 might be described as the extreme end of a 
spectrum, at the opposite of which lies the open-ended particularism of certain strands 
of Critical Legal Studies scholarship.3 Legality, on the other hand, is viewed by some 
as a more aspirational concept, of fundamental importance to constitutional 
democracy: according to Bańkowski, it is a crucial element in what makes a free and 
democratic society – it is ‘something worth living for; something worth dying for’.4  
While the precise meaning and components of legality are contested, there are 
some overarching themes. Bańkowski talks of the operation of individual will 
ameliorating the blanket heteronomy of legalism, with legality representing the 
appropriate interplay, or placing of the threshold, between the moralities of duty and 
aspiration (i.e. between those rules which citizens should follow ‘mindlessly’ like 
automata, and those which they should consider more deeply before acting, perhaps 
with the help of appropriate institutions).5 Brownsword views legality as concerning a 
‘legal approach’ that embeds ‘participation, transparency, due process, and the like.’6 
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He also speaks of ‘processual public law values of transparency, accountability, inclusive 
participation, reason-giving and the like together with the controls exerted by 
background fundamental values (such as compatibility with respect for human rights 
and human dignity).’7 For Hildebrandt, legality is about purpose binding, where the 
exercise of power by the sovereign is limited according to pre-existing principles, ‘tying 
the state to its own legal rules, but also [instantiating] a system of checks and balances 
that safeguards against the Sirens of tyranny or those of market fundamentalism’.8 It 
is also concerned with the provision of ‘fundamental rights that prevent [law] from 
turning into legalism.’9 She invokes the Greek legend of Odysseus as an illustration of 
the purpose binding principle – like its protagonist, in a constitutional democracy the 
government is bound by its own pre-de ned rules, despite its notional power to redraw 
those rules and the evident temptation to do so.10 Ultimately this results in a ‘modern 
law’ that consists of ‘self-rule, disobedience and contestability’: (i) laws are constituted 
by a democratic legislator and are made visible and intelligible to those they seek to 
govern, (ii) the governed have the ability to violate those laws, and so the decision to 
comply is an exercise of autonomy, and (iii) the substance of the legal norms, and the 
consequences of their violation, can be contested in a court of law.11  
ese various conceptions of legality have a certain liminal quality; they seem 
to point towards a kind of digni ed space for contemplation and choice that lies 
somewhere between the two extremes of heteronomy and anarchism. Acting 
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appropriately involves more than simply falling in line with legalism’s rote morality of 
duty, but also something more structured than a chaotically subjective choice based on 
the particulars of each and every circumstance. Somewhere between these extremes 
lies a balance of autonomy and duty, provided by legal and social frameworks whose 
guiding force and institutions create spaces that allow for that consideration to take 
place. e ‘intimate justice’ of particularity cannot be true justice because of its lack of 
even-handedness, while simultaneously an ‘aloof’ and objective justice will at times feel 
harsh and unforgiving.12 e ideal of legality aims to tread a difficult line between these 
poles, providing a measure of institutional guidance and rule-bound certainty whilst 
also maintaining some freedom of choice and re ection. In that respect, then, it 
encompasses aspects of legalism; the latter is a necessary element of legality, providing 
a level of predictability that is necessary to avoid the need to enquire into the 
particularities of every circumstance.  
For Bańkowski and MacCormick, strong legalism is a ‘negative ideology’. eir 
de nition of legality, which maps onto Wintgens’ idea of ‘weak legalism’ (discussed 
below), makes use of the legalistic outlook insofar as formalism and certainty are 
required in the ordering of ‘durable social organizations’,13 but it rejects heteronomy 
untempered by rational and critical re ection: 
It remains true, however, that rules without underlying principles of a kind 
that could be assented to by a rational autonomous being are rules that can be 
implements of tyranny. It is also true that every application of a rule is also an 
interpretation of it. Approaches to interpretation that ignore or undervalue 
the need for attention to principles, and to the consequences of decision [sic] 
judged against implicit values and principles of law, are undesirable on the 
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same ground if to a lesser degree. Legalism as vice is indeed the vice of this narrow 
governance of rules, unleavened by the principled approach of interpretation.14 
is view of legality thus encompasses legalism as far as is necessary to create a 
predictable and reliable institutional order, but leaves a space in which the individual 
can deliberate about what her course of action ought to be. Unlike the strong legalism 
set out in the previous chapter, legality on this view does not confuse the rules and 
heuristics with the entirety of the law – it allows a digni ed space for re exive exercise 
of reason, intelligence, and freedom,15 in contrast to the ‘one shot’ at autonomy allowed 
in the social contract-based proxy model of strong legalism.16  
Drawing on Fuller, Bańkowski argues that whereas the legalistic attitude cares 
only to meet the threshold of the morality of duty and no more, legality expands this 
to include the idea of a morality of aspiration. Here the question is not simply of what 
is ‘owed’, but rather what comes into play are less strictly limned values, like 
authenticity.17 It is, he argues, not sufficient simply to meet the minimum standard 
represented by a bald interpretation of the rules; instead, these exist on an ‘aspirational 
scale’18 and there are times when it is appropriate to expect more of an actor (or indeed 
perhaps ‘less’, in the consequentialist sense of disobeying the rule being morally 
desirable if it means a better outcome, contra the Kantian categorical imperative). e 
morality of duty is one point on the aspirational scale and represents (ceteris paribus) 
the minimum action that is required. But the scale goes further; it is possible to do 
more. Aspiration goes beyond the morality of duty’s ‘rules of grammar’, aiming instead 
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for what Smith called ‘what is sublime and elegant in composition.’19 is related to 
Floridi’s discussion of ‘post-compliance ethics’ and the line between compliance with 
the bare law and the legitimate expectation that more is done.20 As we shall see, the 
question of where this threshold should lie arises in the context of code: to what extent 
should the concrete behaviour of the technical design be legalistic ( xed con guration; 
the heteronomous end-user), and to what extent should it build in the aspirations of 
legality ( exible con guration; the autonomous end-user)? It also connects with the 
goals of responsible research and innovation (RRI), where the ‘substance’ of research 
is not constrained (unlawfulness aside) but it is nevertheless guided by pre-de ned 
‘normative anchor points’ towards desirable outcomes.21 
2.1 Input and output legitimacy in law 
We can see from the above scholars’ views of legality that it is a somewhat amorphous 
ideal, with conceptions of it focusing sometimes on the ex ante criteria that dictate the 
process of norm creation and the formal qualities of the resulting rules, sometimes on 
the other ideas of ex post criteria that provide for due process and non-arbitrariness in 
administration (this latter perspective is what I understand by the rule of law22), and 
sometimes both.23 Waldron makes a similar distinction between what law is (the 
‘concept of law’, i.e. what constitutes law), and how it is administered and applied (the 
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‘rule of law’).24 Legality on this account speaks to the formal qualities of the rules, while 
the rule of law speaks to how those rules are applied in practice. Neither of these ideas 
concerns the substantive content of the rules directly – the question is one of process, 
both before promulgation (i.e. in the design of the norm), and after (in its 
application).25 
Scharpf and Waldron each contrast the concepts of input (process) and output 
(result) legitimacy, within the traditional contexts of legislation and judicial review. 
Input legitimacy is about the process being followed, which in the traditional sphere 
requires participation or representation of some form.26 Scharpf calls this ‘government 
by the people’;27 Waldron gives the obvious examples of political equality and 
enfranchisement.28 Output legitimacy, on the other hand, is about the ‘proof being in 
the pudding’ – legitimacy is established through an assessment of the results of a rule’s 
operation. Scharpf calls this ‘government for the people’, where a result is deemed 
legitimate because it solves the problem it was aimed at.29 
Disagreement about the desirability of a norm’s substantive content (its output) 
can exist alongside an agreement that the norm was arrived at and formulated in a 
proper way (its input legitimacy) – this is how the norm, despite its divisiveness, attains 
(political) legitimacy.30 is distinction between input and output reasons chimes with 
the Fullerian ideas of the inner and external morality of law, the former of which is 
constituted by his principles of legality (these are discussed below). Whereas input 
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criteria speak to the procedural aspects of the creation of a given rule or judicial 
decision, output criteria speak to its efficacy or desirability in the world. Goldoni 
describes the distinction in the following terms: 
Input reasons are those reasons that apply to the procedural aspects of 
decisions, that is, to how a decision is reached. As a measure for legitimacy, 
input reasons take into account the fairness of the adopted procedure. Output 
reasons concern the content of decisions and they represent a moral yardstick 
for judging the legitimacy of technologies. What counts as legitimate, 
according to the output-based perspective, is the end result of a decision and 
its normative content, not how the decision was reached.31 
Very crudely, then, a focus solely on input criteria is deontological, while a focus on 
only output criteria is consequentialist. As with Fuller, the two perspectives interact – 
the quality of the rule in action (i.e. its consequences, or output) is shaped by the 
conditions that channel how it was made; those conditions can tend towards 
normatively undesirable as well as desirable substantive rules32 (although of course 
Fuller argued in his debate with Hart that the principles of legality tended to minimise 
the possibility of substantive iniquity33). e inner, input, morality constrains the 
substantive content of its outer, or output, morality; form circumscribes substance.34 
Wintgens’ theory of legisprudence makes a similar claim: whether a given proposed 
legislative rule is legitimate or not is contingent on it being justi ed according to the 
principles of legisprudence, whose formal qualities dictate, apart from any substantive 
political content, the base level required in order for legitimacy to obtain. Floridi too 
suggests that the scope for ‘soft ethics’ to operate is determined by the space left after 
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‘hard ethics’ (and their legal instantiations) are de ned, and so too is the quality of the 
possible forms that soft ethics can take predetermined to an extent by the morality of 
the constitutive laws that de ne ab initio that ‘ethical geography’.35 
We can perhaps sense from the preceding discussion a roughly four-part 
classi cation of the various types of criteria, according to their target and temporal 
position. In terms of input (ex ante) criteria, these can be split into (i) procedural 
criteria that govern the process of deliberation that leads to a given norm being 
created,36 and (ii) criteria that constrain what formal qualities the norm should have, 
assessed separately from its substantive content.37 In terms of output (ex post) criteria 
we have (iii) mechanisms of due process, transparency, and accountability to enable 
the detection and remedy of wrongs in operation,38 and (iv) assessments of the moral 
or political content of the norm itself.39  
As we shall see, most theorists’ frameworks include criteria from more than 
one of these categories. Of course, as I have so far argued, computational legalism 
requires greater focus on the rst two of these classi cations, although in the private 
sector, at least, ex ante procedural criteria are less likely to be readily applicable than 
ex ante formal criteria, given the lack of incentives to facilitate participation. e 
digisprudential theory I am developing is primarily concerned with the second 
classi cation (formal ex ante, or input, criteria), part of which is intended to facilitate 
the ex post criterion of contestability (the third classi cation). In this way, the former 
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operate both to constrain iniquity and to facilitate the latter. I return to the question 
of criteria for code below in section 3, but for now the remainder of this section sets 
out more fully Fuller’s and Wintgens’ normative frameworks for the design of legal 
norms. 
2.2 Fuller’s internal morality of law 
Perhaps the most prominent and in uential discussion of normative principles for law-
making can be found in Fuller’s e Morality of Law.40 Explicitly aspirational, Fuller’s 
eight ‘principles of legality’ are intended to appeal ‘to a sense of trusteeship and to the 
pride of the craftsman’.41 ey are about trying to achieve excellence (not to say 
perfection) in the business of law-making and application – a primary consideration 
arising from his principles is how best to design a law, as distinct from what its political 
content is or ought to be. Indeed, Fuller uses the language of design on various 
occasions, referring to law-making as a ‘craft’,42 and to the eight principles as ‘those 
laws respected by a carpenter who wants the house he builds to remain standing and 
serve the purpose of those living in it.’43 As can be appreciated from the principles, 
listed below, they are not just about making good law from the perspective of the 
conscientious law-maker; they can also be viewed as constraining the unconscientious 
law-maker to prevent the possibility of (excessive) iniquity.44 Fuller’s eight principles 
are as follows: 
(1) e generality of law. In order for conduct to be regulated, rules must be laid 
down that display ‘reasoned generality’ rather than the ‘patternless exercise of 
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political power’.45 Arbitrariness is to be avoided. (Recall the discussion of 
legality above, and the threshold between duty and aspiration). 
(2) Promulgation. e rules must be made available to those who will be governed 
by them, who are thus empowered to interpret and criticise them, and observe 
how they are applied and enforced.46 
(3) Retroactive laws. is principle overlaps with the others: if laws are 
promulgated which render conduct unlawful that was not prohibited at the 
time it took place, the possibility of citizens knowing and obeying the law 
becomes fatally undermined. is principle is not absolute, however; Fuller 
notes that while retrospective law-making is prima facie ‘a monstrosity’, in some 
cases a holistic view of the principles will require it in order to cure some other 
‘shipwreck’ in the enterprise of legality.47 is hints at the non-absolute, 
deliberative nature of legality. 
(4) Clarity of laws. Fuller describes this as one of the most essential principles. 
Whereas legalism deems that what looks like law is law (i.e. formal validity 
begets law, regardless of its substantive merits), this principle requires the 
legislator to do more. As Fuller puts it, ‘it is obvious that obscure and 
incoherent legislation can make legality unattainable by anyone, or at least 
unattainable without an unauthorized revision which itself impairs legality.’ If 
a rule is so unclear that its interpretation distorts either its original expression 
or the intention behind it, then recursively we hit the buffers of legality again, 
whereby the law as practiced is not the law as promulgated.48 
(5) Contradictions in the laws. Fuller suggests that dealing with contradictions in 
legal norms is not simply a case of logic, that is to say it is not enough to observe 
that norm A cannot be the same as not-A (¬A); clearly such a statement does 
not on its own assist in resolving the contradiction. Fuller makes the point that 
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in determining whether two laws are contradictory something more is required: 
an appeal to extra-legal factors is necessary to determine the state of the world, 
what he calls the ‘whole institutional setting of the problem – legal, moral, 
political, economic, and sociological.’49 
(6) Laws requiring the impossible. Fuller’s treatment of this principle is complex 
and includes a discussion of criminal and delictual liability, unjust enrichment, 
and economic (taxation) law that is not of relevance here. e essential concept 
is simple, however: a law should not compel the impossible, for example that 
‘one should become ten feet tall’.50 e promulgation of laws which are 
impossible to follow risks ‘doing serious injustice or […] diluting respect for 
law’. Whereas in other contexts (such as the classroom) the exhortation to 
impossible ends can be an incentive to aspire to better results, in the legal 
context the stakes are different, and higher.51 
(7) Constancy of the law through time. is requirement is interesting from the 
perspective of the digni ed pace of law. Fuller observes that both retrospective 
laws and constantly changing laws are apt to create injustice. If one of the aims 
of law is to normalise expectations, this can only be achieved if norms have a 
chance to settle in to the society in which they are promulgated.52 
(8)  Congruence between declared rule and official action. Fuller describes this as 
the most complex principle, such congruence being potentially undermined in 
various ways, including ‘mistaken interpretation, inaccessibility of the law, lack 
of insight into what is required to maintain the integrity of a legal system, 
bribery, prejudice, indifference, stupidity, and the drive toward personal 
power.’53 is is in a sense a catch-all requirement, under which institutions 
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such as procedural due process, contest, and judicial review operate to identify 
and address such problems. It relates also to the constancy and retroactivity 
principles; the settling of arrangements over time may be necessary for latent 
incongruences to emerge as circumstances evolve. 
e purpose of the principles of legality is to ensure the presence of what Fuller calls 
the ‘inner morality of law’.54 is inner morality is distinct from its ‘external’ morality, 
which represents the substantive content of legal norms. A legal norm can, 
theoretically, be simultaneously internally moral and externally immoral – the 
assessment of external morality will differ according to each individual’s moral outlook 
whereas, Fuller argues, the internal morality of law requires certain standards which 
are universal in a democratic polity. Internal morality should not be optional, whatever 
one’s political persuasion might be.55 
Fuller’s principles are a mix of input (ex ante formal) and output (ex post 
procedural) criteria. Principles three to six govern the form of a proposed rule, 
constraining ex ante what its substance can possibly be: the rule cannot be retroactive 
(with exceptions); it must be reasonably clear in order to enable interpretation by 
regulatees; it cannot contradict extant rules without amending or repealing them; and 
it cannot require the impossible. Principles two and eight are examples of ex post 
procedural criteria: the former requires that the rules once made are publicised, while 
the latter binds the implementing authority to operate according to a reasonable 
interpretation of the substantive content of the rule (subject to the overarching 
contestability requirement). 
As will become apparent, there are signi cant overarching parallels between 
Fuller’s concept of legality and Wintgens’ legisprudence, although Wintgens’ formal 
prescriptions constrain even more tightly the substantive content a norm can possibly 
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have. e same concern, adverted to above, applies however, whereby the formal 
characteristics ought to exist in any norm in order for it to be legitimate, regardless of 
the substantive political content (external morality) that it instrumentalises.  
2.3 Wintgens’ legisprudence 
Legisprudence combines criteria for ex ante formal validity with additional criteria that 
constrain the possible substance of a given rule, rejecting a legalistic/positivist 
perspective in order actively to peer behind the ‘veil of sovereignty’56 to nd additional 
legitimation of the proposed norm. Given the sovereignty of the legislator, Wintgens 
says that there is no limit to the theoretical foundations for a rule: the rationale could 
for example be economic, sociological, or technical. e important point, however, is 
that there must always be justi cation from some theoretical basis other than just bare 
sovereign whim. Unlike strong legalism, which as we have seen is content not to lift 
the veil of sovereignty to reveal the reasoning that motivated a particular exercise of 
power, the legisprudence framework requires both formal qualities in the norms that 
are promulgated, and enquiries as to the other, extra-legal, theoretical bases that 
provide the necessary additional justi cation. 
is provides some useful, and I would suggest necessary, theoretical 
foundations for a critique of computational legalism and for the guidance of the 
production of technological normativity. e remainder of this section sets out the 
main parts of the theory of legisprudence, before moving on to discuss each of its 
principles. 
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2.3.1 What is legisprudence? 
Legisprudence aims to shift jurisprudence away from a focus on only the ex post 
reasoning of the judiciary and legal professionals towards a greater consideration of the 
ex ante reasoning of legislators. e intention is to provide an explicitly legal-
theoretical (as opposed to ethical or political) framework for the creation of legal rules, 
instead of ignoring the latter as an aspect of the ‘dirty business’ of politics. Shklar’s 
fences of legalism – those boundaries that surround and aim to separate law from other 
human endeavours – are thus broken down. Wintgens summarises legisprudence like 
this: 
A different position is to study legislative problems from the angle of legal 
theory. is approach I propose to call legisprudence. Legisprudence has as its 
object legislation and regulation, making use of the theoretical tools and 
insights of legal theory. e latter predominantly deals with the question of 
the application of law by the judge. Legisprudence enlarges the eld of study 
to include the creation of law by the legislator.57 
Legisprudence is a practical approach through which those who legislate can avoid 
succumbing to a strongly-legalistic ideology. It adopts a position of ‘weak’ legalism, 
whereby delity to rules is accepted as necessary, but on the condition that the form 
of those rules meets certain criteria and the rules are subject to ongoing justi cation. 
As Wintgens puts it, 
[l]egisprudence can therefore be taken to be a meta-theory of morality, in that 
it allows for the formulation of principles that justify external limitations [of 
freedom, i.e. legal norms]. It is the latter that make morality possible, without 
enforcing any substantive moral principle whatsoever.58 
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e framework thus constrains the substance of the rules to which it is applied 
regardless of the subject area they are concerned with. If we consider that the principles 
of legality in a constitutional democracy are broadly about fairness and accountability, 
legisprudence can be viewed as a tool both to achieve legality at the outset of the 
legislative process, and as an on-going means of upholding it as time passes and 
circumstances change.59 It views the law-making process in a holistic fashion that seeks 
to achieve not just formal validity but also a broader rationality in the enterprise of 
making new norms.60 
2.3.2 e requirement of justi cation 
Wintgens describes the distinction between strong legalism, the type described in 
Chapter 3, and what he terms weak legalism, which is legalism tempered by what he 
calls the justi cation test,61 which lies at the centre of the theory – Wintgens says 
justi cation is ‘the core of legisprudence: limitations of freedom must be justi ed.’62 
Whereas strong legalism is satis ed by the presence of an authorised sovereign and 
does not enquire (indeed, prohibits enquiry) as to how a particular rule was made, weak 
legalism permits the lifting of the ‘veil of sovereignty’ in order to enquire as to the 
reasons behind a particular rule.63 e justi cation for a new rule cannot simply be the 
‘bare sovereign power’ of the legislator,64 nor the natural laws or social contract she 
might purport to instrumentalise.  
Whereas under strong legalism the hierarchy of powers means the subordinate 
may not (in most cases) question the superior, under weak legalism the requirement of 
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justi cation enables precisely this – the hierarchy can be, for speci c normative 
purposes and only to a certain extent, reversed. is is the work of legisprudence, which 
provides a framework for this temporary reversal, to legitimate the work of the 
legislator which the strongly legalistic perspective requires must be ignored. In this 
way the appropriate level of justi cation for a particular limitation on freedom (i.e. a 
legislative norm) can be ascertained, both in advance of its promulgation (ex ante), and 
as an on-going test of its efficacy in the world (ex post). 
2.3.2.1 Individual freedom and the trade-off model 
For Wintgens, there is a principium, or foundational principle, of individual freedom. 
is has two elements. e rst is descriptive, akin to the ‘state of nature’ in political 
philosophy: ‘[i]n the absence of any norm, anyone is free. In the beginning that is, 
there is freedom. From this perspective, freedom is at the origin of our philosophical 
inquiry’.65 e second is normative, in that the principium should be a leitmotif, or 
guide, for both politics and law.66 By de nition, legislative rules constrain that 
foundational freedom for some individual or group in some place at some time. 
According to legisprudence, the fact that a proposed norm constrains foundational 
freedom means it should be rejected a priori, unless its imposition is sufficiently 
justi ed; requiring citizens to acquiescence to rules simply because they are ‘there’, as 
strong legalism does, is not a legitimate exercise of power according to this conception 
of freedom as principium – it is merely the arbitrary exercise of power.67 Individuals’ 
‘conceptions of freedom’ are their subjective senses of what freedom is (and is not), and 
as such they should not be interfered with lightly by the political project of the 
legislator’s ‘conceptions about freedom’. Conceptions of freedom are the individual’s 
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internalised and subjective understanding of the idea, whereas conceptions about 
freedom are concretisations that come from an external source, such as the state.68 
Under legisprudential theory, with the primacy it places on individual freedom, the 
individual’s idea of substantive freedom therefore takes precedence over the state’s 
external view of it.69 e distinction seems somewhat similar to Hart’s discussion of 
the internal and external points of view of rules, where the individual has an 
internalised view of the concept and the state is by de nition ‘on the outside’, looking 
in.70  
As Chapter 3 discussed,71 under strong legalism the sovereign is given a ‘general 
proxy’ to promulgate rules, and the resulting legislative acts are thus de facto legitimated 
– the veil is not lifted to consider whether or not they are justi ed; they are deemed a 
priori to be so. Under this model, the individual circumscribes her absolute freedom ab 
initio through the ‘outsourcing’ of its limitation to the sovereign, thereafter accepting 
whatever limits the latter promulgates under that arrangement. e proxy model 
provides the sovereign with generalised justi cation for imposing limitations on the 
freedom of the individual.  
By contrast, Wintgens’ alternative ‘trade off’ model requires that such 
limitations be justi ed in each case, in order that the principium of maximising 
individual freedom (or, expressed another way, the minimising external limitations on 
individuals’ conceptions of freedom) be honoured each time its scope is under threat 
of being circumscribed.72 Under weak legalism, then, there is no proxy that ‘takes 
control’ of the individual’s conception of freedom and is able unilaterally to limit it. 
ere is instead a ‘trade-off’, in which the sovereign’s desire to impose regulation based 
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on its ‘conceptions about freedom’ must be balanced with the individual’s subjective 
conceptions of freedom:  
Legislative ruling on the trade-off theory is not a priori legitimate as it was in 
the proxy theory. Legitimation, according to the trade-off model, consists of 
a justi cation as to why acting on a conception about freedom is preferable to 
acting on a conception of freedom. e legitimation of law under the trade-
off theory, in short, consists in a justi cation of each external limitation of 
freedom that is a priori presumed to be legitimate or justi ed under the proxy 
model.73 
is balance between the moral (individual) conception of freedom, and the political 
(sovereign) conception about freedom, prioritises the former over the latter, and puts 
in place a requirement of justi cation, the standards for which must be met in order 
for the balance legitimately to be tipped in favour of the limitation on freedom. is 
process of justi cation is one of ‘weighing and balancing the moral and political 
limitations of freedom.’74 e justi cation test then is a challenge to the impact of a 
new legislative provision (i.e. an external limitation) on individual freedom. Moral 
justi cation is achieved when the principles of legisprudence are taken properly into 
account. Wintgens summarises this as follows: 
It is on the basis of freedom as principium that a norm giver is to justify why 
freedom is limited, that is, because (1) social interaction is failing, and (2) 
weaker alternatives are insufficient. In addition, freedom as principle requires 
that (3) the norm giver justify why he is issuing an external limitation at a 
certain time, in addition to an upholding of the limitation of freedom over 
time, and (4) a justi cation of its relation to the legal system as a whole.75 
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ose requirements map onto the four principles of legisprudence, which in turn 
become duties the legislator must consider in the course of making a new norm. e 
following discussion sets out each of these principles.  
2.3.3 e principle of coherence (PC)76 
Wintgens views the legal system as a complex system of dynamic and intertwined rules, 
which has grown exponentially (rules beget rules, in order to facilitate the ‘operative 
closure’ of legalism77). Within this he identi es four levels of coherence which apply 
to ex ante legislative as well as ex post judicial reasoning. e principle of coherence is 
cumulatively normative: its levels are stepped through, and in order to be properly 
justi ed on the basis of the PC, a legislative act should attain coherence at each level. 
Wintgens argues that ‘[c]oherent legislation as the upshot of freedom as principium 
takes citizens morally seriously in legislative and not only in judicial decision making.’78 
Level of coherence 0 (‘LoC0’; ‘internal or synchronic coherence’). e basic 
vocabulary and grammar of a discourse, this level of coherence is about the building 
blocks of intelligibility, without which the substance of the concepts that make up the 
system cannot be communicated:79 ‘Coherence0 is a necessary condition for any 
discourse to make sense.’80 is level is concerned with the basic elements of 
communication (grammar, semantics, the logic of individual norms), and their 
compatibility with one another. In an earlier paper Wintgens labels this rst level of 
coherence ‘simultaneous consistency’, which has the slightly different meaning that no 
inconsistencies or contradictions be permitted within a particular decision or 
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instrument.81 ese two elements – the alignment of individuals’ understanding of the 
intension of a concept and the absence of logical contradiction between those 
understandings – can be read together to make up LoC0. As Fuller notes, difficulties 
in avoiding contradictions can arise both within and between legislative instruments, 
and it is in part the ‘legislative carelessness about the jibe of statutes with one another’82 
that is ultimately ‘very hurtful to legality’.83 e aim of the coherence principle is to 
mitigate this kind of carelessness. 
is level relates to Hildebrandt’s discussion of the printing press as essential 
to the affordance of modern legality. Without an agreed vocabulary of settled 
meanings, facilitated by the communicative affordances of writing and later the 
printing press, this level of coherence will always be contingent on the accuracy and 
consistency of verbal communications between practitioners and between 
generations.84  
e idea of epistemic continuity is closely related to the second level of 
coherence, which begins to look at the relations between the elements of the discourse 
rather than their individual intelligibility. 
LoC1 (‘diachronic or rule coherence’). is level considers consistency over 
time – it is the requirement that similar cases should attract similar judgements. is 
is in large part the consistency required by the rule of law: everyone is equal before the 
law, and the external limitations on freedom should be uniform across every individual 
who is addressed by them (ceteris paribus). From the perspective of the legislator, who 
as the sovereign is not bound by stare decisis, this translates into the principle that the 
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rules should not be changed too frequently, but when they are, good reasons should be 
given.85 If an element of justice is the modulation of expectations over time, it follows 
that injustice arises from the excessive promulgation of new rules that override 
arbitrarily what has gone before.86  
LoC2 (‘compossibility or system coherence’). Despite LoC1, circumstances can 
and do change over time, and so can (and should) norms/external limitations of 
freedom, provided that the change is otherwise legitimated by the justi cation 
principle. e arguments that warrant this departure from precedent are provided by 
LoC2; they take into account not just the individual facts of a particular case, but the 
legal system as a whole. rough ‘systematic interpretation’, which views the legal 
system holistically, it may be that another part of it invites, permits, or justi es a 
different interpretation and thus a different judgement from that which came before. 
A paradigm example given by Wintgens is the question of whether to view a 
lease through the lens of contract or of property law.87 Either choice is prima facie 
legitimate, but the legal implications differ signi cantly. Stopping at LoC1 would 
require continuity with past similar decisions, so no change in approach would be 
mandated. In this situation, however, a departure could be justi ed under LoC2: the 
judge views the legal system as a systematic whole and observes that there are parts of 
it other than those elements used in preceding cases that can legitimately in uence her 
ruling. Wintgens provides a real-life example from Belgium that is perhaps more 
illustrative.88 ere, a judge ruled that a husband was eligible for a ‘spousal premium’, 
despite judicial precedent in that jurisdiction never previously having ruled in favour 
of a male spouse receiving it. e justi cation for departure on LoC2 (in direct 
contradiction of LoC1) was demonstrated by other instruments that expressed a 
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general principle of spousal equality, including domestic legislation such as Belgium’s 
Matrimonial Act 1976, and international treaties such as the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In this instance, 
the judge took a holistic view of the system, rather than just the precedents relevant to 
the instant case, and found external, but justifying, reasons to rule differently. Indeed, 
when viewing the system as a whole, coherence is improved by such a ruling because 
it brings judicial precedent with respect to the spousal premium into line with the 
principles expressed in those various legislative instruments.89 A departure from LoC1, 
justi ed by LoC2, resulted in a more coherent legal system; judicial interpretation was 
re-aligned to t legislative principle.  
Whereas the judge assumes the possibility of viewing the legal system as a 
coherent whole, it is the legislator’s duty to facilitate that systematic ‘wholeness’, contra 
the in nite latitude that her sovereignty gives her. Of course, this is a difficult task, 
replete with possibilities for carelessness and oversight.90 e point is that the legislator 
‘has to justify his external limitations so that they allow the judge to make coherence2 
arguments’.91 e unbridled sovereignty of the legislator means that he or she is not 
constrained in the way that the judge is by the assumption that the legal system is 
coherent. e onus on her is all the greater, then, to justify her legislative ‘activism’, in 
order that its effects cohere with the rest of the system, including ex post adjudication.92 
One can see how this contrasts with strong legalism, according to which the legislator’s 
promulgated rules are law, to be grappled with by the adjudicator regardless of how 
incoherent they may be. Whereas LoC0 was concerned with mere logical coherence, 
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LoC2 is about ‘compossibility’, the requirement that norms do not contradict one 
another’s substantive effect.93 
LoC3 (‘environmental coherence’). According to this level of coherence, 
attaining a holistic view of the system is not possible from a standpoint within that 
system – an external perspective is required to make sense of it.94 Wintgens suggests 
that to get such a perspective is possible only by ‘leaning over the edges of what is 
considered the whole’.95 Whereas LoC1 and LoC2 are concerned with the internal 
rationality of the legal system, LoC3 places that coherence within a wider, non-legal, 
context. is is where Shklar’s fences of legalism are broken down; not only do we 
observe that law does not operate in a vacuum, but we require that sensitivity to this 
fact be embodied in it through its justi cation according to the broader societal context 
within which it operates.96  
is required sensitivity is what Wintgens calls ‘theory dependence’; at LoC3 
the legitimacy of the legislator’s proposed rule is dependent on some extra-legal theory 
that can justify it – it is not enough to look for justi cation ‘inside’ the legal system. 
Unlike strong legalism, where the perspective of the sovereign legislator is held to be 
a direct conduit to reality and so her pronouncements are isomorphic with that reality, 
under LoC3 there is a requirement for an external mediating theoretical framework 
which justi es, according to the requirements of its own ‘regime of veridiction’,97 the 
                                                 
93  Wintgens, Legisprudence, supra n. 16, p. 252. 
94  Wintgens, ‘Legisprudence as a New eory of Legislation’, supra n. 61, p. 21. 
95  Ibid. 
96  On the importance of viewing law as an integral part of a broader social good, see Z. Bańkowski, 
‘Bringing the Outside In: e Ethical Life of Legal Institutions’ in T. Gizbert-Studnicki and J. 
Stelmach (eds.), Law and Legal Cultures in the 21st Century (Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer, 2007). 
97  is is Hildebrandt’s terminology, borrowing from Latour. She makes a related argument that ‘[t]he 
ends of law – though deeply entwined with their internal validation – are thus co-determined by the 
needs of the society it serves and co-constitutes’. e rst part of this quote maps onto LOCs 1 and 




legislative rule that is to be made. From the perspective of that external theoretical 
framework, the law will take on a shape that is different from that of the sovereign 
who operates in a strong legalistic bubble, or indeed even that of the enlightened legal 
practitioner whose perspective is nonetheless circumscribed by her professional 
background. Fuller makes a related argument about identifying contradictions between 
rules as part of his fth principle, noting that it is not ‘merely or even chie y 
technological’ incompatibilities that must be taken into account but the ‘whole 
institutional setting of the problem – legal, moral, political, economic, and 
sociological.’ 98 Wintgens gives the law and economics school as one example of this – 
the study of law from the external viewpoint of a non-legal eld, i.e. economics.99  
On LoC3, then, the legal system must be viewed holistically and in context. It 
is not simply a question of applying the rules according to the internal logics of LoCs 
1 or 2 – something more is required (this hints at Fuller’s distinction between the 
moralities of duty and aspiration in the search for legality, cf. legalism100). ere is a 
connection here with MacCormick’s hermeneutic perspective on rules, whereby the 
legislator has both an internal view of the legal system and an external view of its 
coherence vis-à-vis the social context. Quoting MacCormick, Wintgens says: 
Since law or a legal system refers to a ‘form of life’, as MacCormick and Aarnio 
rightly puts [sic] it, coherence, then, is not a matter of logic alone, but a matter 
of ‘making sense as a whole’. is ‘making sense as a whole’ refers to ‘the whole 
corpus of the normative system’, and thus brings MacCormick to state: ‘To 
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put it crudely, legal decisions must make sense in the world and they must also 
make sense in the context of a legal system.’101 
From the perspective of rule-making, the proposed norm can be observed then from 
both the legal (internal) perspective and its broader social (external) perspective. 
Viewing it only from the ‘inside’ begets legalism, while the addition of extra-legal 
justi cation consolidates its legitimacy – its ability to make sense ‘in the world’. e 
norm must be justi ed therefore according to both the internal logic of the legal system 
(LoCs 1 and 2; the ‘cognitive internal’ aspect in MacCormick’s language102), and the 
external reality of society (LoC3), it being re ected in whatever external theoretical 
framework provides the extra justi cation that is required under legisprudence.103 
Rationality in the project of legislating arises from the legislator taking a hermeneutic 
perspective: the rational quality of a rule consists not just in (legal) formal validity, i.e. 
the internal perspective, but also validity owing from an investigation into the 
‘external social data’ that have been produced and rendered as knowledge by other 
scholarly elds.104 Legal reality is thus made to relate to social reality.105 
2.3.4 e principle of alternativity (PA)106 
e PA requires that the creation of an external limitation on freedom (i.e. a legislative 
rule) must be preferable to the absence of that rule. Creating a rule that prohibits 
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certain conduct removes the possibility of agonistic con ict,107 which thereby contracts 
to that extent ‘social space’ while simultaneously expanding ‘political space’ to ll the 
gap that is created. Social space involves practices whose dimensions are discernible 
partly by the observation and resolution of con ict according to the practice’s internal 
rules, and if that possibility is removed, which an external rule threatens to do, the 
practice itself might also cease to exist. By imposing a rule externally, i.e. a legislative 
rule, the ability of individuals to choose is removed, thus potentially reducing their 
scope to exercise moral autonomy. e imposition of a rule can only be justi ed, then, 
to correct a dysfunction that the practice cannot resolve according to its own internal 
processes.108 is relates to contestability as an inherent part of legitimacy, and 
legislators should be loath to promulgate rules without rst considering whether an 
alternative scheme might have the desired effect. e PA is concerned not with the 
substantive content of the proposed rule, but with whether it is justi ed to have a rule 
at all – because freedom is notionally in nite prior to the imposition of a limitation 
(i.e. a rule) and, as we have seen, freedom is the principium under legisprudence, the 
proposal to impose a limitation must be a priori justi ed, regardless of its actual 
content.109 e PA is therefore a threshold requirement, which once passed is 
connected particularly intimately with the principle of normative density with respect 
to the normative impact of the design mechanism that is chosen (this principle is 
discussed below). is idea of a threshold is related to the discussion in Chapter 2 of 
the spectrum of technological normativity.110 
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2.3.5 e principle of temporality (PT)111 
e principle of temporality signals a signi cant departure from the ‘single moment’ 
focus of strong legalism. Whereas legalism wants to ‘switch time off’,112 the PT requires 
a recognition that external limitations (legislative instruments) exist in a historical 
context. Unlike natural (physical) laws, which are constant, the contexts within which 
legislation must operate are evolving, and so the process of enacting a legislative 
provision must take account of, and be responsive to, such contingency. 
Over time the justi cation for a legislative norm may change. Whereas strong 
legalism takes no account of this (the law is the law until the legislator changes it; the 
morality of duty requires obedience to the rule as-is), the weak legalism of 
legisprudence requires that time be considered. In terms of equality, distinctions that 
obtained at the time of the rule’s promulgation may no longer hold, leading to 
discrimination.113 More broadly, justi catory reasons that held true at the time of 
promulgation may no longer apply. e legislator’s focus is the future, but because her 
rationality is, in economic terms, bounded, she cannot possibly foresee all the possible 
circumstances that in the future might undermine the justi cation of the norm she 
proposes in the present.114 Justifying the promulgated rule is thus an on-going process, 
and circumstances must be continually observed to ensure that the legislative norm 
continues to be an appropriate response to the circumstances at which it was 
targeted.115 Failure to do so is to fall back into legalism, where the rule is viewed as 
‘just there’, to be followed without further consideration of its legitimacy. Legitimacy 
under legisprudence is therefore an ongoing process that requires continual renewal in 
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response to the requirements of each of the principles.116 e PT requires consideration 
of the prospective effects of the rule, but because some effects are likely to be 
unintended, ongoing assessment and (if necessary) recti cation are also required.117 
2.3.6 e principle of normative density (PN)118 
e principle of normative density is related to, but more nuanced than, the concept 
of proportionality. e extent of the limitation on freedom that a legislative norm 
imposes must be in proportion to its justi cation. In other words, the stronger (more 
‘dense’ or ‘intense’, in Wintgens’ language119) the regulation, the greater the level of 
justi cation that is required to legitimate it. For him, normative density exists on a 
spectrum – sanctions represent the highest density, while other options include 
‘regulatory techniques such as information, incentives such as tax relief, self-regulation 
based on codes of conduct or agreements, labelling and the like.’120 e PN expects 
there to be a proportionate connection between a policy aim and the means by which 
it is achieved; the impact on freedom should be as close to the minimum required to 
achieve the policy aim as is possible, in order not to over-regulate.121 e use of a 
technique with a particular normative impact must therefore be justi ed against any 
techniques that would have a lesser impact.122 Again, one can appreciate the 
connection to the spectrum of normativity discussed in Chapter 2, from wired-in 
con guration to greater openness of behavioural possibilities.123 
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We have seen then that the legisprudential principles are about legitimising an 
incursion on freedom, and without sufficient justi cation such incursion is a priori 
illegitimate. e principle of coherence speaks to the proposed norm’s t within the 
existing legal and social system. e principle of alternativity asks whether the 
imposition of an external rule is justi ed in order to ameliorate a dysfunction in a given 
social practice. e principle of temporality requires the rule-giver to maintain 
sensitivity to changing circumstances, and therefore to reappraise regularly the 
justi cation for the rule and adapt it if the conditions change such that it is no longer 
justi ed. Finally, the principle of normative density queries whether the instrumental 
technique of the rule is proportionate to its aim, in order to ensure that those to whom 
the norm applies are not unnecessarily over-regulated (i.e. their freedom is not 
unjusti ably limited). 
Although the principles have equal weight, Wintgens notes that, like Fuller’s 
principles, they do not apply equally in every case. e justi cation under each 
principle can therefore operate more or less strongly depending on the circumstances124 
(I consider this again in Chapter 5). As with Fuller’s principles, these are aspirational 
and might never be fully embodied in the terms of a proposed norm, but the idea is to 
reach for the best possible laws, rather than to achieve a perfection that is unattainable 
due to the contingencies of time and the limits inherent to the legislator herself.125 
Observing the bare constitutional rules is a necessary but insufficient element of 
achieving legitimacy under legisprudence; the rule that is proposed must be rendered 
‘good’ by its observation of the four principles126 or, put another way, a proposed rule 
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is reasonable when it has been sufficiently justi ed, and unreasonable when it has 
not.127 
Returning to the discussion of input and output legitimacy above, we can see 
how the principles of legisprudence expand upon the categories. e PC is an ex ante 
formal standard for assessing the intelligibility of the proposed norm vis-à-vis both 
existing legal norms and one or more potentially legitimating extra-legal theories. e 
PA is ex ante procedural – it speaks to the decision of whether or not to institute the 
proposed norm, and ex ante formal in that it asks whether a rule is the correct format 
for achieving the desired outcome. e PT is both ex ante and ex post procedural, in 
that it requires justi cation both that at the time of original promulgation that that 
was the correct thing to do, and ongoing (ex post) legitimation of the norm. e PN 
is unusual in that it requires an ex ante assessment of the substance of the rule and the 
extent of the constraint that it imposes on the individual. To that extent it therefore 
does not t within the criteria discussed above, but is nevertheless important. 
Fuller’s principles are to an extent more hands-off than Wintgens’; the latter 
constrain more forcefully what the substantive content of a rule can possibly be. We 
can, however, detect some overlaps between the two theories. Fuller’s rst principle 
requiring the use of rules connects with the legisprudential principle of alternativity – 
whether or not to use a rule in the rst place. e second principle (promulgation) also 
connects with the principle of alternativity – can the mechanism chosen (if not a rule) 
be promulgated such that regulatees are able to understand how they are being 
regulated? It also connects with the principle of normativity, where the extent of 
normative force may be such, and in so many forms, that promulgation in the usual 
sense becomes impossible. e third, fth, and seventh principles of legality 
(respectively, against retroactivity, against contradiction, and in favour of constancy) 
speak to the levels within the principle of coherence. 
                                                 




e next chapter maps these criteria for law-making alongside the criteria for 
code-making below, in order to identify how a code artefact’s design can afford 
mechanisms that embody the criteria, thereby ameliorating computational legalism. 
For now, the next section considers the literature on normative code-making. 
3. Normative criteria for code-making 
e literature on the regulation of and by technology is of course signi cant, but the 
subset that deals speci cally with what normative criteria should justify and/or guide 
the production of code is very small.128 According to Goldoni, this is due to a 
scepticism developing in the decade following Reidenberg and Lessig’s ‘code is law’ 
thesis, which he suggests limited the ‘ ourishing of a debate on the normative criteria 
for assessing code as a lawmaking procedure’.129 Ohm and Frankle have very recently 
made a similar argument: 
Too many scholars have interpreted Lessig as doing little more than issuing a 
license to imagine that anything is possible online, falling into a ‘science ction 
trap’. Too rarely do they consider the process of how code ends up the way it 
does (let alone how regulators can make use of this process), leaving a 
signi cant void in the utility of this body of work.130 
e scepticism in the literature referred to is somewhat ironic from the perspective of 
the current analysis, because it brings to mind aspects of the legalistic ideology 
discussed in Chapter 3, whereby an unwillingness to consider extra-legal sources of 
normativity leads lawyers to retreat to their intellectual bunkers, from where they can 
continue to view law as a separate enterprise that is ‘fenced off’ (in Shklar’s evocative 
phrase) from those other concerns. is strengthens the instinctive belief that code is 
                                                 
128  Goldoni, supra n. 31, p. 123. 
129  Ibid., p. 117. 




not, and should not be seen as, law, and that legal thinking should therefore not 
concern itself with it. Brownsword noted this tendency recently when he suggested 
that the domain of jurisprudence should be ‘redrawn’ to sensitise it to a ‘bigger 
regulatory picture’, which can include forms of non-legal normativity that are ‘at least 
as important as legal norms in the daily lives of people’.131  
As Chapter 1 discussed,132 the purpose of this thesis is not to validate private 
enterprises as producers of law per se. Rather, its aim is that code which has normative 
effects is legitimate, which is to say it embodies effects, features, or affordances 
alongside its commercially-purposive functionality that ameliorate the negative effects 
of computational legalism. e issue then is not one of the ‘legalness’ of code rules per 
se, i.e. of viewing them as a source of law, but rather the question of how the ‘non-law’ 
of code can, in spite of those negative effects, be produced in ways that are legitimate 
from the perspective of the law and constitutional democracy.133 A failure to do so 
leaves a signi cant and serious de cit in our understanding of how citizens, as end-
users, have their behaviour enabled and constrained by unelected private enterprises. 
e remainder of this chapter considers the existing literature on normative 
criteria for the production of code. Following Goldoni, it is possible to discern a broad 
separation between those arguments which focus on input criteria and those which 
focus on output criteria. First, I discuss brie y what these classi cations mean in this 
context and why input criteria deserve much greater focus within the context of 
computational legalism, before summarising each scholar’s contribution. We can then 
take stock before moving onto the next chapter, where I build on the criteria discussed 
here to propose a framework of affordances whose presence in a design can legitimise 
privately-produced normative code. 
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3.1 Input and output legitimacy in code 
We saw above how a norm’s legitimacy can be considered by focusing on its production 
and/or the effects it has in operation. Chapter 2 set out why in the computational 
context the deontology of input legitimacy is necessary: the ex ante characteristics of 
computational legalism demonstrate that an ex post consequentialist perspective is not, 
on its own, sufficient to ameliorate those negative characteristics. When we move from 
the traditional legislative sphere into the computational context, though, things pivot 
somewhat. e focus on process is not just one of participation – indeed, the 
participatory aspect will in a great many cases be minimal, owing to the private spheres 
within which technologies are developed. Rather, the ‘input’ aspect shifts to have more 
of a temporal focus, where more granular design decisions about particular aspects of 
the code’s functionality are the focus of legitimation according to binding criteria – 
because of their private production they might not be the product of a participatory 
democratic process per se, but they are ‘input’ in the sense that they are crucial 
constituents of the products (outputs) of the design process that ultimately are 
responsible for the code’s effects in the world.  
e distinction is a subtle but crucial one in the context of computational 
legalism: if we only assess a system according to its operation in the real world (i.e. we 
apply only criteria that assess output) then the production ship has already sailed, and 
the opportunity to amend the design to remedy any defects we discover may be limited 
or impossible. Furthermore, this assumes that assessments of output are capable of 
detecting all salient negative effects which is, of course, far from guaranteed, especially 
owing to the opacity of code. e shift toward input criteria puts the focus on the 
design process, to ensure that certain design characteristics are in place ab initio that 
allow for better output assessments but simultaneously lessen to a degree the need for 




Within the sphere of privacy by design, Hartzog argues in favour of focusing 
on processual standards because ‘even certain risky designs can be tolerated so long as 
companies take the right steps to mitigate potential harm and ensure that debatable 
design decisions were justi ed.’134 us, mandating certain processes can potentially 
mitigate risk through the requirement to consider, during the process of design, the 
extent to which the proposed code embodies the standards we wish to see in a 
legitimate normative order. is approach also has practical appeal in terms of 
reducing the expense and delay of having to recon gure a design once post hoc 
assessment uncovers that it does not meet one or other requirement. Because of the 
integrated nature of software development processes, such ex post ‘patches’ are often 
less effective than approaches that took matters into consideration ab initio. As Luger 
and Golembewski note in the privacy by design sphere,  
[a]ddressing these concerns at the end of a design cycle leaves the creators of 
the system with little time or agency to manoeuvre, and leads to a situation 
where potential privacy problems are addressed – if at all – as afterthoughts, 
with inelegant solutions and imperfect implementations bolted on to a 
mostly-complete design.135 
Importing the distinction between input and output reasons into the computational 
sphere, Koops observes that 
Input legitimacy implies legitimacy through rules-of-the-game and the 
procedure followed, output legitimacy means that the result establishes 
legitimacy… in the context of normative technology input legitimacy is a primary 
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concern. Because technology is often irreversible – once it is developed and 
applied in society, it is hard to fundamentally remove it from society in those 
applications – the process of developing technology is a key focus when 
normativity is at stake. After all, it may well be too late when technology 
simply appears in society to ask whether it is acceptable to use this technology; 
quite often, the genie may then be out of the bottle never to be put back in… 
criteria addressing the process of technology development – ‘rules of the game’ – 
should be a key part of our acceptability criteria.136 
Input criteria are important because the characteristics of code (i.e. computational 
legalism) militate against the effectiveness of ex post assessments of effects in the world 
(i.e. outputs). Goldoni argues along similar lines:  
Given the nature and logic of architectural regulation, the emphasis on output 
legitimacy is misplaced for several reasons… e difficulty of reversing 
embedded code is often evident and makes it fundamental to focus on the 
procedure and the actors involved in the development of the technology. Second, 
given the opacity of architectural regulation, to be aware of how technology is 
directly or indirectly impacting upon agents’ behaviours may prove to be too difficult 
in many cases. Last but not least… the importance of default technology 
cannot be underestimated. What appears to be default in code is often taken 
as a natural and immutable fact.137  
He argues therefore that ‘input-based legitimacy should become the primary concern 
in choosing normative criteria.’138 Moving from a focus on output (ex post) to input 
(ex ante) legitimacy is necessary if the public dimension involved in traditional rule-
making is to be imported into the computational sphere, particularly when so much of 
the latter is privatised. Crucially, however, the latter does not replace the former – ex 
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post measures remain crucially important in order to maintain a connection with 
institutional legal processes. Goldoni thus advocates for a shift from a ‘descriptive to a 
normative approach’ to code-as-law (recall that this is a reversal of the effects of 
computational legalism, where the normative becomes the descriptive139). 
In his brief survey of the literature, Goldoni categorises it between authors who 
have focused on input and output criteria, noting a tendency towards the latter. is 
is perhaps to be expected, because observations of the discernible real-world effects of 
code (i.e. its output) can be more easily subjected to a traditional legal critique based 
on substantive doctrine (i.e. a critique built around compliance). e problem with this 
view is that it does not address directly those who produce the very code that is in 
question – it sustains the ‘fencing off’ of jurisprudential analysis from the object of that 
analysis, which as I have emphasised is unsatisfactory given the realities of 
computational legalism. Lawyers continue to be viewed as ex post assessors of code 
without acknowledging designers as the ex ante producers of it. 
Ultimately Goldoni suggests that two principles should govern code 
production: transparency and ‘publicness’.140 e rst suggests that rules embodied in 
code must be knowable in order that they can be observed and their creators held 
accountable, and the second that there must be opportunity for those subject to the 
rules to have a say in their creation. 
In the remainder of this section I consider the literature on the question of 
normative criteria for code, following Goldoni in separating the works broadly into 
those who focus on substantive output criteria and those who focus on procedural input 
criteria. As I have argued, the latter is the more appropriate sphere for the construction 
of criteria that can assist in guiding the design (production) of digital artefacts. While 
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ex post assessments are also crucially important, we have seen how computational 
legalism tends towards obfuscation, and thus the ability to carry out the assessments is 
itself contingent on ex ante design decisions that ensure they are possible. e 
complementarity of input and output criteria is therefore a part of the framework I 
develop in the next chapter. 
3.2 Output legitimacy 
3.2.1 Brownsword’s ‘technological management’ 
Writing from a natural law perspective,141 Brownsword’s primary criterion for assessing 
techno-regulation is that of justi cation, which he characterises as a judgment on 
‘whether we are over-regulating or under-regulating’.142 is has a bearing on the 
central theme of Brownsword’s work more generally: the acceptability of techno-
regulation assessed from the perspective of human rights and human dignity. He views 
the latter as a question of ‘empowerment’, which consists of three elements: ‘that one’s 
capacity for making one’s own choices should be recognised; that the choices one freely 
makes should be respected; and that the need for a supportive context for autonomous 
decision-making (and action) should be appreciated and acted upon.’143 is 
conception of dignity leads ultimately to the suggestion, in the computational context, 
that individuals always retain the choice not to follow the rule as inscribed in the 
artefact.  
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To encourage the development of ‘moral community’,144 the individual should 
where appropriate be positioned to take moral rather than merely ‘prudential’ choices 
(i.e. choices that are in one’s own interest).145 Technological management is 
problematic not because it naturally favours a particular form of (a)moral reasoning, 
but rather because it has the capability of bypassing practical reason altogether,146 
effacing opportunities for both moral and prudential choice.147 Without the 
opportunity to exercise such choice, the possibility of moral community begins to 
falter, with individuals becoming ‘de-moralised’, that is having their capacity for moral 
judgement corroded through the elision, by technological architecture, of 
opportunities to exercise a decision between two or more courses of (moral) action.148 
e result is a blunting of sensitivity to social norms, and a break-down in moral 
community.149 Indeed, the very concept of morality might disappear altogether if the 
very possibility of infringing rights (i.e. doing harm) is removed by techno-
regulation.150  
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In his earlier work on ‘techno-regulation’ Brownsword maintains a focus on 
state regulators as its source, suggesting that any movements from what he terms 
normative regulation (that is, measures which invite compliance) towards non-
normative regulation (measures that do not permit scope for choice) should be 
ventilated by means of a ‘regulatory margin’ that can ‘facilitate deliberation about, and 
review of, changes to the complexion of the regulatory environment’.151 In later work 
he suggests that this must take place ex ante in order to ratify the use of technological 
management before it is rolled out. Failure to do so will result in the potentially un-
legitimated use of code which, because of the efficiency with which it enforces rules 
(i.e. its immediacy), closes the gaps in enforcement that previously permitted civil 
disobedience and the resulting friction and con ict that can be a driver for positive 
social change.152 
is overarching goal is sensible from a democratic perspective but does not 
provide much beyond the policy level in terms of how the production of code ought to 
be guided. e essential concern is that we ought to be wary of decisions that might 
lead to unfettered use of code for regulation. As an overarching goal, Brownsword’s 
requirement of respect for human dignity, embodied in the ability to reason practically 
and to exercise choice, is insightful and useful. In later work he expands beyond the 
focus on dignity and moral community to consider more legal-theoretical ideas, for 
example Fuller’s principles of legality (his discussion of legality is considered alongside 
Asscher’s in section 3.3.2 below). For him, Fuller’s characterisation of legality as 
involving a reciprocal relationship between the end-user and the state is key to the 
latter’s use of code, and therein lies his prescription for the ‘regulatory margin’ that can 
facilitate the participatory mechanisms that will legitimise such regulation.153 
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Brownsword’s earlier focus on the public regulation of citizens means that his analyses 
do not venture far beyond relationship (a) in the model set out in Chapter 1 (depicting 
the normative relationship between the state and the citizen/end-user154).  
I return to Brownsword’s more recent work in section 3.3.2 below, where he 
shifts towards a more legal-theoretical perspective that focuses speci cally on the 
question of legitimacy with which I am concerned. For now, from his earlier work 
three criteria can be identi ed for the proper application of ‘techno-regulation’, namely 
(i) respect for individual dignity through the preservation of choice (and more choice 
is better), (ii) reciprocity between the regulator and the regulatee in the designing of 
norms, and (iii) the need for a delaying ‘regulatory margin’ that can facilitate this 
reciprocity. 
3.2.2 Leenes’ ‘techno-regulation’ 
Leenes expands Brownsword’s conception of techno-regulation to include private 
actors as well as the state.155 His explicit sensitivity to the role of private regulators in 
creating technological normativity is useful, and so too are his analyses of normativity 
more generally. Despite his evident sensitivity to design theory, he nevertheless 
maintains a focus on techno-regulation as regulation borne of identi able legal sources, 
namely state legislation or private contracts. Although relevant, then, this focus sets 
his analysis apart from my own, although he does obliquely reference the kinds of 
extra-legal normativity I am concerned with: 
In the case of techno-norms implementing contractual terms or deriving legal 
status from the law… the legal status of the norms embedded in the artifact 
and the legal effects of breaching the norms are clear. In other cases the norms 
may be legally null and void and hence not legally bind individuals, yet as long 
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as the norms remain embedded in the technology they in fact do regulate 
behaviour: legitimacy and effectiveness may be disjoint in practice.156 
e latter class of norms that Leenes refers to is of course the focus of the thesis, 
although he does not say much more about it.157 Ultimately, for Leenes the key factor 
is transparency of the ‘techno-norms’ and the process by which they are arrived at. For 
him, in an ideal situation regulatees consider the norms promulgated by privately-
produced code to be legitimate, the latter being achieved by ‘engaging this community 
in deliberate discourse’ which ‘requires a free ow of unhindered vital information.’158 
is would appear, then, to overlap with Brownsword’s regulatory margin and 
Goldoni’s transparency and ‘publicness’ requirements. Again, the limitations of 
participation in the private design process are something that I consider again below. 
3.2.3 Koops’ ‘criteria for normative technology’ 
Koops provides an overview of criteria to be considered when assessing what he calls 
‘normative technology’ (i.e. code).159 He notes many of the concerns we have already 
seen in the discussion of computational legalism, around for example the ability of 
code to establish new norms,160 the effect of translating textual norms into code,161 and 
the applicability of democratic and constitutional values even in the context of private 
sector code production.162  
While his survey of other scholars’ criteria provides a useful overview of the 
literature, his classi cation perhaps adds rather than reduces complexity, as well as 
con ating concepts that I believe should be kept apart. For example, he classi es due 
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process, legality, and ‘checks and balances’ all under the umbrella of the ‘rule of law’, 
and refers to them as substantive (as opposed to procedural or formal) criteria.163 
Similarly ‘transparency of rule-making’, ‘transparency of rules’, and accountability are 
listed as ‘secondary criteria’, while ‘rule of law’ and ‘democracy’ are listed as primary.164 
It is not clear that these concepts are quite so easily distinguished or prioritised.165 Of 
course, these concepts are all contested and open to subjective interpretation, but 
without a clearer picture Koops’ criteria are a useful starting point but do not go much 
further (a point he acknowledges, and something he suggests be left to further 
research). 
Koops takes what he describes as a ‘pragmatic, bottom-up’ approach that 
identi es the criteria already applied by other scholars, rather than the alternative ‘top-
down… theory-based interpretation of law’.166 Here we have another point of 
departure between his work and the present analysis. He is consciously concerned 
primarily with ‘outcome justice’ rather than the procedural or input justice discussed 
above. Although he does, as we saw in the quote above, acknowledge the fundamental 
importance of procedural (input) legitimacy, he nevertheless explicitly frames his 
analysis in terms of the ex post operation of speci c technologies. is necessarily 
limits the extent to which it can engage with the design stage of a technology and 
separates it from the present analysis and those others discussed below. e set of 
criteria he develops is thus intended as a heuristic for structuring the process, rather 
than a means of performing it.167 His fourth level of abstraction begins to push towards 
concrete practices, particularly in his class of ‘secondary criteria’, where he includes for 
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example review, audit, the possibility of choice, optimal default settings, and context-
adaptability.168 He notes that the ‘proof of the pudding is in the eating’,169 suggesting 
that what matters is testing of the criteria against concrete technologies. is will 
never, he says,  
be a straightforward or uncontested exercise. For one thing, several of the 
criteria are culture-dependent, in their interpretation (e.g., moral values, 
democracy) or in their importance (e.g., human rights, choice).170  
Like other authors, this is the ex post ‘output’ legitimacy that represents a kind of 
‘thick’ version of legitimacy. As a result, the substantive aspects of, for example, human 
rights, become part of the assessment, contributing to the difficulties that Koops refers 
to and the complexity of his criteria. Whether such assessments of substantive law can 
ever be expected to be carried out by designers all across the private sector remains to 
be seen, but it would seem doubtful in light of the complexity and nuance of the law 
and the limited resources of companies (especially SMEs) without dedicated legal 
departments who can investigate it and come to an informed conclusion as to what its 
implications are.171  
Koops’ perspective seems, as mentioned above, to privilege the position of the 
lawyer as code assessor, thus maintaining an inbuilt bias towards legalistic ex post 
assessment. Goldoni criticises Koops on this ground: ‘In a rather typical legalistic and 
formalist fashion, Koops would also have lawyers testing the set of normative 
criteria.’172 e gaps between lawyers and designers and between a product’s design 
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and runtime phases seem therefore unfortunately to be maintained rather than bridged 
by Koops’ analysis. 
Koops also suggests that the list of criteria itself will require periodic 
reassessment,173 but again this is because of his focus on substantive rather than formal 
or procedural legitimacy. e latter should be able to stand the test of time, as in 
Fuller’s internal morality of law, because a procedure that follows legitimising formal 
principles ought to underpin the making of all code-based norms regardless of their 
substantive content.174 Indeed, in a constitutional democracy we might say that it is a 
prerequisite of those rules being legitimate.175 Furthermore, focusing on procedure also 
potentially simpli es the criteria that need to be applied, since (as we shall see) there 
are fewer of them, and they are more-or-less constant.  
Admittedly, as previously mentioned Koops sees his set of criteria as a starting 
point that is open to further re nement, and to that extent his contribution is indeed 
useful. He nishes with an enjoinder to consider the question of ‘ambient law’, or the 
incorporation of legal norms and values of legality into technological infrastructure 
itself. is notion, developed alongside Hildebrandt,176 is the precursor to the latter’s 
concept of ‘Legal Protection by Design’, which the next section discusses. 
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3.3 Input legitimacy 
In contrast to Koops’ explicit focus on pragmatism rather than legal-theoretical 
approaches to assessing legitimacy, Hildebrandt, Brownsword, and Asscher each take 
the latter approach, and in so doing they push the focus away from output legitimacy 
towards input, or production, legitimacy. 
3.3.1 Hildebrandt’s ‘Legal Protection by Design’ 
e concept of Legal Protection by Design, or LPbD, is central to this thesis – indeed 
its contribution can be viewed as an interpretation of LPbD as well as a framework for 
achieving it. In earlier work Hildebrandt used the term ‘ambient law’,177 suggesting 
that we must ‘ nd ways to articulate the legal framework of democracy and the rule of 
law into the technological architecture it aims to regulate, creating what has been called 
“Ambient Law”’.178  
Chapter 1 discussed the use of the term ‘by design’, and how it can perhaps 
confuse matters between substantive compliance with particular elds of law (most 
commonly privacy, as in privacy by design) and the more general – and indeed 
fundamental179 – goal of achieving ‘legal protection’, or the multifaceted protection 
afforded by traditional legal processes. It is therefore more of a philosophical project 
about the operation of law and traditional legal institutions within the computational 
context, rather than merely about the application of substantive doctrine to the 
computational context.180 Hildebrandt suggests that LPbD as an umbrella concept is 
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concerned with both aspects – on the one hand, technological normativity should 
comply with substantive law, and on the other it should be both resist-able and 
contestable in a traditional court of law.  
As I have previously discussed, the rst requirement (substantive compliance) 
is not the focus of the present thesis. e second and third requirements point to the 
design of an artefact, and what it enables the end-user to do: can she exercise choice, 
and can she contest the design in a court? For Hildebrandt, ‘[t]he “resistability” 
requirement rules out deterministic environments, and the contestability requirement 
rules out invisible regulation.’181 e goal is that ‘the exercise of […] rights should not 
be obstructed by the intended or unintended effects of new technologies’.182 In essence, 
then, there are for her two criteria for the non-doctrinal – i.e. input – aspects of LPbD, 
and these are choice and transparency.183 I have already set out in detail in Chapters 2 
and 3 how computational legalism creates the conditions she is arguing against. e 
challenge now is to move beyond them to suggest solutions. Hildebrandt does not 
provide concrete suggestions on how these can be achieved, instead setting out the 
overarching goals of LPbD. She sounds a warning, too:  
[d]eveloping a methodology for LPbD entails a vertiginous challenge to 
traditional doctrinal research methods within legal scholarship and to the 
scienti c methods of computer science, requirements engineering and 
electronics.184 
is challenge is precisely what this thesis begins to grapple with, particularly in the 
next chapter. Crucially, I build on the design theory set out in Chapter 2 to suggest 
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ways that the second aspect of LPbD might be achieved, answering Hildebrandt’s 
second enjoinder that we 
should always include attention to the ‘resistability’ and contestability of the 
ensuing normativity, and should always involve testing how the con guration or 
design of the affordances can best serve the goals of justice, legal certainty and 
purposiveness.185 
ese latter three elements – justice, legal certainty, and purposiveness – are central to 
Hildebrandt’s understanding of the ends, or purposes, of law. e implication here is 
that the focus is on the design stage, where the affordances of the product are 
developed and where it can be considered whether they not only meet the product’s 
commercial requirements, but also those of legitimacy so conceived. As she mentions 
in relation to the data protection by design provisions of the GDPR, ‘[data protection 
by design] will force existing technology developers to include a new set of 
requirements at the starting point of their design process, while at the same time 
creating a market for new technologies that help to render data processing systems 
compatible with the [GDPR].’186 More generally, LPbD requires that the design of a 
product’s ‘commercial’ affordances (i.e. the things that make it attractive or useful to 
the end-user) must take account of its legal affordances; in (dis)affording particular 
behaviours for the end-user, the code must at all times permit the operation of the 
ideals of legality, which means the possibility of the end-user (i) observing the rules to 
which the system is subjecting her, (ii) exercising choice as to which rules apply, and 
(iii) contesting those rules in a court of law.187 Hildebrandt’s analysis thus concerns 
input criteria, even though the focus is about the end-user having the ability to exercise 
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her rights ex post. Her discussion of affordance and the ‘designing in’ of mechanisms 
to facilitate LPbD is inherently concerned with input criteria and the requirement that 
the design process re ect those ex ante requirements; if that is achieved then the ex 
post operation of the system will by de nition embody the procedural, if not necessarily 
the substantive, aspects of output legitimacy (ceteris paribus). 
3.3.2 e Fullerian principles applied to code 
Both Brownsword and Asscher have considered Fuller’s principles of legality in the 
context of code, discussing how they might be adapted to that context.  
3.3.2.1 Brownsword 
In more recent work, Brownsword moves towards a more conventionally legal-
theoretical perspective that is pluralist and sensitive to the private production of code 
and its capability to ‘compete with or complement, or simply supersede Hartian legal 
norms.’188 For him, the principles of legality are an example of ‘cosmopolitan values’ 
that normatively bind all regulators, regardless of the substantive content of the 
regulations they promulgate.189 
Brownsword appears throughout to maintain an ontological separation 
between the ‘rule’ or decision which animates the use of a particular code measure, and 
the substantive effect of the measure itself (this is made explicit in his treatment of the 
second principle, as we shall see). is creates a distance between his analysis and the 
substantive materiality of code, and therefore the design questions – what an artefact 
(dis)affords, and how it mediates reality for the end-user – that, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, some of the Fullerian principles can usefully point towards. Nevertheless, 
Brownsword’s analysis is one of the very few that have considered code from the 
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perspective of Fuller’s principles, and so it is a very useful source for the present 
analysis. In the discussion below, I follow Brownsword’s ordering of the principles, 
which does not match that in the original text.190 
Promulgation of rules (second Fullerian principle). Brownsword claims that 
code environments are not governed by rules per se (and therefore there can be no 
operation of the rst Fullerian principle, which states that there must be rules). us, 
for him, the second principle is converted into a requirement of transparency vis-à-vis 
the proposed use of technological management (i.e. code).191 e result is that 
regulatees should be given ‘a fair opportunity to participate in the processes that will 
determine whether such a use is authorised’,192 the idea being that ‘the purpose of 
promulgation is to invite public debate about the use of [code] measures.’193 As 
mentioned above, whether this is workable in commercial contexts where digital 
artefacts are designed is at the very least questionable, particularly given the lack of 
incentives designers have to consult their end-users. Brownsword seems to aim at 
transparency of intent rather than actual technical transparency; the gap between the 
two is problematic as I shall discuss later. At any rate, while the role of participation 
in the design process may be a desirable one, it is at most complementary to the 
digisprudential theory I am developing because it speaks to either (i) organisational 
processes (Brownsword’s focus on the decisions to use code, rather than the code 
itself), or (ii) the substantive functionality that makes the code attractive to a given 
class of end-user, at which point the question has moved beyond the ‘constitutional’ 
design principles that should be present in all digital artefacts regardless of their 
commercial purpose. is is a theme I return to below. 
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Rules should be prospective, not retrospective (third principle). Although it is 
possible for retrospective acts in technologically-managed environments (Brownsword 
gives the examples of database records being deleted, or contractual provisions being 
altered) he suggests that in general changes to the environment are prospective and 
therefore technological management does not introduce any new risk of ‘unfair 
retrospective penalisation of conduct.’194 
Rules should not require the impossible (sixth principle). Brownsword’s 
discussion here focuses on the notional mental state of the regulatee, and how various 
legal systems deal with (criminal) attempts that are frustrated because of their 
impossibility.195 Here, though, his focus shifts to the subjective position of the 
regulatee, rather than the legitimacy of the technological management measure, and 
so his analysis of this principle is not relevant here. 
Rules should be clear (fourth principle). In the context of technological 
management, Brownsword suggests that the channelling of regulatees’ behaviour 
‘should be done with less friction and confusion where the regulatory signal is clearly 
and decisively transmitted.’196 Regulatees ought to have it communicated clearly that 
their conduct will be limited in some way by a technological measure. 
Rules should be relatively constant (seventh principle). Brownsword suggests 
that frequent changes in what an application of technological management permits 
and denies, either because of malfunction or a deliberate change to the ‘regulatory 
coding’, might invite the uncertainty in regulatees that the principle aims to guard 
against. He warns against causing confusion to regulatees, caused by frequent code 
changes, resulting in their contravention of the ‘terms’ of the system and thus the 
levying of what are therefore unfair penalties because of a lack of constancy.197 
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Rules should not be contradictory ( fth principle). In the technological 
management context this principle should be ‘consistent in allowing or disallowing a 
certain “act”’.198 is would appear more or less to match his proposal for the seventh 
principle, discussed above. He suggests further that where the system permits a 
particular act, i.e. renders it possible, the regulatee should be given the bene t of an 
assumption against levying a penalty where it was the ‘fault’ of the system that what 
should have been a prohibited act (presumably owing to some other legal requirement) 
was in fact made possible.199  
e practical administration of rules must match their content (eighth 
principle).  Again, Brownsword maintains the ontological separation between code 
and the ‘offline’ rules that sit ‘behind’ the technological measure and animate its use. 
is is perhaps necessary for this particular principle. Here, his focus is on the 
translation of rules into code, and it is there where his concern over congruence arises: 
whether the rule as stated (or written) is properly re ected in the technological 
management measure.200 is is the well-known problem of compliance by design,201 
or the translation of ‘“law in the books” to “law in other technologies”’.202 
Rules should be general ( rst principle). Here Brownsword shifts focus onto 
the question of algorithmic pro ling, whereby the technological management system 
can feasibly have as many bespoke rules as there are regulatees subject to it.203 To that 
extent, this focus on ‘data-driven’ law is, as explained in Chapter 1, outwith the scope 
of the thesis.204 Nevertheless, the concept of generality is still relevant in the ‘code-
driven’ context on which I am focused. For example, end-users can believe themselves 
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to be having the same experience as one another, when in fact this is not the case (an 
evocative example is the Facebook emotional contagion experiment, an example of so-
called ‘A/B testing’205). Another example is the use of software ‘alpha’ and ‘beta’ 
programmes, where end-users elect to access new features in a system before they are 
fully completed and ready for widespread distribution. In some cases, updates are 
released that fragment the uniformity of the code across the userbase.  
Ultimately Brownsword summarises his understanding of Fuller’s principles in 
the technological management context as requiring ‘openness, or transparency, in 
authorising the use of measures of technological management for particular regulatory 
purposes, supported by ideals of fairness and due process.’206 As I previously 
mentioned, this focus on authorisation maintains an ontological separation between 
the policy animating the use of technological management and the code that actually 
implements the normativity. e focus too on ex ante deliberation, the ‘regulatory 
margin’, is sensible from the perspective of large public regulatory bodies but is, I 
suggest, less plausible in the context of small commercial enterprises creating low-cost 
digital artefacts. e suggestion that such rms submit to ‘special procedures possibly 
akin to applications for planning permission’207 seems unlikely to receive much 
purchase given the fecundity of the Internet as a generative platform and the ease with 
which almost anyone can get started creating code that has normative effect.208 Where 
Brownsword does discuss the private sector, he sets up a dichotomy between ex ante 
‘approval and authorisation’ on the one hand, and ex post ‘challenge and review’ on the 
other. Where the ex ante measures are not present, the ex post measures are thus 
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necessary.209 While this is a good starting point for thinking about the responsibilities 
of software designers and their employers, I suggest that on its own this does not go 
far enough. As I have argued throughout this thesis, and as we saw from the discussion 
of computational legalism in Chapter 3, an either/or approach is insufficient; if we rely 
only on ex ante measures we cannot account for emergent and/or unexpected 
regulatory effects, while if we rely only on ex post measures there may be signi cant 
harm being done that will not be detected in order for those processes to be invoked. 
In summary, then, Brownsword’s application of Fuller boils down to the need 
for openness, transparency, and due process in the authorisation of the use of 
technological management, together with the requirement – a longstanding part of his 
work – that the conditions for moral community be maintained. As I discussed in 
section 3.2.1 above, for him the latter conditions are provided where there is 
preservation of individual choice and the ability to make a moral decision.210 
Brownsword does not engage with the concrete materiality of design, beyond a passing 
reference to transparency ‘about how the particular technologies work.’211 For my 
purposes, this observation is particularly apposite: ‘while it is certainly a necessary 
condition for the acceptability of a particular use of technological management that 
the underlying rule or policy is compatible with the Rule of Law, it might not be 
sufficient.’212 My contention is that it is indeed not sufficient, because it does not engage 
with the materiality of the design that actually implements the normativity that ought 
to be legitimate. is will be discussed in the next chapter, but for now I turn to 
Asscher’s application of Fuller’s principles to code. 
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Asscher’s analysis is more closely focused on the idea of code per se, as opposed to 
Brownsword’s focus on the legitimacy of the rules operating behind the code. Because 
of this sensitivity to the code per se Asscher’s analysis is therefore closer to my own. 
His approach in adapting Fuller’s principles is to pose numerous questions for the 
assessment of code.213 First, is it transparent: can citizens discern the rules they are 
subject to, or, in computational terms, can we be sure of what the code is doing, and 
is this what we expect to happen?214 Second, is the code consistent, both in the 
temporal sense (i.e. it is not updated arbitrarily), and in the sense of congruence both 
with other code rules and with legal rules? is speaks to the trust that end-users can 
have in the system. ird, is its provenance clear, i.e. can end-users identify who is 
responsible for its production (‘can a sovereign be distinguished that can also be held 
accountable for the in uence of the software?’215). Fourth, is autonomy respected 
through the preservation of the choice of whether or not to obey?216 He distils these 
adaptations of Fuller’s principles into the following ‘checklist’: 
1. Can rules be distinguished in the code? 
2. Can they be understood, i.e., is it understandable how code works and what 
it does? If so, are those rules transparent, are they accessible to the general 
public? 
3. Can the rules be trusted, is there any guarantee that rules are not changed 
during the game? Are code rules reliable in the sense that they are 
predictable? 
4. Is there a sovereign? An authority who makes the code rules? 
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5. Is there a choice? Can consumers/citizens choose not to obey the rules? 
Can consumers/citizens freely choose another system of law/code?217 
If the answer to the rst question is negative, the rest can be ignored. Questions two 
and three are connected, while the fourth is a practical concern. Interestingly, for 
Asscher the fth question, of whether the end-user retains choice, is connected with 
the issue of competition (cf. Brownsword’s interest in choice as a foundation for moral 
reasoning and community).218 For him, the questions are about restoring balance 
between code and law. is is connected with the traditional process of legislation and 
law-application, one element of which is the practice of balancing competing interests. 
Asscher suggests that his Fullerian analysis of code is apt to assess whether the balance 
of power has tipped away from institutional law, in favour of the ‘code world’, and 
thereby whether some kind of state intervention is required to restore it.219 
Asscher’s criteria can be summarised as follows. When there are rules enforced 
by code, (i) the code must be transparent (understandable to those regulated by it – 
question 2), (ii) the code must be trustworthy and reliable (it operates as expected, and 
is not changed arbitrarily), (iii) the producers of the code must be identi able, and (iv) 
end-users must have the choice of whether or not to obey its rules. We will see in the 
next chapter how these considerations are taken into account in the suggested 
digisprudential affordances. 
3.3.2.3 Does code contain rules per se? 
We have seen from Brownsword’s analysis a reticence to approach substantive code as 
rules per se. He prefers to focus on the policies that operate in the background to 
animate particular applications of code as regulation. Similarly, scholars like Benoliel 
focus on technological standards as the ‘background’ rules from which individual 
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digital artefacts are derived.220 ese are more readily compared to legal norms per se, 
because they are indeed couched in normative terms that set out the necessary 
conditions, or protocols, for interfacing with a particular technology221 (in this regard 
they are like the constitutive rules of a game of chess, discussed in Chapter 3222). e 
point that technical standards are rules is accepted; protocols such as TCP/IP and the 
standards processes223 from which they arose do set out the ‘rules of the game’ which 
must be followed in order to be a player. While those rules do to an extent curtail what 
is possible with the systems that are built upon them, they are in general constitutive 
in an infrastructural sense, operating at a level far beneath the technological 
normativities that I am concerned with. ey are less about the individual artefact’s 
design, and more about the underlying foundations of the network. is is in part 
because of the ‘end to end’ principle, where the network provides only the most basic 
and generic of infrastructure, and the applications that provide bespoke functionality 
are properly ‘at the edges’.224 A great deal has been written about the regulation of the 
Internet and how its architecture facilitates particular behaviours – indeed, most early 
‘cyberlaw’ scholarship focused on this level of the technology.225 e focus of this thesis, 
however, is on the individual artefact as the site at which technological normativity is 
imposed, and so the ‘rules’ in question are not the underlying infrastructural standards 
with which all networked devices must comply in order to communicate, but rather 
the sui generis rules that constrain or enable behaviour in the ‘immediate’ and material 
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design of the artefact, as identi ed according to the theories set out in Chapter 2. e 
sovereignty involved here is that of the designer, developer or enterprise that is 
responsible for the affordances of a given artefact’s design, and not those who develop 
the underlying infrastructure of the network that the artefact in turn relies upon. 
In this regard, Asscher suggests also that ‘rules should not be confused with the 
technical commands within a certain computer language but must be understood on 
the conceptual level’.226 I am not convinced that this is so, or at least that the issue of 
code-as-rules per se can be quite so easily dismissed. While it may be too much to focus 
on the individual commands in source code, the materiality of the system in operation 
is precisely where the action happens, and thus is it not only appropriate but is indeed 
necessary to focus upon it (I made the same argument against Brownsword in section 
3.3.2.1 above). It may be that Asscher is simply implying that code does not present 
us with rules in the conventional Austinian sense of a law-maker issuing a command. 
He is possibly adverting to this when he refers to ‘the subtle examples of the 
intertwined effects of legal policy and software effects’,227 the latter perhaps pointing 
to the concrete, ‘a-legal’ effects of technological normativity. e ‘rule’ in this sense 
comes about in its inducement or enforcement of behavioural patterns that become 
like habits,228 but it is nevertheless the case that it is the design per se that makes this 
happen. 
We saw in Chapter 3 Leenes’ and Koops’ suggestion that private enterprises’ 
negligent production of privacy-eroding code can be viewed as akin to a rule stating 
that privacy is not important, or is less important than other values:229  
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[w]e are inclined to think that the development and application of code that 
negligently fails to take privacy effects into account can indeed be seen as the 
embedding of a ‘rule’ in the technology, namely that privacy is unimportant 
and secondary to other values that the code primarily serves.230 
is sensitivity to the totality of the code’s effects is important, shifting us away from 
the narrow focus on just purposive effects, adopted in much of the literature.231 We 
saw in Chapter 1 how the scope of our enquiry ought to consider not just the intended 
regulatory effects of code, but also those wider ‘techno-effects’ that may not have a 
legal underpinning, whether public or private.232 It is important to consider not just 
the intended normative effects of a system but also its potential unintended effects, and 
if those are deleterious to the values of legitimacy we have been discussing then this is 
a cause for concern.233 Again, as has been emphasised throughout, this is where the 
issue of ex ante design standards comes in, including ensuring that unexpected effects 
are capable of being dealt with post hoc.  
Adapting Leenes’ and Koops’ formulation from the quote above, we can say 
that code rules which (negligently) undermine the standards of legitimacy that 
normative orders ought to re ect in effect represent ‘rules’ stating that those elements 
are not important and need not be valued. e (dis)affordances and inscriptions that 
the code embody can be seen as rules of this sort, and the code ought to be compatible 
with those standards by providing certain (digisprudential) affordances. In so doing, 
the likelihood of the artefact’s commercial normativity being illegitimate is accordingly 
reduced. 
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To conclude, we can summarise the various contributions from the work surveyed in 
the previous sections. Brownsword and Koops are interested mostly in substantive 
assessments of code’s real-world effects. Brownsword’s earlier contributions focused 
on public regulation, arguing quite abstractly that ‘techno-regulation’ must maintain 
scope for individual choice in order that moral decision-making, as a foundational 
element of moral community, is retained as a possibility. Koops, apart from providing 
an interpretation of other scholars’ criteria, focuses on ex post assessments of speci c 
technologies as they operate in the world. e criteria he identi es are mixed, although 
he prioritises the substantive (output) criteria of human rights and ‘other moral values’ 
before the rule of law and democracy.  
Hildebrandt, Asscher, and Brownsword (in his later work) include a focus on 
input criteria, with the latter two scholars considering the application of Fuller to code. 
Hildebrandt’s concept of ‘legal protection by design’ can be summarised as requiring 
transparency in the rules which technological normativity embodies, the ability of the 
end-user to exercise choice (i.e. to resist the default con guration), and lastly the 
possibility of contesting the rules in a court of law. Brownsword surveys Fuller from a 
rule of law perspective, but his ontological separation between code itself and the policy 
rule which animates its use means that his target of assessment is not the design of the 
code per se, but rather the decision of whether or not to use it. Although he does show 
some sensitivity to private regulation, this focus on the rules-behind-the-code perhaps 
belies Brownsword’s general focus on public (state) regulation. At any rate, he requires 
transparency and due process in the authorisation of the use of code regulation, as well 
as the original requirement of the retention of the possibility of (moral) choice on the 
part of the individual. Unlike Brownsword, Asscher maintains a closer focus on code 
per se. His distillation of the Fullerian principles requires that code is transparent, that 




and that end-users retain choice as to whether or not to obey its rules. I adopt various 
of these requirements in the framework of affordances I develop in the next chapter. 
4. Conclusion 
is chapter has considered two in uential normative frameworks aimed at the 
creation of legitimate legal rules. For Fuller, achieving the latter is about respecting 
the ‘internal morality’ of law, which in turn minimises the potential for iniquity in the 
substance of the norms that can subsequently be promulgated from within that 
framework. For Wintgens, legitimate rules respect as far as possible individual 
autonomy, requiring justi cation of incursions on that autonomy only when in 
accordance with the legisprudential principles which, like Fuller’s theory, limit what 
the content of the resulting rules can possibly be. is analysis gives us a sense of what 
is expected of legislators when they are trying to make good laws, regardless of the 
political content of those laws. 
e chapter then surveyed the literature on normative criteria for code. e 
conclusion here is that there are certain gaps in existing analyses, particularly with 
respect to the private production of code (as opposed to state-sanctioned use of code 
as a regulator), to the production of unforeseen normativity, and in the focus on ex 
post assessments of codes’ operation instead of the ex ante design decisions which lead 
to those effects. What this analysis provides is both a legal-theoretical view on 
legitimate normativity, and the state of the art in the literature of scholars whose work 
focuses on code-as-law. 
As we have previously seen, with code there is an inevitability about the initial 
con guration – once the decision to build something has been made, that something 
by de nition embodies some set of initial commitments which by necessity involve the 
privileging of one con guration of normativity over all the other possibilities.  And as 




simply wait to see how a particular (legal) issue will be settled by the courts; the 
decision is by de nition ex ante. To restate the central concern of the thesis, the 
con guration of the system by the designer is an inevitability, and the plasticity of 
software means that the range of ways in which she can regulate the end-user’s 
behaviour is near-in nite. We must therefore interrogate critically that initial 
con guration in order to ensure its legitimacy. e next chapter uses the understanding 







Affording computational legitimacy 
To promote the bene ts of legality, and to prevent the disadvantages of 
legalism, we will require new forms of interaction with these systems.1 
 
…regulatory schemes should seek to ensure that the design of consumer 
technologies is presenting the most optimal and sustainable choices, 
affordances, and constraints for users.2  
1. Introduction 
is chapter will now synthesise the ideas from the previous three chapters to suggest 
a framework of digisprudential affordances. It can be appreciated from the review of 
the literature in the previous chapter that although work in this area has considered 
criteria for the use of code as a regulator, this scholarship has not engaged in depth 
with the theories of design that I set out in Chapter 2, and has therefore not considered 
the desirability, efficacy, or indeed legitimacy of code from that perspective. is is the 
novel contribution of the present chapter. I synthesise the legal-theoretical perspective 
of legitimacy with design theory in order to suggest the affordances that code ought to 
exhibit in order to be deemed legitimate. 
I begin by mapping the characteristics of computational legalism onto the 
Fullerian and legisprudential principles to which they are related. From this mapping 
I identify relationships between those principles and the affordances that can help to 
embody their aims within the design of code. e affordances can be viewed as 
simultaneously positive and normative; they provide a way of asking what a given 
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design affords, and a set of goals for what should be afforded in order to achieve 
legitimacy. Designers should not think only about what their code is intended to do 
from a commercial perspective; they ought also to make informed assessments of 
whether it is, and if not how it might become, legitimate. e digisprudential 
framework is a mechanism for guiding those anticipations from a legal-theoretical 
perspective. is is similar to Verbeek’s discussion of anticipating a design’s 
technological mediation from a moral perspective,3 which requires anticipation of the 
design’s operation and, ultimately, ex ante restrictions on what forms it can possibly 
take. It also chimes with Hoepman’s work on privacy design strategies and the idea of 
de ning concrete design goals at the outset of a project.4 
is chapter further bridges the gap between design and a legal-theoretical 
perspective of what those restrictions ought to be, importing insights gained from the 
latter to suggest how they might be concretely rei ed in the former. Each of the 
affordances is discussed from the perspective of the two case studies – blockchain 
applications and the Internet of ings (IoT) – to give them a grounding in concrete 
application. 
1.1 Testing decisions or testing design? 
We saw in Chapter 4 how Brownsword and others have focused on background 
decisions as the target for tests of legitimacy, and have (implicitly) viewed the code 
that embodies them as a separate product of those decisions. By contrast, I am more 
concerned with the legitimacy of the resulting design itself. As previously discussed, I 
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do not therefore maintain an ontological separation between the normativity of the 
code, which I frame as a de facto ‘rule’,5 and the preceding decision of the designer or 
enterprise to use code to achieve a particular aim. Or, alternatively, if it is thought that 
such a separation ought to be maintained, then it is the concrete instantiations in code 
of those background decisions that I am concerned with. We saw in Chapter 2 how 
design has a direct in uence on end-user behaviour. We also saw in Chapter 3 how 
representationalism means that the text of the ‘rule’ (i.e. source code) and its operation 
are effectively one and the same:6 isomorphism between source code and the 
materiality of the artefact is to a great extent a given in the computational context. 
Rather than querying the motivations behind the design of a particular code (as 
important a concern as this may be), the task then is to query what the code actually 
does, and whether the normativity that it imposes is itself legitimate, separately from 
those background motivations. e distinction is nuanced but important, for if we 
focus on only the motivation behind a design but fail to look critically at how that 
motivation is in fact instrumentalised in code, we risk not only failing to observe what 
the artefact actually does, but also – and potentially worse – sanctioning it, in the 
erroneous belief that because the decision to use code was sound the implementation 
must also have been. 
e aim therefore is to guide production of the ‘moreness’ of code (its 
instrumentality; Chapter 2) in ways that reduce its ‘lessness’ (its computational 
legalism; Chapter 3). e question is ultimately one of what the design affords the 
end-user (contestability, choice, transparency, and delay), legal institutions (evidential 
standards), and its own designer or manufacturer (oversight). e ultimate goal is 
delity to the input criteria of quasi-legality (Chapter 4) that ensure that its 
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technological normativity, whatever its substantive output functionality, includes 
mechanisms that ameliorate the path dependencies of computational legalism. 
2. Mapping the criteria 
In Table 1 below I map the Fullerian and legisprudential principles discussed in 
Chapter 4 onto the relevant characteristics of computational legalism, showing how 
they apply across the separate normative orders of institutional law and code. I then 
consider how the digisprudential affordances re ect the purposive goals of the 
principles. Legitimacy under the digisprudential framework requires that, at a 
minimum, code ought to provide the end-user with those affordances. It will be 
appreciated that there are overlaps between the characteristics and the suggested 
affordances – I am not suggesting that a given affordance applies only to ameliorate 
the speci c characteristic indicated; the idea rather is to consider them in a holistic 
fashion, with the goal of achieving more legitimate technological normativity through 
a concurrent sensitivity to each of the issues raised. Wintgens represents a similar claim 
in the legisprudential context using the following model, where each X represents a 
proposed norm:7 
                                                 




A given norm will be more or less justi ed according to each of the four legisprudential 
principles; the point is that the particular circumstances surrounding the proposed 
norm will dictate the extent to which it must be justi ed by each of them. For example, 
emergency legislation following a natural disaster might be justi ed despite a lack of 
in-depth fact- nding or foresight, because the alternatives would not implement the 
powers and duties that are necessary to deal with the crisis quickly enough.8 is might 
mean for example that there is strong justi cation under the PA, but less justi cation 
under the PC, but that on balance the former is sufficient to justify the norm. Proposed 
norms that fall outside the box, i.e. that are not sufficiently justi ed by any of the 
principles, are not legitimate(d) at all. 
In a similar fashion, the digisprudential affordances are not intended to be 
viewed in isolation, but rather to be seen as a set of elements that work in concert to 
achieve more legitimate con gurations of technological normativity. Depending on 
the purpose and intended use of a particular code, the relevance of each principle will 
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vary, and therefore so too will the justi catory contribution of each affordance. A code 
that includes none of the affordances is on balance unlikely to be legitimate.  
e intention is to contribute a set of ‘normative anchor points’9 that are 
explicitly oriented toward legal-theoretical concerns.10 e exercise is necessarily 
qualitative to an extent, and therefore it requires human judgement and the willingness 
to do the right thing on the part of the designer. Table 1 below maps the characteristics 
of computational legalism onto the Fullerian and legisprudential principles, and 
suggests the digisprudential affordances that can embody the purposive aims of those 
principles within code. 
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Fullerian principle Legisprudential principle Digisprudential 
affordances 
Ruleishness Contradictory (v) or 
impossible (vi) rules 
Alternativity (PA);  





Opacity Promulgation (ii); 
Intelligibility (iv) 
Alternativity (PA); 
Normative density (PN); 






Immediacy Contradictory (v) or 
impossible (vi) rules; 
Frequency of change 
(vii) 




Immutability [in]Frequency of 
change (vii) 
Temporality (PT);  
Coherence (PC) LoC3 
Oversight; 
Choice 
Pervasiveness - Normative density (PN) - 
2.1 Contestability as an overarching affordance 
In addition to the ordering of code’s normativity suggested by the digisprudential 
framework, it is important also to bear in mind the importance of facilitating 
contestability as an overarching concern. Contestability is the keeping open of the 
possibility of questioning the code in, and taking its designer/manufacturer to, a court 
of law. As we saw in the previous chapter, contestability is an important criterion for 
the maintenance of the rule of law in the computational context; Hildebrandt in 
particular sets it apart as a fundamental requirement of the maintenance of legal 
protection in the computational paradigm.11 From a strictly legal point of view, the 
                                                 




ability to ‘return’ from the normative order of code to that of institutional law, and 
especially the courts, is an important part of retaining the role and the rule of law, even 
within the a-legal realm of code. Computational legalism militates against 
contestability: end-users must be in a position to understand the normativities they are 
being subject to in order to mount any kind of legal challenge to them. As the 
discussion below will consider, resistance and transparency are aspects of this that are 
concerned with the ability of the end-user to ‘see’ and question the norms to which she 
is subjected. is is the user-centric side of the contestability coin, but there is also an 
institution-centric side which ought to be considered at the point of production. 
2.1.1 Affording scrutiny to legal institutions 
In order for contestability to be fully embodied in code, legal institutions must be 
afforded proper evidential scrutiny; if the end-user contests the code in a court it is 
axiomatic to say that she must be able to bring evidence of her complaint, and that 
evidence must be intelligible to the trier of fact (cf. the opacity of computational 
legalism). Here we maintain the connection between the realm of code and the rule of 
law, ensuring that whatever happens in the code-based order the judicial process can 
still be the ultimate arbiter of any dispute. e affordance of contestability, then, is 
necessary not just to enable the end-user to understand the code’s normativities 
sufficiently well that she can choose to contest them, but is necessary also to enable 
legal institutions to grapple with the code from an evidential perspective. is 
implicates further questions of due process vis-à-vis evidential quality and propriety, 
and how these might interact with the design process. From an evidential perspective, 
certain standards must be met in order for an action to succeed; from a computational 
perspective this means that affordance of those standards must be considered ex ante 
during the design process if valid contestability – and therefore legitimacy – is to be 




it will not be possible (or will be that much more difficult) at the stage of operation. I 
discuss in the next chapter some approaches that can assist in implementing this 
institutional aspect of contestability at design time. 
In sum, then, contestability operates as an overarching concern, suffusing 
digisprudence as an ultimate backstop; no matter the merits or demerits of the design 
from a digisprudential perspective, it must in the end always be possible for the end-
user to resort to a court action to determine illegality (of whatever substantive form). 
is ensures the continuing role of the rule of law, notwithstanding code’s existence as 
a separate a-legal normative order. In that regard, while the digisprudential affordances 
do not aim to render code legal per se – as the table above sets out, and as I argued in 
Chapter 1, they are concerned with the mirroring of legal notions of legitimacy within 
the a-legal order of code – they do nevertheless contribute towards the design of code 
that re ects the quintessentially legal characteristic of contestability, in particular via 
the affordance of transparency (discussed below). 
3. From characteristics to affordances 
We come now to an important contribution of the thesis, where the analysis of 
computational legalism and its negative effects meets the affordances that can 
ameliorate them. Following the design theory set out in Chapter 2, the idea here is to 
sensitise designers to the issues exposed by the legal-theoretical analysis of the previous 
two chapters, in order to shape or augment the affordances of the code they design to 
re ect the goal of legitimacy I have been considering. is is aspirational; the idea is 
to aim for legitimacy in privately-designed code, in the knowledge that on the one 
hand attaining absolute perfection is unlikely, and on the other the characteristics of 





Code rules are, as we saw in Chapter 3, extreme in their precision; they by nature do 
not admit of exible application. While they might exhibit exquisite non-
discrimination, in that they apply to every end-user completely regardless of their 
characteristics, this is only a virtue if the rule is legitimately designed.12 As I discussed 
in Chapter 3,13 code rules execute in every situation where their precise requirements 
are met, they execute in no situations where those requirements are not met (no matter 
how close the circumstances are), and the precise consequences speci ed within the 
rule are all that will or can ow from its execution. ey are thus, by default, brittle in 
the extreme. is aspect of ruleishness – in the sense of strict and brittle application, 
rather than merely the laying down of rules, cf. Fuller’s principle of generality – is at 
the heart of computational legalism.14  
is connects with the previous discussion of constitutive norms and the 
threshold between a design’s ‘constitution’, or the behavioural constraints which are 
‘wired in’, and its merely ‘regulative’ aspects,15 which provide the end-user with the 
latitude to decide whether or not to acquiesce to a suggested limitation on freedom – 
in other words avoiding architectural determinism through the retention of ‘resist-
ability’.16 
3.1.1 Affordance: choice 
We saw in Chapter 3 how the default con gurations of code contribute to shaping an 
end-user’s understanding of the behavioural possibilities it affords her.17 End-users 
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tend to trust that the designer has made the ‘right choice’ for them, even where the 
code permits alternative choices to be made – the situation presented to the end-user 
is perceived to be normal, and even legitimate in systems that are pervasive. Once the 
artefact is operating, the outputs of its processes also tend to be trusted by end-users, 
due to automation bias.18  
e effects of immediacy and immutability can be countered through the 
affordance of appropriate con gurability. For the latter characteristic, the ability to 
change the con guration of the system is by de nition in opposition to the state of 
immutability. But the mere provision of choice is not enough on its own – if it is to 
ameliorate ruleishness and empower the end-user, choice must be between appropriate 
options and must come at the appropriate time,19 otherwise we might come full circle 
to the code equivalent of long terms of use documents which notionally inform the 
end-user but which in practice leave her bewildered. Con gurability per se can thus 
potentially become a counterproductive burden, particularly for naïve end-users20 who 
may be ‘confused and intimidated by the number of choices’.21 At any rate, 
customisation is viewed by many end-users as time-consuming, and so they avoid it 
even where objectively it could bene t them by enabling them to choose options that 
re ect their interests and/or preferences.22 us, the ways in which code affords 
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20  D.D. Clark et al., ‘Tussle in Cyberspace: De ning Tomorrow’s Internet’ (2005) 13 IEEE/ACM 
Transactions on Networking (ToN) 462, p. 467. 
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con gurability must be considered in advance if the appropriate audience is to be 
appropriately empowered by them. 
3.1.1.1 ‘Tussles’ and designing for choice 
One theory from computer science that touches on the issue of choice and the role of 
design in responding to different parties’ interests is known as ‘tussle’.23 ‘Tussle points’ 
are sites of con ict between those with con icting interests that have some bearing on 
the design of code. Con icts can be technical, legal, social, or economic, and it is for 
the designer to anticipate them and consider how their code ought to respond: 
Our position is that the laws of men and the so-called whims of bureaucrats 
are part of the fabric of society, like it or not. ey are some of the building 
blocks of tussle, and must be accepted as such. We, as technical designers, 
should not try to deny the reality of the tussle, but instead recognize our power 
to shape it.24 
Unusually for a computer science paper, the authors’ analysis demonstrates a sensitivity 
to STS concepts in its discussion of how technologists might identify the con icting 
actors and interests that contribute to tussle.  
One can appreciate how the commercial bene ts of computational legalism are 
in con ict with the goals of legitimacy, thus creating a ‘tussle space’: enterprise makes 
use of the former to advance their commercial interests – ruleishness and immutability 
provide predictability; opacity provides protection of commercial secrets and hides 
pro table but dubious design/normativity; and immediacy gives feedback and 
marketable results. We saw in Chapters 2 to 4 how those characteristics are, at least 
potentially, antagonistic to end-users’ interests. ere is thus a tussle between the 
interests of the end-user and the enterprise that wishes to channel her behaviour in 
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predictable (and pro table) ways. e tussle space arises because digisprudential 
legitimacy looks to uphold basic ‘constitutional’ safeguards against illegitimate 
behavioural regulation, but these are by nature absent in the default condition of 
computational legalism.  
Anticipating points of tussle during the production phase is important to avoid 
problems during operation. One of the principles that Clark et al. suggest for dealing 
with tussle spaces is designing to permit choice.  
3.1.1.1.1 Designing for choice 
e premise here is that the design ought to anticipate, or least allow for, different 
possibilities: ‘[r]igid designs will be broken; designs that permit variation will ex 
under pressure and survive.’25 While Clark et al. are thinking from the perspective of 
infrastructural design, from a digisprudential perspective we can think of designs 
which afford spaces in which users can exercise their autonomy, where what the design 
affords them is not limited so as to impose heteronomy (all things being equal – the 
notional scope for exercising autonomy depends of course on the fundamental purpose 
of the design). is accords with Brownsword’s requirement, discussed in the previous 
chapter, that code permit choices to be made by individuals in order to preserve their 
capacity for moral action.26  
Designing for choice also accords with the legisprudential principle of 
alternativity (PA),27 which as we saw concerns the legitimate use of ‘rigid’ rules that 
admit of no latitude, versus alternatives that incentivise or suggest courses of action, 
thereby implying the possibility of choice. Leaving the tussle space open to allow for 
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interpretation and end-user choice shifts power away from the designer and on to her.28 
e PA in this context requires that (i) the use of a rule in the code be more desirable 
than not, and (ii) the use of a rule rather than some less ruleish mechanism be 
necessary, for example a nudged default, or the option for the end-user to choose. e 
rst speaks to the enterprise’s business model and how this is articulated in code, 
raising some potentially existential questions as to the fundamental desirability of a 
given approach or product. In the context of privacy regulation, Hartzog warns us 
about the reluctance to consider design: ‘too often industry wants the freedom to 
experiment on the public without accepting the responsibility for the harm they 
cause.’29 We might then think of a kind of Hippocratic oath for code – ‘ rst, do no 
harm’ – which might ultimately lead a responsible designer/enterprise to conclude that 
the feature or product should not be developed at all.30 us, shifted into the present 
context, a computational PA would assess rst whether a given 
(dis)affordance/inscription is necessary for the operation of the artefact and the 
business model being pursued. If it is not, then a priori it should not be included in the 
design because it represents an unnecessary and unjusti ed limitation of the end-user’s 
freedom. 
If the element of technological normativity is necessary, the question then 
becomes one of the ruleishness of the implementation – how ‘wired in’ does the 
functionality need to be to achieve the designer’s goal? Should the code require the 
end-user to exercise a choice, or perhaps provide a passive con gurable option? Or 
does the purpose of the code imply the need for nudging/inscription, or even the 
requirement (wiring-in) of one of the possible options to the exclusion of all others? 
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e latter is the most ‘ruleish’ form of technological normativity, while the former 
approaches are progressively less constraining.31 As with the legisprudential PA, the 
decision to choose a more ‘ruleish’ (and therefore less choice-oriented) design approach 
must be justi ed because of the correspondingly larger limitation it places on freedom. 
I consider this further in the discussion of default choices in section 3.1.1.2 below.  
3.1.1.1.2 Taking choice further – agonism in design 
e concept of tussle and the anticipation of con icting interests is connected with 
Hildebrandt’s discussion of agonism in constitutional democracy.32 Agonism is a 
political theory that views adversarial debate to be fruitful where it enables contrasting 
points of view to be ventilated and compromise thereby to be achieved. ‘Inviting 
dissent’ in this way, which can be consciously facilitated by design,33 is ultimately at 
‘the core of both democracy and the rule of law.’34 For Hildebrandt, this is re ected in 
participatory design processes like Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA)35 
which aim to achieve a ‘settlement’ during the design process that takes into account 
the views of those with a stake in the outcome.36 I have previously suggested that such 
processes are less likely to be used in some design contexts, particularly small and 
medium enterprises.37 Furthermore, as Pols and Spahn have noted, design for all need 
not be the same as design with all.38 Initiatives like CTA seek to legitimise a design by 
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the fact of having involved stakeholders in decisions as to its substantive characteristics. 
is is a separate concern from my own, since such processes are built around the value 
of participation, rather than an underlying theory of what provides legitimacy.39 
Recalling the discussion of input and output legitimacy in the previous chapter, these 
approaches follow a ‘thick’ conception of legitimacy based on particulars rather than a 
‘thinner’ formal conception that is separate from the substantive content of 
participants’ views on the merits of a particular design. e ‘constitutional’ standards 
of digisprudence are sited at an earlier point than the question of whether stakeholders 
had their views taken into account. e two do not con ict and a design process can 
certainly involve both, but if the design is not otherwise digisprudentially-legitimate 
then the fact that a participatory process was used to shape it will not by itself provide 
legitimacy of the kind I am proposing.  
Nevertheless, the preservation of agonistic space can stand as a constitutional 
principle for code design, along the lines of tussle previously discussed: by anticipating 
in advance the points at which tussle is likely to arise in the operation of the design, it 
is possible to avoid imposing one path or outcome for that tussle ahead of time, thereby 
preserving the space for both choice and agonism. is extended view of designing for 
choice enjoins the designer consciously to ‘retreat’ from the impulse to impose a pre-
determined outcome, thus preserving a space for agonism, for tussle, within the 
operating space of the design itself. e domain of the morality of duty (computational 
legalism; external limitation on freedom) is reduced, and the domain of aspiration 
(‘legality’; individual conceptions of freedom) accordingly expanded. is twist on 
agonism operates at runtime but is facilitated by decisions made at design time, hence 
the continued relevance of input legitimacy. Unlike Hildebrandt’s discussion, the 
agonism in this case is anticipated in the operation of the artefact rather than in the 
design process; of course, both may be present (i.e. participation in the design process, 
                                                 




and the design affording space for agonism during operation). e extent to which 
implementation of this extended affordance of choice will be possible or plausible 
depends on the intended use of the artefact. e design of a single-function IoT device, 
for example, is less likely to admit of space for agonism than is the design of a social 
network platform. is is an example of how different artefacts re ect the 
digisprudential affordances to differing degrees, as in Wintgens’ model in Figure 4 
above. 
Returning to the analysis by Clark et al., they suggest another principle relevant 
to dealing with tussles in the production process, namely modularisation. 
Modularisation is also relevant to the affordance of choice, as we shall see. 
3.1.1.1.3 Modularisation 
Breaking down a system into (re-usable) modules of functionality is standard in the 
modern practice of code production.40 Modularity requires that ‘functions that are 
within a tussle space should be logically separated from functions outside of that 
space.’41 is idea connects with the legisprudential principle of normative density 
(PN).42 In terms of the goals of that principle, the code should avoid bundling together 
norms that are not conceptually related, forcing the end-user to acquiesce to multiple 
heterogenous normativities simultaneously when she might wish to accept some but 
resist others. is idea is re ected in the GDPR’s provisions requiring consent to be a 
genuine and free choice, requiring separate consents for separate operations, and 
preventing the bundling of consent along with performance where the former is not 
necessary for the latter.43  
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By modularising code normativity in this way, other digisprudential 
affordances are also made more readily achievable, for example transparency of the 
code’s operation. e aggregated normativities of a system, when they exhibit the 
characteristics of computational legalism, can lead to exponential negative effects as 
the characteristics each amplify the impact of the others. Modularisation as a design 
approach should seek to isolate discrete elements of normativity, perhaps along the 
boundaries of speci c features or functions, thereby enhancing the end-user’s ability 
to model accurately the system’s effects by avoiding the con ation of what should be 
conceptually isolated issues. As Clark et al. recommend, designers should ‘modularise 
the design along tussle boundaries, so that one tussle does not spill over and distort 
unrelated issues’.44 For example, in a smart thermostat, an example of an Internet of 
ings device, functionality that involves pro ling the end-user implicates a tussle 
involving different interests (i.e. the end-user’s right to data protection versus the 
enterprise’s desire to extract commercially-valuable insights from her habits) from 
functionality that merely gets on with controlling her heating system (i.e. the end-
user’s desire for domestic warmth versus the excessive consumption of energy).45 
Modularising these discrete functionalities enables the end-user to understand them 
separately and to respond to them in different ways. e connection with choice and 
the exercise of autonomy can be readily appreciated.  
For now, the next section picks up the discussions of technological normativity 
in Chapters 2 and 3,46 considering the connection between the design of digital 
systems’ default con gurations and the affordance of choice.  
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3.1.1.2 Default choices 
As Sunstein and aler note about the ‘offline’ world, default con guration is all 
around us – some initial con guration of rules is an inevitability,47 which in turn implies 
the inherent non-neutrality of technologies.48 We have seen at various points 
throughout this thesis how this observation applies even more strongly in the 
computational context. It is not possible for a designer to leave open to interpretation 
what the design of the artefact should be in the way that it is possible for the legislator 
deliberately to leave the meaning of a textual norm somewhat open. Some choice must 
be made by the designer that constrains the in nite possibilities of the tabula rasa, and 
therefore intervention to shape those initial decisions is all the more necessary. 
Kesan and Sandvig note that to rely on default settings (i.e. settings that can 
be changed) is in many cases to outsource decision-making to designers, moving it 
away from both government and end-users. Consequently, it becomes necessary to 
‘push and prod developers to set default settings that comport with established societal 
concerns’.49 If we accept that one of those concerns ought to be the legitimacy of code, 
then the aspects of the code that are made ‘chooseable’ must accord with that spirit. 
e number of choices and their quality (i.e. what substantive functionality they enable 
the end-user to alter) is thus an important design question with respect to the scope of 
autonomy that the code provides the end-user, and so too is the way in which these 
affordances of choice are communicated (signi ed) to her through the design. e 
provision of choice for choice’s sake does not beget legitimacy if those choices do not 
provide real autonomy.  
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Kesan’s analysis (with Shah) of the power of default settings in code is 
particularly relevant in this context.50 ey identify a spectrum of design mutability, 
from ‘wired-in’ functionality that cannot be changed, through to default settings that 
can be changed, and on to the notional ‘free choice’ of full customisation51 (it must be 
noted that even this level of con gurability can never be completely free, because as I 
noted above the initial commitments of the design by de nition circumscribe 
possibilities, which in turn limits the area within which the end-user can exercise 
autonomy). e extent to which end-users are aware of the control they have over 
con guration is a core concern,52 and is entirely contingent upon the affordance of 
choice being perceived – it is not enough if the affordance is merely real53 but unknown 
(or so complex as in practice to disafford54). In their survey of real-world approaches 
to setting defaults, the authors identify two core principles that drive design decisions, 
namely the consideration of novice end-users and efficiency.55 Kesan and Shah note 
the vagueness of the two principles, particularly with regard to who might be 
considered a ‘novice’, and by whose standards ‘efficiency’ is to be judged, particularly 
since the effect of a default will often impact on ‘fuzzy’ values that are difficult to 
calculate in such terms.56 e latter demonstrates a value often held by commercial 
designers; we will see below in section 3.3 how the goal of increasing efficiency – 
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pervasive among technologists – is not necessarily desirable in every case, even where 
there is technical scope for it. 
In terms of guiding design, the authors draw on legal notions of default rules 
to consider the threshold between what con guration is ‘wired in’ (immutable) and 
what is set merely as a default.57 Adopting analysis by Radin,58 they suggest that where 
the code is ‘wired in’ it must both notify the user and permit a judicial remedy (i.e. it 
must be contestable). is accords with this discussion throughout this chapter on the 
affordances of contestability, transparency, and delay.  
e system ought to provide ‘an easy-to-use interface that allows users to 
con gure the software according to their preferences’59 – Kesan and Shah do not refer 
to the theory, but this is of course about what affordances the interface provides, which 
should follow common design and usability conventions that end-users are familiar 
with.60 Added to this requirement, the authors set out a framework of principles for 
the setting, by designers, of the initial defaults in code. e starting point is what they 
call the ‘would have wanted standard’. is requires anticipation of what the parties 
(the enterprise and end-user) would likely have negotiated, had that been a 
possibility.61 is principle applies in situations where the setting does not materially 
affect a fundamental societal concern, such as (they suggest) privacy or online security. 
To those I might add normative legitimacy and contestability, as herein described.  
e next requirement is that where there is an information imbalance between 
designer and end-user, the default must be set to protect the latter, with appropriate 
information or guidance provided to her should she wish to change it. is of course 
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is inconvenient if the functionality in question is the very purpose of the device. Kesan 
and Shah give the example of cookie settings in a web browser, where because of the 
informational imbalance (end-users do not readily understand what cookies are and 
what they are used for62) the default setting should be to reject them.63 Should web 
companies wish them to be turned on (presumably to facilitate the business model of 
online behavioural advertising), they then must explain to the end-user their purpose 
and how to enable them64 (this is redolent of the concept of affording transparency of 
purpose, discussed below). e idea with such ‘penalty defaults’ is that before the end-
user can choose the non-default setting, the burden is on the designer to explain its 
effect. e default is therefore what the party with the greater understanding of the 
code (i.e. the designer or enterprise) would not have wanted, as a delaying mechanism 
that allows for the end-user to be informed (this is connected with the discussion of 
friction in section 3.3.1.2 below). 
e next principle suggested by Kesan and Shah also justi es this ‘would not 
have wanted’ approach and is based on the economic concept of ‘externalities’, or the 
broader (potentially negative) effects of the system on third parties. e default setting 
should reduce externalities or, if the stakes are particularly high, there should be no 
choice and the bene cial option should be ‘wired in’.65 An example might be an IoT 
webcam that is con gured by default to stream whatever it captures, with either no 
authentication mechanism enabled by default or with a standard and obvious default 
password (such as ‘admin’). e negative effects of such designs, especially given the 
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potential pervasiveness of such technology,66 can be signi cant.67 e idea, then, is that 
while the end-user might wish the camera to work immediately upon connection (and 
the enterprise might wish this too, from the perspective of given the end-user what 
she wants), the ‘would not have wanted’ standard might require that streaming is not 
enabled by default and that a (strong) password must be set before the device will 
connect. Anecdotally, this has been the direction of travel in the design of domestic 
routers, where instead of merely suggesting that end-users change the administration 
password or WiFi code, the device comes pre-con gured with strong, unique options 
already set. 
In terms of design, the cognitive biases mentioned in Chapter 368 can 
strengthen the ‘stickiness’69 of a default setting, militating against the end-user 
exercising choice; this implies an even greater responsibility to design the initial 
con guration wisely.70 Furthermore, the prominence of the setting in an interface can 
affect end-users’ awareness of it, and indeed the designer can explicitly draw attention 
to defaults that require special attention but do not cross the threshold to merit being 
‘wired in’ (for example the ‘would not have wanted’ defaults just discussed – making 
the administration password for a domestic router ‘wired in’ would be an odd design 
choice). Attention can be called by, for example, alerts which require the end-user to 
con rm a choice, or to make it ab initio at the rst point of use, with no pre-selected 
option and no opportunity to bypass the con guration request. Such measures can 
build in an element of the delay and friction described below in section 3.3. 
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Importantly, the design of these affordances of choice must take into account what 
Sunstein and aler call ‘framing effects’,71 or the way in which wording affects 
comprehension of one or other option (the classic analogue in the legal world being 
the leading question). e design should not promote the enterprise’s aim at the 
expense of digisprudential legitimacy, and of course the use of the adversarial design 
approaches that we saw in Chapter 272 is de facto illegitimate. 
is analysis of choice qua con gurability gives added texture to the bare 
requirement suggested by Brownsword and others that the technological normativity 
of code preserve the possibility of choice, and also the idea that more choice is de facto 
better. e affordances of the artefact ought to re ect the spirit of digisprudential 
legitimacy at each point of the end-user’s ‘journey’ through the inscriptions designed 
into the code. More choice per se is not sufficient to legitimate code if it is not the right 
kind of choice; the design must afford meaningful spaces for the exercise of autonomy 
and not simply more options. As mentioned above, this might raise difficult existential 
questions as to the desirability of a given artefact or business model, but such questions 
are precisely what digisprudential legitimacy is intended to provoke. 
3.1.2 Discussion: blockchain applications 
Blockchain applications pose potentially signi cant problems from the perspective of 
affording choice. We saw in Chapter 1 how one of their primary attractions is that the 
code of the application, once written and added to the chain, is essentially immutable, 
owing both to how it is stored and the decentralisation of the network. If the possibility 
of choice has not been anticipated in advance, the central bene t to blockchains of 
tamper-resistance becomes a hindrance to its exercise at runtime. To afford choice, 
then, it is particularly necessary in the case of blockchain applications to choose 
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carefully in advance how much of the code is ruleish and how much relies on external 
contingencies, including end-user input. is is intimately connected to, and overlaps 
with, the issue of immutability, discussed in section 3.4 below: the xity of the code 
that ows from its storage on, and execution by, a blockchain (recall the discussion of 
Sony BMG’s DRM and the immutability of the CD medium) means that the design 
of the threshold between wired-in and con gurable code is important, particularly 
given the additional complication of blockchain applications’ execution of logic that is 
(i) automatic, and (ii) potentially legally-relevant.73 
If blockchain applications are to be used to implement legally-relevant 
operations (cf. the discussion in Chapter 1) such as transfers of assets, one approach to 
ameliorating ruleishness is to reconceive of them as mere ‘custodians’ of the mutability 
and exibility of language, and thus to change expectations of what can and should be 
implemented computationally. An example is the Ricardian Contract, an approach 
that aims not to automate the purposive elements of a contract-like agreement (which, 
as we saw in Chapter 1, is the aim of some smart contract maximalists) but rather to 
maintain the exibility of textual agreement and to augment it with a limited amount 
of coded functionality that complements, rather than replaces, the latter.74 e (natural 
language) text of the agreement is ‘wrapped’ in a minimal code semantics that enables 
basic code-based features such as tamper-resistance and provenance checking, through 
the use of hashing and public-key cryptography. Because the actual text of the 
agreement retains all the possibilities of nuance that contract law and indeed language 
in general have evolved to accommodate, the apparent immutability of the agreement 
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74  I. Grigg, ‘ e Ricardian Contract’, Proceedings of the First IEEE International Workshop on Electronic 
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can nevertheless be combined with the inherent exibility of expression. In other 
words, the execution of the agreement remains ‘human’, any choice possibilities are 
rei ed in the immutable text, and the contribution of code is in providing the bene ts 
of immutability and provenance checking that are ancillary to the substance of the 
agreement. e exercise of choice, then, takes place outside the code. e extent to 
which this is practically useful from the perspective of the technology remains to be 
seen; limiting the ruleishness of blockchain code to such ancillary bene ts in this way 
might in practice undermine their perceived value in the rst place.  
Alternative approaches that maintain the full(er) utility of code will need to 
involve designing the application’s inscriptions to afford the end-user choice at key 
moments. ose inscriptions ought to be designed with sensitivity to the implications 
of blockchains as a platform (i.e. its automated instrumentality and immutability). e 
greater the normative impact of the code’s logic (its normative density; the PN), the 
greater the need for choice to be preserved; in practice the implementation of this will 
vary between applications and will involve a mixture of the appropriate selection of 
oracles, noti cation to the end-user, appropriately-de ned choices, and logic that can 
deal with the outcomes. Given the peculiar characteristics of blockchains, whether it 
can reasonably be expected of designers to anticipate all the relevant points where 
choice is necessary is at the very least questionable. ese requirements may 
fundamentally undermine the premise of blockchain applications, such as distributed 
autonomous organisations, that are predicated on their ability to execute operations 
without human input, some of which are of quintessential legal relevance, such as 
purchasing goods or services. is again raises the existential question of whether such 
applications can be legitimate – if it is accepted that the affordance of choice is 
necessary to achieve digisprudential legitimacy, it may well be that a failure to provide 




3.1.3 Discussion: IoT 
As we saw in Chapter 1,75 one of the common characteristics of IoT devices is their 
minimal interfaces. One way of affording choice is to provide better, more 
sophisticated interfaces, perhaps through the connection of the IoT artefact itself with 
another device that affords more complex interactions. is could be a smartphone or 
a television, whose affordances in turn facilitate the presentation and signifying of 
choice affordances to the end-user. is is a difficult balance to strike, because of course 
many IoT devices are intended to have a minimal number of functions. In the next 
section I discuss the Amazon Dash Button, which consists of a single button but whose 
background functionality is extremely complex; in that case the affordance of choice at 
the point of using the device is dramatically curtailed – its only real use is the pressing 
of a button, but the number of con gurable variables that are relevant to the process 
that is put in train by doing so is signi cant, as we shall see. 
3.2 Opacity 
In the computational context opacity is connected most closely with the Fullerian 
principles of promulgation and intelligibility, and the legisprudential principles of 
alternativity (PA)76 and normative density (PN).77 In terms of promulgation, Fuller 
was concerned that citizens should know (or be in a position to nd out) the rules by 
which they were being governed, partly as a check against them being disregarded by 
the authorities administering them78 (this is related also to his eighth principle, 
requiring congruence between the declared rule and the official action that ows from 
it79). is of course enables citizens to observe their operation, which is a prerequisite 
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for contesting it. In order to be valid, the rules should also be intelligible – obscurity 
and incoherence can make legality difficult or impossible to attain. 
For the legisprudential principles, opacity is targeted again by the PA and the 
PN. Under the former, the inherent opacity of code again imbues the decision to 
implement a rule with extra normative impact versus a less ruleish measure. e 
inability of the end-user to see the rule to which she is subject is emphasised in the 
computational context, and its use is therefore subject to a higher standard of 
justi cation. As before, the threshold of justi cation is lowered when a less ‘ruleish’ 
design measure is employed, but at all times the fact of code’s opacity must be borne 
in mind. is in turn relates to the application of the PN: the more opaque the code, 
the more difficult it may be for the end-user to appreciate the aggregate ‘density’ of 
technological normativity that she is being subjected to. e PN expects there to be a 
proportionate connection between the policy aim and the means by which it is 
achieved, with threats of sanctions at the ‘denser’ end of the scale and mere suggestions 
that can be easily ignored towards the ‘lighter’ end.80 In terms of justi cation, the use 
of a particular design technique must be justi ed in the context and in light of the 
other principles, particularly if there are alternative mechanisms that might have 
achieved the same end. In the computational context, we saw how the geography of 
code is often taken by the end-user to be a ‘natural fact’, rather than merely one 
possibility among in nite others.81 is opacity of normative impact is particularly 
strong where the con guration of (dis)affordances and inscriptions strongly guides the 
end-user’s behaviour; the necessity for justi cation is therefore all the stronger in such 
situations. 
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3.2.1 Affordance: transparency of provenance & purpose 
An important aspect of affording transparency, which is also connected to the 
affordance of contestability, is that of provenance. is links to Asscher’s adaptation 
of Fuller’s principles, where he states that the source of the code-based norm must be 
identi able.82 is can be problematic when complex digital systems are made up of 
multiple components, often from different suppliers.83 Designers ought to afford 
reasonable notice of the sources of the code in their systems (or at least provide a means 
to nd out84) so as to inform and to afford contestability. As Gürses and van Hoboken 
suggest, while many websites appear to end-users to be published by a single 
commercial entity, they are in fact ‘a mix of a Frankenstein and a Matryoshka doll 
concealing dozens of services.’85 Recent scrutiny of online behavioural advertising has 
shown just how large the network of unseen third parties operating in the background 
can be, including situations where the design of a website’s interface might suggest to 
the end-user that there is only one provider involved.86 e same is often true of other 
digital artefacts whose back-end processing relies on a host of services (and third 
parties) the end-user is unlikely to have cognisance of. 
e question of the code’s purpose relates to the LoC3 element of the 
legisprudential principle of coherence (PC).87 Transparency under this rubric will 
require information as to the reason for a given piece of functionality, where this is not 
self-evidently the artefact’s raison d’être. For example, a smart fridge might be marketed 
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as including features that provide information on the goods that are stored within it 
(nutritional information, expiry dates, recipes, etcetera), but this does not imply that 
data about the goods stored in the fridge will be used to pro le the end-user vis-à-vis 
her diet, income, and preferences, information which can be used for purposes far 
outside the basic functionality of a fridge.88 e normativity of such functionality ought 
to be justi ed via the affordance of transparency, and where this cannot be done the 
function should not be included in the design. Another example is the inclusion of a 
geolocator in a smartphone torch application – transparency ought to be afforded on a 
similar basis, because it is not a part of the functionality commonly required of a 
torch.89 e designer must then consider from where this unorthodox function of 
geolocation is justi ed, given what affordances are commonly expected of torches. is 
kind of transparency might be termed transparency of purpose.90  
With each form of transparency, however, the designer must not succumb to 
the transparency fallacy, where essentially any otherwise legal normativity can be 
included in the code provided it is described in a terms document that gives the end-
user notice and the notional opportunity to exercise her judgment.91 Pols and Spahn 
discuss the concept of the ‘monitoring citizen’ as a better normative ideal than the 
‘well-informed citizen’ that such documents envisage.92 In an ideal world a fully-
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informed end-user might be a possible and desirable goal, but with the complexity and 
pervasiveness of code it seems likely only ever to be a mirage. e ‘monitoring citizen’, 
on the other hand, is empowered to nd out information when she needs it. As Pols and 
Spahn put it, ‘[t]he Monitoring Citizen does not know everything that is going on but 
can monitor it successfully and can investigate and contest policy when needed.’93 is 
ideal is more plausible than aiming for ‘real’ or ‘full’ transparency, and it provides a 
guiding principle for design: the aim is to empower the end-user by affording her, at 
an appropriate level of abstraction, information about the operation and purposes of 
the code she is interacting with. One can think here of an analogy with legislative 
procedure: in addition to the citizen being able to access directly the legislative rule in 
the statutory document (cf. Fuller’s rst principle), it is also possible for her access 
explanatory notes, impact assessments, Hansard, and other ancillary material in order 
to glean a deeper understanding of the purpose of a piece of legislation. 
3.2.2 Affordance: transparency of operation 
e most obvious mechanism here is transparency in the imposition of normativity, in 
the form of documenting the use of a design that lies at a particular point on the 
normativity spectrum or actively informing the end-user of this fact. As we saw above, 
however, transparency is a contested concept. In the context of machine learning 
systems where it has been criticised as a means by which engineers can ‘whitewash’ 
decisions that are antagonistic to end-users’ interests;94 similar concerns can apply in 
the code-driven context.95 Transparency as a goal can be framed such that including 
descriptions of functionality in lengthy terms documents that notionally inform the 
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end-user is legitimate, when in practice it does little to illuminate for her what is 
actually going on.96 e (ideological) belief here is that simply providing more 
information will enable end-users to make informed choices about which products can 
and cannot ful l their preferences, thus leading to greater competition and better 
products by dint of the operation of market forces97 (recall the normative distinction 
between the ‘monitoring citizen’ and the ‘well-informed citizen’ in the previous 
section).  
Other work argues for solutions that do not involve the end-user directly. For 
example, the source code that underpins regulatory software systems could be required 
to be open, i.e. viewable, in order that it might be audited by third parties to detect 
unethical or unlawful functionality that might not otherwise be apparent.98 is 
proposal may be plausible for public sector regulators (the European Commission, for 
example, follows such a mandate99), but as the ‘code wars’ in the late 90s to mid-2000s 
showed, commercial enterprise has been reticent if not actively hostile to the idea of 
opening up the proprietary code at the core of its products and services.100  Others have 
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suggested an escrow system, where an artefact’s source code is held by a trusted third 
party who can be required to release it by a court if litigation should arise.101 
In neither of these suggested cases are the full context and texture of the code’s 
materiality taken into account. (Dis)affordance and inscription speak to more than just 
the bare logic of the code, so while it is true that a great deal can be gleaned from code 
just by studying it (assuming the relevant expertise, of course), a broader sensitivity to 
qualitative design concepts is required in order fully to appreciate its effects in 
operation, particularly those on the end-user. Perhaps more importantly, such 
approaches are not based on input legitimacy, because they operate as a kind of 
insurance policy to be invoked only once malfeasance has been suspected or detected. 
By de nition, such assessments are ex post, and so they do nothing to avoid the 
production of illegitimate code in the rst place. Should the effects of the code not be 
suspected or detected then it might continue inde nitely to operate illegitimately. 
e goal of transparency in this context should not, therefore, be limited to the 
literal openness of source code. As we saw in Chapter 2, design can signify to the end-
user what the functionality of the system is and what it allows her to do.102 What 
matters is comprehension rather than bare noti cation, and thus it is incumbent on 
the designer to ensure as far as possible that the end-user’s mental model of the system 
matches what it actually does.103 As Hartzog notes, ‘[g]ood design means that a user’s 
mental map of how a technology works matches reality.’104 e designer must ensure 
that she has taken into account the ‘conceptual model’ (the combination of information 
about the product from advertisements, sales people, instruction manuals, and the 
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interface of the artefact itself) that the end-user is likely to construct, acknowledging 
that her own model of the system, with her intimate knowledge of its operation, is 
likely to differ signi cantly from that of the much less informed end-user.105  
Similar considerations arise in relation to the legisprudential principle of 
coherence (PC).106 In terms of internal coherence (LoCs 0 and 1), the code should be 
consistent in its design language (cf. the grammar and basic meaning of words under 
the PC) and it is the designer’s role to ensure the artefact is ‘understandable and 
usable.’107 End-users should not be confronted with con icting or inconsistent design 
in order to avoid causing confusion and misapprehension (recall the discussion in 
Chapter 2 of malicious design practices and how these are used for nefarious – i.e. 
illegitimate – ends108). In terms of LoC1, this includes arbitrary changes that can 
confuse or trick the end-user, especially after she has developed a familiarity with how 
the code works.109  
Affording this kind of transparency might be termed transparency of operation 
– the requirement is to design in such a way that the end-user can understand what 
the code is doing as it operates. is form of transparency is also an on-going concern 
(and linked with the strategy of oversight, discussed below). Because systems are 
frequently updated with features added and removed, it is incumbent on the designer 
to appropriately communicate such changes where they ‘recon gure’ the relationship 
between end-user and enterprise.110 
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3.2.3 Discussion: blockchain applications 
Blockchain applications are usually published on a public chain where they can be 
viewed by anyone, or at least by those who are subject to their terms. is however 
simply repeats the problem of source code transparency described above – having 
access to the application’s code does not automatically render it intelligible to those 
end-users who are or might be affected by its operation. Certain initiatives in the 
cryptocurrency community are seeking to ameliorate this problem. For example, the 
community behind the Ethereum platform is developing the ‘Ethereum Natural 
Speci cation Format’ (‘ENSF’),111 designed to be used alongside Solidity, the 
programming language for Ethereum blockchain applications. ENSF is a form of code 
commentary that enables blockchain application designers to tag the individual 
elements of an Ethereum application with descriptions, from which a natural language 
explanation of the application’s purpose can be automatically generated using 
templates into which the contingent values of the code are inserted (e.g. party and 
parameter names, and notices of what a particular function does). e result is a 
commentary of the blockchain application, a simple example of which for a single 
function might look like this: 
Send 1.125 BTC from the account of ABC to an account accessible only by 
XYZ112 
is message might be derived from the following tags which immediately precede the 
actual application code which performs the action: 
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/// @notice Send `(valueBTC / 1000).fixed(0,3)` BTC from the 
account of `message.caller.address()` to an account accessible 
only by `to.address()` 
One can see how the elements between the backticks (`) are placeholders for the actual 
values generated within the application’s logic, and how the tagging thereby results in 
the commentary above. 
is provides some useful measure of transparency of operation, in that the 
logic of the blockchain application can theoretically be explained to the end-user. A 
problem with such approaches, however, is that they inevitably rely on the designer’s 
subjective understanding of the code. For the approach to work she must accurately 
model, in a combination of natural language and code placeholders, the logic of the 
application. If she fails to do this, intentionally or mistakenly, the end-user might end 
up with both an erroneous understanding of the system and a misplaced con dence in 
that understanding, an outcome which is arguably less desirable than if there were no 
explanation at all. is is akin to Brownsword’s focus on the rules which led to the use 
of code, rather than the normativity that it actually implements.113 Relying on 
descriptions of this sort adds an additional layer of abstraction between the end-user 
and the instrumentality of the code, increasing the likelihood of errors and 
misinterpretations on the part of the designer, the end-user, or both. What we have, 
then, is the resurgence of the hermeneutic gap between text on the page (in this case 
the tagging/commentaries) and the instrumentality of the code.  
is may be a necessary compromise if transparency is to be achieved, however, 
since as we saw merely publishing raw source code with no commentary by itself does 
little to advance end-user understanding. ere is also the possibility of leveraging the 
programmer of the programmer, in the form of the software design environment, to 
detect instances during development where such tags might be included in the code 
                                                 




and to suggest that or force the designer to add them. is approach is discussed 
further in Chapter 6. 
3.2.4 Discussion: IoT 
Affording transparency in the IoT is a complex challenge for several reasons. IoT 
devices are often intended to be embedded and pervasive, creating a network of 
interconnected devices that communicate with one another to create ‘ambient 
intelligence’ or ‘ubiquitous computing’.114 As a consequence of the invisibility that 
arises from such devices ‘receding’ into the background of everyday life, they often have 
either minimal or no interface with which the end-user can interact in order to observe 
what the code is actually doing. Many IoT devices will offer few or even no perceptual 
affordances, and with such minimal means of communicating their presence and/or 
purposes to the end-user, the opacity of the normativity is all the more impenetrable. 
As Matassa and Simeoni warn,  
…the existing affordances in connected and technologically augmented 
objects are becoming unable to immediately communicate to people their 
actual values and meanings… [t]he impossibility of establishing a clear 
connection between objects and functionalities could become a threat for 
humans, since they are missing their innate ability to understand what they 
can do only based on their knowledge and perception of the surrounding 
context.115 
is connects with the discussion of real and perceived affordances in Chapter 2.116 
e invisibility of IoT devices, and/or their minimal interfaces, mean that the 
communication of even perceived (dis)affordance is already limited, much less the real 
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(dis)affordances that the design embodies. e scope then is all the greater for the end-
user to experience a dissonance between what she thinks is happening, what her 
possibilities for action are, and what is actually taking place.117  
It may be, then, that to achieve legitimacy an IoT device must be consciously 
designed to facilitate understanding on the part of the end-user, even where this is not 
necessary for the product’s purpose to be achieved. e normativity of the artefact 
should thus be made apparent to the end-user. IoT devices are hybrids – they combine 
the up-front physicality of a tangible object with the background processing of 
(networked) code, the latter being made even less tractable by the absence of an 
interface.  
We saw above that one approach to facilitating intelligibility is through the use 
of a traditional device such as a smartphone or connected television to provide the 
interface through which the user can interact with and monitor the IoT device. Devices 
such as ‘smart’ thermostats and doorbells use this approach. e degree to which the 
obscured (dis)affordances/inscriptions embodied in the device are communicated to 
the end-user will vary according to the complexity of the device’s functions. For 
example, after it is con gured via the end-user’s smartphone, the Amazon Dash 
Button provides the most minimal of interfaces – a simple adhesive push-button that 
can be stuck at various points around the home, which when pressed re-orders the 
product indicated by a logo on its surface.118 e apparent simplicity of the single-
button interface belies the signi cant complexity of the operations that take place when 
it is pressed: these involve multiple networking processes (WiFi, TCP/IP handshakes, 
Amazon account authentication), a nancial transaction (communication between 
Amazon’s servers and the provider of the end-user’s bank account) and, perhaps most 
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importantly, the generating of data that deepens Amazon’s pro le of the end-user’s 
domestic preferences and shopping habits. e gap between the simplicity of the 
device and what actually goes on demonstrates the potential dissonance Matassa and 
Simeoni refer to (albeit that the end-user will presumably have at least some awareness 
of what the button does given its purpose).  
3.3  Immediacy 
e immediacy of code is especially problematic when combined with the 
contradictory or impossible rules warned of in Fuller’s fth and sixth principles. We 
saw above in relation to the legisprudential principle of coherence how contradiction 
can apply within the computational sphere – at the level of the interface, design 
language can be confusing to the end-user if it lacks consistency. Impossible rules can 
guide end-users into situations where there is no logical way out. For example, website 
cookie notices often give the illusion of providing the choice of whether or not to 
consent but in reality require acquiescence in order to gain access.119 Frequent changes 
to the code are also problematic – end-users can become accustomed to one way of 
working with an artefact then nd this being changed or reversed by a software update. 
Depending on the kind of artefact the scope for such changes can vary – consider the 
interface changes that online platforms occasionally roll out which can disorient end-
users to the point of backlash.120 Beneath the surface of code, alterations to 
functionality can also have important effects: the periodic tweaks to Google’s search 
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algorithm can signi cantly alter what material is found on the web for a given search 
term.121  
From a legisprudential perspective, immediacy speaks to the principle of 
normative density (PN).122 e fact of the immediate imposition of a given 
con guration of (dis)affordance/inscription means that its impact is of particular 
importance, making ex ante consideration all the more necessary. We saw above in the 
discussion of opacity how the density of technological normativity is a topic of crucial 
concern; the immediacy of its application heightens this further. Immediacy also 
concerns the legisprudential principle of temporality (PT),123 requiring sensitivity to 
the moment of the imposition of normativity and ongoing justi cation to ensure the 
mechanism for achieving the aim of the norm continues to be appropriate in light of 
the other principles.  
3.3.1 Affordance: delay 
We have seen how speed and immediacy of execution are quintessential elements of 
computational legalism. Floridi suggests that in the modern computational context the 
lack of ‘informational friction’ contrasts with previous eras of human society where the 
inherent makeup of the social fabric meant that information could not travel above a 
certain speed or beyond a certain geographical radius.124 For him, information privacy 
is facilitated in part by the ‘ontological friction’ within a system, which operates to 
oppose the ow of information and increase the effort required to gain access to it.125 
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Similarly, in the legal context Hildebrandt argues that it is precisely the 
inherent ‘friction’ of text that has resulted in the existence and character of the 
institutions and processes of law that we now take for granted.126 e affordances of 
text and the printing press have in turn afforded society a certain kind of law, one that 
is based around text-based norms whose meanings are under-determined but whose 
textual expressions are stable enough to facilitate a baseline of inter-geographical and 
inter-generational consensus that can, through incremental evolution through 
democratic processes, adapt to societal change.127  
e possibilities for friction provided by a given design are affordances of that 
design, and are therefore susceptible to conscious implementation by the designer. 
Floridi suggests (rather optimistically) that ‘contrary to old ICTs [information and 
communications technologies], new ICTs empower users in both directions, as they 
can both increase and decrease informational friction’.128 Whether or not this is true 
for a particular system is contingent in large part on its designer’s willingness to make 
it so – Floridi acknowledges this reality when he warns that ‘[s]olutions will not 
develop by themselves without some effort on our part.’129  
3.3.1.1 Desirable inefficiency 
In a recent paper Ohm and Frankle posit the concept of ‘desirable inefficiency’,130 
where the efficiency of code (embodied as we have seen in the computationally-
legalistic characteristics of ruleishness and immediacy) is consciously tempered in order 
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to permit or protect some value that it might otherwise undermine. ey de ne 
efficiency in the computer science context as ‘the extent to which [a system] minimizes 
the consumption of time, energy, space, or cost in satisfying a speci cation of 
correctness for a given problem.’131 A desirably inefficient approach is one that 
fails to minimize the consumption of time, energy, or space in satisfying a 
speci cation of correctness for a given basic problem in order to address a 
different, related enhanced problem.132 
e ‘basic problem’ is the underlying technical outcome that the designer wishes to 
achieve, while the ‘enhanced problem’ is one that requires ‘human judgment, values, 
or discretion in the de nition of success or failure’.133 e authors argue in favour of 
desirable inefficiency as a set of design patterns, part of their call for a ‘new 
interdisciplinary research agenda investigating how values can be embedded into 
code.’134 ey give the example of a passcode screen on a smartphone, which locks the 
phone for a progressively longer period of time when incorrect attempts are registered. 
Designs like this balance the inconvenience that a forgetful end-user experiences with 
the security of the device that might otherwise be compromised in the hands of a 
thief;135 the technical ‘basic problem’ is providing the end-user with secure access to 
her smartphone, while the societal ‘enhanced problem’ is the prevention of access for 
thieves.136 Another example is proof-of-work in blockchain applications,137 where the 
technical processes involved that would otherwise be capable of near-instant 
computation (i.e. recording in a database the outcome of a transaction) are, through 
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proof-of-work, made sufficiently ‘inefficient’ to re-introduce the human values of trust 
and ‘clock time’.138 e basic problem is tamper-resistant validation of transactions, 
while the enhanced problem is their fair validation.139 
Ohm and Frankle’s analysis focuses strongly on the underlying logics of 
computational systems, explicitly excluding from their discussion designs that ‘do no 
more than slow down the operation of a computer to match the speed of human 
processing systems’.140 ere seems, however, to be no principled reason why the 
concept of desirable inefficiency cannot be a conscious part of the design of end-user-
facing code, especially where doing so can help to facilitate another human value such 
as comprehension of the code’s behaviour or the opportunity to exercise autonomy. As 
Clark et al. suggest, even where greater efficiency is possible from a technical 
perspective, in some cases it will be better to opt for a less efficient design where doing 
so makes it possible to separate points at which the artefact’s design implicates 
diverging or con icting interests (this is the idea of tussle that I discussed above).141 
When framed in terms of (dis)affordances and inscriptions, the concept of 
desirable inefficiency can be applied fruitfully to end-user-facing systems where that 
inefficiency operates to throttle computational performance in service of end-user 
comprehension and empowerment, in opposition to the immediacy of code. Fraser 
and Kitchin discuss ‘slow computing’,142 the idea of consciously reducing ‘time 
compression, fragmentation, densi cation and stresses’ in end-user interactions with 
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digital artefacts.143 Pols and Spahn connect this outlook with critical theories of 
technology that view technology as a threat to democracy and justice.144 According to 
such theories, social spheres in which democratic values ought to be given time and 
space to operate are in danger of being limited by a ‘technological rationality that 
centers on efficiency and strategic rationality’.145 Democracy and justice depend on 
‘communicative’ rather than ‘strategic’ rationality, and thus the space for the former 
must be left open. is can be read to imply the affordance of inefficiency to 
circumscribe ‘technological rationality’ (speed, efficiency, certainty) in favour of the 
space for communicative possibilities. We can also see here a connection to Julie 
Cohen’s concept of the ‘play of everyday practice’.146 For Cohen, play is a necessary 
part of how individuals are empowered to exercise their autonomy within architectural 
and institutional structures, exploiting the space between predictability and 
contingency. is is akin to the space between the imposition of heteronomy by core 
constitutive functionality – the ‘morality of duty’ – and the provision of ‘open’ spaces 
within the code’s geography that can invite the exercise of freedom and autonomy – 
the ‘morality of aspiration’. is relates to the counterintuitive concept of consciously 
encouraging ambiguity in a design’s affordances so as not to constrain end-users’ 
responses to the artefact to only those possibilities predetermined by the designer.147 
We can see how these ideas relate to the concept of multi-stability and the possibility 
of the end-user re-interpreting a design’s purpose, discussed in Chapter 2.148 e extent 
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to which this can happen is contingent, at least to some extent, on the latitude for such 
reinterpretation left open by the designer. What can be taken from these various 
perspectives is that technological inefficiency, when consciously and appropriately 
designed into an artefact, can be an important bulwark against the limitations on 
freedom that technological normativity can impose.  
3.3.1.2 Friction 
e concept of friction has been used in recent literature to refer to its opposite, 
particularly in the context of information sharing on social networks. e presumption 
has been, as with inefficiency in the computer science context, that less is always 
better.149 ‘Frictionless sharing’ refers to the ease and speed with which the code of such 
platforms affords sharing,150 through for example the use of metadata standards (e.g. 
Open Graph tags that describe content in a machine-readable way, enabling previews 
and analytics) and front- and back-end functionalities that reduce the cognitive burden 
involved in sharing (e.g. share buttons embedded on third party websites and liking/re-
sharing functionalities that combine with end-user interaction metrics to enable 
‘virality’). e reduction in friction can be taken even further, to the point where 
everyday events such as visiting a particular retailer or going for a run are automatically 
shared by the code on social media platforms without the end-user’s input.151 Before 
these affordances existed, the act of sharing content online was subject to the ‘friction’ 
of having to go through various manual steps: copying the URL of the item into an 
email or instant message, choosing the recipient(s), and perhaps composing a short 
note describing what the link referred to (before the introduction of metadata 
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previews, all that would be included was the URL itself, which on its own might make 
little sense to the recipient). All of this requires thought and conscious decision-
making on the part of the sharer, in contrast to the single-click, one-to-many forms of 
sharing described above.  
Designs that include especially efficient affordances can have unforeseen 
consequences if they are not accompanied by appropriate instruction or information; 
they remove friction from the action in question while hiding the potentially 
undesirable and complex consequences of that action (recall the discussion of IoT 
devices in section 3.2.4 above). One of the problems of Facebook’s frictionless sharing 
is the extent to which some end-users were unaware of the precise audience they were 
sharing their intimate posts with.152 In that respect, McGeveran connects the idea of 
friction to design: 
…the amount of friction is a complex design choice, which inherently helps 
some users and burdens others. We cannot avoid making some choice, 
whether through code or law; there is no “natural” state of online friction.153 
is is ultimately a question of affordance; the option to share is an affordance of the 
interface and back-end code that is made available to the end-user at a time chosen by 
the designer. In the case of sharing, McGeveran suggests a design principle, according 
to which the affordance (though he does not use the language of design theory) of 
sharing should not be made available before the act itself has taken place. His ‘law of 
friction’ states that ‘it should not be easier to “share” an action online than to do it.’154 
A similar principle can apply in relation to any computational operation that has 
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normative effect: the end-user should be afforded the opportunity to consider the 
operation before it takes place. e intention here, then, is to consciously design friction 
into the appropriate parts of the artefact, in order that end-users are given an 
opportunity to take stock before the code moves on to the next step in its logic.155 e 
end-user can comprehend a system only through the relatively small keyhole of its 
interface; the depth and breadth of the mass of code steps that are actually being 
executed is akin to the vast bulk of an iceberg hidden beneath surface waters – as 
Vismann and Krajewski put it, ‘[b]eyond the interface, users have no access 
whatsoever.’156 e challenge then is to design interfaces that afford the appropriate 
pacing of computation, alongside an appropriate level of technical feedback, in order 
to facilitate a sufficiently detailed mental model for the end-user to enable her to make 
an accurate prediction of what will happen next.157 is idea connects with the concept 
of the ‘human in the loop’, discussed next. 
3.3.1.3 Human in the loop 
We saw in Chapter 3 how the automatic application of code-base rules is in very many 
cases perfectly possible from a purely technological perspective.158 e characteristics 
of computational legalism are attractive from a commercial perspective, particularly 
when channelling end-user behaviour can be made more efficient and pervasive while 
at the same time reducing cost. A primary mechanism for forcing delay into code-
mediated processes is the ‘human in the loop’ (‘HitL’), where those elements of the 
process that are appropriate for the code to execute are left to the machine, and 
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decisions that have social, ethical, or legal import are made by a human (or the 
machine’s suggestion rati ed by a human). e classic application of the HitL principle 
is in lethal autonomous weapon systems, where the elements of an engagement are 
automated up to the point of the nal decision on whether or not to strike, which must 
be taken by a human controller.159 Discussing the use of code in the law enforcement 
context speci cally, Hartzog et al. argue for a ‘conservation principle’ that would 
require inefficiency and indeterminacy to be conserved, primarily by retaining a role 
for humans to exercise judgment at speci c points within the criminal justice 
process.160 For them, HitL is a necessary bulwark against the determinism of in exible 
code, and they suggest that where one of the three elements of law enforcement that 
they consider is automated in code (surveillance, analysis, and detection), the 
(desirable) inefficiency and indeterminacy of the other two should be increased 
proportionately.161 
In the context of consumer products, the role of the HitL will be played by the 
end-user herself. In order to retain the desirable delaying effect of the HitL’s 
‘inefficiency’, then, interfaces ought to afford end-users noti cation and choice before 
normatively-signi cant computational events take place. As discussed above, 
information about these scenarios should not be front-loaded in terms documents that 
are not read, but rather should be delivered piecemeal at appropriate moments in the 
end-user’s journey through the code’s inscriptions. is might be achieved by, for 
example, employing ‘just in time’ noti cations, akin to those used in the Android 
operating system to allow the end-user to give or deny permissions to an application 
requesting access to an operating system feature at the moment the request is made, 
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instead of in bulk at the time of installation when she might not foresee all the relevant 
implications.162 e idea is to granularize permission-giving at the appropriate level, 
and to request it only at the relevant time, such that the end-user can make a choice 
that is informed by context.  
HitL is also a necessary element of retaining indeterminacy, the quality of a 
circumstance not being adequately re ected in the code or data which come to 
represent it (recall the discussion on representationalism in legalism, and how code’s 
representations are reductive of the world).163 Whereas code imposes such (reductive) 
interpretations, indeterminacy (or ‘underdeterminacy’, in Hildebrandt’s terms164) 
should actively be preserved in order to allow for responses that are sensitive to the 
texture of the real world. us, the HitL has a role in ‘completing the narrative’ in such 
scenarios, lling in the contextual gaps which computational representations are 
incapable of showing sensitivity to but which are nevertheless important in the pursuit 
of justice or of end-user autonomy.165 e goal, then, is to ensure that the design 
affords HitL input at all appropriate points in its inscription, in order that the 
aspirations of freedom and rational interpretation are not effaced by the ‘duty’ of wired-
in code. 
3.3.2 Discussion: blockchain applications 
Many of the considerations of ruleishness discussed above also apply here in the 
context of immediacy. Levy notes that ‘[b]ecause they are based on code’, blockchain 
applications ‘can be immediately and automatically effectuated, without reliance on 
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manual transfer, or the intervention of institutions like courts.’166 One of the putative 
bene ts of blockchain applications (promoted in particular by smart contract 
enthusiasts167) is their removal of the perceived inefficiency of ambiguity and processual 
costs.168 is efficiency is potentially deeply problematic, especially if the code has been 
poorly designed. When combined with the immutability of blockchains, the 
consequences can be serious indeed. As de Filippi and Wright suggest, 
[t]he automated nature of smart contracts, combined with the inability to 
readily alter their underlying code, could further lead to situations where a 
faultly [sic] piece of code would repeatedly run, to the detriment of all parties 
involved.169 
is implies the need for ex ante consideration of the implications of automated and 
immediate execution: assets or funds could be transferred or goods and services ordered 
according to the predetermined logic of the blockchain application, without any 
human intervention or oversight. is could happen near-instantaneously if the 
conditions in the code were met – the good is ordered, the funds transferred, and the 
drone commandeered (recall the discussion in Chapter 1170). As with the affordance of 
choice, providing delay may therefore require the design of appropriate moments in 
which the end-user is afforded the opportunity to consider the situation before 
execution of the code continues. Given that anticipation of every conceived outcome 
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is impossible,171 contingency ought not to be the province of code, and any attempt to 
enclose it is perhaps likely to set up unforeseen and undesirable results. Simultaneously, 
however, imposing friction in blockchain applications is arguably anathema to their 
ethos. It may be necessary, however, given their exempli cation of computational 
legalism, if they are to achieve digisprudential legitimacy. 
3.3.3 Discussion: IoT 
I alluded above in the discussion of default choices to IoT webcams that have ‘out-of-
the-box’ con gurations that are potentially problematic, such as insecure default 
passwords.172 We saw how end-users often trust that designers know better than they 
do, and so they assume that the default con guration is the most sensible one. Such 
con gurations are especially problematic in the IoT, because the object itself might be 
‘plug and play’, which is to say it starts operating according to its default con guration 
as soon as it is switched on. is single action may be enough by itself to set off various 
undesirable path dependencies, for example joining an open wireless network, and 
connecting to a remote server to register its existence. Designing in delay in this 
context, then, might involve ensuring that IoT devices have all defaults set initially to 
prevent any functionality that is not immediately signi ed by the physical 
characteristics of the device. is relates to the discussion of the ‘would not have 
wanted’ standard in defaults, discussed above.  
To return to the example of the smart fridge, when the device is rst switched 
on it would immediately begin cooling because that is its inherent purpose (i.e. its 
intuitive physical affordance of cooling would be immediately available), but its ‘smart’ 
(Internet-connected) functionalities would remain disabled until the end-user takes 
the active step of con guring and enabling them (i.e. they are intentionally disafforded 
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until the end-user has taken the conscious decision to enable and con gure them). 
Building in this kind of delay before the normativity of the code gets a chance to 
execute can enable space for the other affordances above to be facilitated: the end-user 
can consider the implications of the device’s provenance and purpose before the code 
that imposes its normativity is executed, giving her a chance to respond to any 
misgivings she may have before (potentially opaque) harm is done. If she chooses to 
go ahead, she can then think about which con gurable choices best t her interests. 
is would accord with the aim expressed by Hartzog in the quote at the beginning of 
this chapter, where the design of code re ects the ‘most optimal and sustainable 
choices, affordances, and constraints for users.’173 Much like the suggestion discussed 
in below in the section on oversight that manufacturers include a ‘ oor’ of security in 
even their disposable IoT products, one might imagine a minimum delay where no 
functionality that is not signi ed by the physical properties of the artefact can be 
enabled prior to the end-user taking the active choice to do so, even (and particularly) 
where this is in opposition to the commercial interests of the manufacturer. In addition 
to a ‘ oor’ of security, one can think of a ‘ceiling’ of affordance that can only be 
extended by the conscious choice of the end-user. 
3.4 Immutability 
e issues with immutability overlap with those demonstrated by ruleishness and 
immediacy. e Fullerian principle regarding frequency of change applies, but in the 
opposite sense: the fact that certain media are resistant to being updated must be borne 
in mind in their design; the threshold between unchangeable duty and the space 
allowed for the end-user’s ‘aspiration’ to operate must be set with this concern in mind, 
lest path dependencies arise which can result in users being locked into the constraints 
                                                 




of a particular design.174 is relates to the legisprudential principle of temporality 
(PT)175 which, as previously mentioned, requires sensitivity to the concreteness of the 
imposition of an external limitation, particularly so where there is less scope for future 
alteration – in such cases the requirement of ex ante justi cation is all the stronger. 
Furthermore, because of the potential for unexpected future harm, the necessity for 
ongoing vigilance to ensure the crystallisation of normativity continues to be justi ed 
is also particularly important in this context. 
is connects too with the principle of coherence (PC),176 which as we saw 
requires a broader societal justi cation (under LoC3) and not just coherence according 
to the system’s own internal rationale. On this footing, the digisprudential strategy of 
oversight means that a change in the external justi cation must be capable of being 
re ected in a change of code rules; a failure to afford this would mean the continued 
operation of illegitimate code, regardless of whether or not it was legitimate at the 
original time of release. 
3.4.1 Affordance: oversight 
e principle here is that the manufacturer ought not release code to market unless the 
necessary conditions are in place for them to maintain oversight of it and to correct 
any (unforeseen) negative consequences. is is similar to the concept of revocability 
in the HCI-Security literature, where user-centric design principles suggest that the 
end-user must be afforded the possibility of revoking any permissions she has granted 
within the system.177 In this context, the concept of revocability requires that the 
creator of the code is capable of maintaining some control over it. is brings to mind 
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one of the central themes of Shelley’s Frankenstein and Winner’s discussion of its 
contemporary relevance: ‘men release powerful changes into the world with cavalier 
disregard for consequences’.178 In order to maintain legitimacy, therefore, the design 
must anticipate ex ante the potential need to make changes ex post. Consideration of 
this principle requires that the design permits it, and any design that does not is prima 
facie illegitimate.179 
Consider, for example, the Sony BMG DRM scandal discussed in Chapter 
1.180 e problematic effects of the design were ampli ed by the fact it was stored on 
an inherently immutable medium, namely the compact disc. Although the system was 
ultimately revoked, this was only as a result of the signi cant public relations impact 
of the scandal, and that revocation took the form of a laborious and expensive physical 
recall of over seven million CDs.181 Similar issues arise in relation to the IoT, where 
the market provides slim margins on inexpensive devices and thus the incentive to 
invest in long-term updates and support is diminished. Devices are therefore rushed 
to market without either the necessary capacity for post hoc software updates or the 
ongoing commitment to providing bug and security xes.182 e design must therefore 
afford oversight by the designer or enterprise so that necessary changes can be made. 
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is might involve anticipation of software updates, now a fairly standard feature in 
modern networked devices.  
is is in line with the design standard suggested by Hartzog and Selinger, 
according to which IoT device manufacturers must provide a ‘minimum expectation 
for servicing’ and a ‘ oor of data security for even disposable items.’183 e implication 
here is that, as elsewhere within the digisprudential framework, if the enterprise cannot 
commit to such standards of oversight then the legitimacy of the design has de facto 
not been demonstrated. Similarly, where the design will not permit updates by its very 
nature (for example due to limited connectivity or processing power) then the scope of 
wired-in functionality should be to that extent limited to ensure that the unchangeable 
code will not be responsible for any future negative effects. e design must therefore 
anticipate the possibility of external change, either by the facilitation of remote updates 
or by restricting the scope of its normativity ab initio. Where it proves too difficult to 
anticipate such eventualities, ex post remedial measures of the sort envisaged by 
Hartzog and Selinger (e.g. third-party maintenance or insurance) must be put in place. 
If none of this is possible, the inevitable conclusion is that the design is a priori 
illegitimate. 
3.4.1.1 Sunsetting and ‘lobotomy switches’ 
In their discussion of the Sony BMG DRM scandal Halderman and Felten suggest 
the inclusion of a ‘sunsetting’ feature that renders the system inert after a speci ed date 
or period.184 Depending on the business model being pursued this might avoid some 
of the problems of code operating far into the future, particularly if it is especially 
difficult to alter it post hoc (as with the physical CD media discussed above). ey 
suggest that the Sony BMG DRM system could have been designed to run only until 
                                                 
183  Ibid., p. 597. 
184  J.A. Halderman and E.W. Felten, ‘Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode’, 15th USENIX 




a point beyond which the commercial bene t of preventing copying through code was 
negligible enough as to be outweighed by the other (computationally-legalistic) effects 
of the system. ey propose a period of three years, during which they expect that 
nearly all possible revenue from disc sales would by that point have been raised and 
collected. An approach of this sort is contingent on the business model that is adopted 
– the economics of CD sales have of course changed signi cantly in the years since the 
Sony BMG scandal. Nevertheless the principle is still valid: designers ought to 
consider the medium- and long-term effects of the technological normativity they 
embody in their systems, and where oversight over such a period is anticipated to be 
difficult or impossible, sunsetting may be an appropriate safety mechanism to limit the 
possible effects of the code operating blindly in unforeseen contexts.  
A related approach is what Hartzog calls a ‘lobotomy switch’ which, following 
the discovery of a serious bug, reduces the system to a set of core functions while 
disabling any optional affordances (and in particular network access).185 is is the 
mirror image to the discussion of core affordances above in the section on delay: basic 
functionality is retained, but optional ‘smartness’ is disabled. Hartzog gives the 
example of a child’s Internet-enabled doll: once the lobotomy switch is ipped, the 
doll can still be played with, but its potentially security- and privacy-harming 
connectivity is disabled. e efficacy of such an approach of course depends on the type 
of device; if networking is a central element of its purpose (e.g. the Amazon Dash 
Button, which relies on network connectivity) then disabling it through a lobotomy 
switch might render the device effectively useless. Furthermore, this sort of design 
proposal is also complicated by questions of who should control such a switch, and 
under which precise conditions it should be activated. e determination of such 
                                                 




questions might represent a salient point at which the institutional law can step in 
through traditional regulation.186 
In any event, the overarching question of legitimacy operates, raising the 
thorny question of whether the device should have been designed in such a way in the 
rst place: if the manufacturer cannot commit to (i) supporting the device with updates 
and maintenance for a reasonable period, (ii) ‘sunsetting’ the device after a speci ed 
period, or (iii) retaining sufficient control to permit a ‘lobotomy’ to be performed 
should this turn out to be necessary, then it can be argued that the design is not 
digisprudentially legitimate, because it does not afford the necessary level of oversight. 
3.4.2 Discussion: blockchain applications 
One of the de ning characteristics (and selling points) of blockchains is that data 
stored on them is tamper-resistant.187 From the perspective of traditional contracting 
this is especially problematic, since the ex ante interpretation that is rei ed in the code 
of the blockchain application when it is stored on the chain will be executed when the 
relevant conditions arise, regardless of any intervening factors which might suggest a 
change is desirable.188 e technical necessity for consensus to be reached in order to 
make changes, coupled with the inability unilaterally to break the contract (and face 
the (legal) consequences), makes these artefacts particularly problematic from the 
perspective of oversight. Observing the fact of the application’s execution may be 
possible, because the storage of the output of a blockchain application’s execution is 
generally stored on the underlying chain, thus enabling audit ex post. is is, however, 
a different form of oversight to that with which I am here concerned. What matters 
from a digisprudential perspective is ongoing maintainability and revocability, in order 
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to ensure that the code’s normativity can be accounted for; both are, however, 
undermined by the immutability of the blockchain. If one end-user party to the 
application changes her mind, or is incapacitated, the code will remain on the 
blockchain and will execute as stored, regardless of such contingencies. 
is goes to the very heart of the kind of ex ante anticipation that digisprudence 
is concerned with. Designers of blockchain applications must be aware of 
contingencies (far) in advance and must, because of the immediacy of the code, limit 
its normative scope to those facts they can be reasonably certain of. e number of 
variables can quickly become extremely complex, however, but such conditions will not 
prevent a blockchain application from operating unless its code is designed to include 
some external check of such facts.189 It is questionable whether it is feasible properly to 
predetermine all the relevant contingencies that might arise, and even those that are 
foreseen will require reliable sources that the code can interpret. e ability of 
blockchain applications to react to external conditions through oracles – external 
sources of contingent data190 – may not provide the necessary information, or that 
information may be inaccurate, incomplete, or not provided in a format the code is 
equipped to ‘understand’. Even where these issues are not present, the assumption is 
that the third-party oracle will continue to operate as it did at the time when the 
application was designed, but this may well not be the case if that third party alters 
their systems or shuts down altogether. Furthermore, in terms of contestability, even 
where a judicial process might in theory be invoked to attempt to address any con ict 
that arises, it may be difficult to identify the parties from the application’s code in order 
to demonstrate standing to launch an action or seek a decree, because identi cation on 
the blockchain is achieved by means of public keys rather than names. In any event, 
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even were it possible such an appeal to judicial process would in many cases take place 
after the code has executed and its negative effects have been felt. 
From the perspective of affording oversight, then, two factors may ultimately 
militate against the use of blockchain applications. First, if the designer cannot be sure 
that certain crucial facts will obtain at the point of execution, she must limit the ‘wired-
in’ elements of the code to exclude these. Difficulties arise in identifying the threshold 
between what Clack et al. call the ‘operational aspects’ of the blockchain application, 
namely those that are automatable, and the ‘non-operational aspects’, that is those that 
cannot or should not be automated.191 Too much automation and many or all of the 
effects of computational legalism are ampli ed; too little and what logic of the 
blockchain application remains automated may be so simpli ed that it is essentially 
‘dumb’, rendering the application a mere tool (or a ‘mechanism’, in Felten’s 
terminology192) for the execution of a real-world agreement, the latter retaining 
responsibility for managing human ‘messiness’ and contingency.193 us, the social 
aspects of traditional agreement (including institutional legal contracting) continue to 
deal with contingent ‘real world’ parts of human arrangements, while the role of the 
blockchain application is constrained to those limited factors that are susceptible to 
reliable and predictable code-based representation and enforcement.194 is is, in a 
sense, to ip the ‘lobotomy switch’ ex ante, limiting the design of the application from 
the beginning in the knowledge that it might otherwise harbour too much normative 
power, power that is exacerbated by the other characteristics of computational legalism 
that blockchain applications exhibit. e result of this may be that while the code is 
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legitimate from an oversight perspective, from a commercial perspective the lack of 
‘smartness’ undermines its attractiveness or utility. 
e second factor militating against the use of blockchain applications in this 
context relates to the code’s ability to respond to contingent facts. If the designer is 
unwilling to forego the ‘smartness’ of the application in the manner just described, the 
external contingent facts that it relies upon must be veri able at the point of execution. 
is implies the use of oracles that are themselves trustworthy and accurate, which is 
problematic from an oversight perspective because it devolves the determination of a 
crucial element of the artefact’s logic away from the designer, thus undermining her 
ability to oversee her own design. It may be possible to design ‘meta-contingency’, 
somewhat akin to sunsetting, whereby if the blockchain application will simply lie inert 
if, at the point of execution, it cannot con rm a given fact to the requisite degree of 
certainty. Of course, any such safety valve requires to be consciously built into the logic 
of the blockchain application, which of course is not a given. Whether the precise set 
of facts that would come within this bracket can be identi ed by a designer in advance 
(rather than by a court ex post, with all the bene ts of expert evidence and time to 
deliberate), and whether they can be provided by an oracle in a form that is susceptible 
to computational representation, are questions that are themselves contingent on many 
external conditions being in place (e.g. a facility providing information that the 
relevant end-users are still alive, or that the property which the application relates to 
still exists and is in the possession of the relevant party who retains the right to dispose 
of it). It may be that the complexity and the variety of factors that ought to be taken 
into consideration means that these standards of oversight cannot be met, which may 
call into question the legitimacy of such applications a priori.195  
                                                 




3.4.3 Discussion: IoT 
We have already seen in the discussion above some suggestions from the literature that 
relate speci cally to IoT devices. Because they tend to be low-cost, manufacturers have 
in some cases underinvested in the ongoing maintenance of their devices.196 e 
resources required to track and x device bugs, and to provide infrastructure for 
delivering updates to the devices, can mean that in a competitive environment 
resources are redirected instead to researching and developing new products that can 
meet the demands of a febrile market. Some manufacturers have even resorted to 
altering legal terms in order to contract out of the responsibility for the technological 
normativity of their designs, for example Vtech, who, in the wake of a serious personal 
data breach, simply changed their terms document to shift responsibility onto the end-
user instead of altering the design of their product, an Internet-connected child’s toy.197 
is is clearly an illegitimate approach by digisprudential standards, given that it prima 
facie does nothing to make legitimate the technological normativity of the device. 
For IoT devices, then, oversight must be designed into the system itself, 
including the ability to update its software should this be required in future (and, by 
implication, a commitment to support such updates). As Hartzog and Selinger 
suggest, 
[i]magine a system where companies told users how long they think a wired 
object will last and how long the company will commit to providing security 
patches. In the event that a company goes bankrupt before then, companies 
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would work quickly to either notify users of its impending shut down or 
facilitate the [transfer of] responsibility for security patches to a third party.198 
is might be combined with sunsetting facilities that either warn the end-user that 
the device has an expected operating life of a speci ed period or, if the supporting 
infrastructure becomes unavailable (e.g. due to insolvency of the manufacturer), that 
there will be either a third-party support mechanism or the system will either gracefully 
degrade (sunsetting/the lobotomy switch) or be disabled altogether. What such 
measures might mean for consumer protection or contract law remains to be seen; of 
course, as with all the other digisprudential affordances, if the designer or manufacturer 
of the device cannot commit to producing a design that embodies a sufficient level of 
legitimacy then the conclusion must always remain open that the design is a priori 
illegitimate and should not be released.  
3.5  Pervasiveness 
e pervasiveness of code connects with the idea of ‘juridi cation’ and the legalistic 
proliferation of ‘ever more re ned and rigid systems of formal de nitions.’199 is is an 
implied aspect of what the legisprudential principle of normative density (PN)200 aims 
to reduce, through the increase in justi cation required proportionate to the 
imposition of a limitation on freedom, with a criminal sanction being the ‘densest’ 
example.201 e concept of juridi cation takes this wider to consider not just the 
‘density’ of a given norm’s limitation on freedom, but the aggregate impact on freedom 
of the proliferation of (legal) normativity more generally.202 
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In the legal sphere the effects of juridi cation are limited by human cognitive 
capability and institutional resources – beyond a certain threshold, regulatees cannot 
comprehend the body of norms they are subject to, and there are limited resources for 
legal enforcement. ere is thus a natural limit to the impact of pervasiveness within 
the legal sphere. In the computational realm, however, such limits do not exist (or their 
threshold is much higher); the number of norms or aggregate normativity that can be 
applied by and through code is effectively unlimited, and the self-enforcing nature of 
computational norms removes any issue around resource allocation. Pervasiveness 
under computational legalism thus exempli es these two aspects of juridi cation – 
normative density of individual norms, and complex aggregations of normativity 
embodied in the inscriptions of both individual devices and networked collections of 
devices. We have already seen how technological normativity can have an immediate 
regulatory effect in a way that law cannot; whereas traditional legal norms can be 
directed at whole populations (or even large classes of individual), their text-bound 
character limits the direct and real-time imposition of their normativity. e way that 
code differs in this respect is made all the stronger when the artefact has widespread 
adoption – large numbers of individuals can be subject simultaneously to the regulatory 
effect of even a single design decision.203 e categorical difference here means that the 
Fullerian and legisprudential principles do not apply quite as readily in this context as 
in the others. However, one can adapt the legisprudential principle of normative 
density (PN)204 to take account of the collective normative effect of a design, 
questioning whether the aggregate imposition of normativity can be justi ed when 
factors such as the product’s target market and likely ‘market penetration’ are 
considered. When combined with the other digisprudential affordances, the question 
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of aggregate technological normativity becomes extremely salient; pervasiveness takes 
the qualitative aspects of computational legalism and adds a quantitative element to 
the balance of justi cation. Put simply, the problems of computational legalism are 
ampli ed by code’s pervasiveness. 
Practically, the very idea of ‘ubiquitous computing’ as the precursor to the IoT 
implies very directly to the idea of pervasiveness. Such devices are intended to be 
embedded in other ‘things’, and/or to be innocuous in operation. Statistics on their 
proliferation suggest that pervasiveness is the trend,205 especially given advances in 
battery and cellular technology. e issue of pervasiveness seems therefore only to 
heighten the need for the digisprudential affordances set out above. 
4. Conclusion 
is chapter has sought to strengthen the relationship between legal-theoretical 
notions of legitimacy and the practical question of what legitimate code ought to afford 
the end-user (contestability, choice, transparency, and delay), legal institutions 
(evidential standards), or its own manufacturer (oversight). It sets out a digisprudential 
framework, couched in terms of affordances, that can guide the design of code towards 
legitimacy. It thus contributes to a bridging of the divide between legal-theoretical 
notions of normative legitimacy and their practical instantiations, discussing the issues 
from the perspective of the case studies to provide a sense of real-world application.  
e next chapter considers some of these issues even more practically, focusing 
on the code development cycle and consider how the programmer of the programmer 
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Operationalisation: towards agile digisprudence 
An insurmountable barrier between users and system programmers safeguards 
the computer’s inalterable functions. Beyond this barrier, as in Kafka’s story, 
a new barrier appears between the programmer and the programmer of the 
programming language who decides how the basic set of elements is to be 
designed, which rights and properties will be granted to whom, and which will 
be denied.1 
1. Introduction 
e discussion in the previous chapter set out the digisprudential affordances and their 
relevance to both the legal-theoretical principles of legality and legisprudence, and the 
normative criteria for code, discussed in Chapter 4. is nal substantive chapter 
discusses some practical ways in which the digisprudence framework might be 
operationalised. It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of coding practices, but 
rather to identify some points in the production process where operationalisation of 
the framework is particularly relevant, and to draw from the literature some practical 
approaches to that could prove effective. 
We have seen that the intent of the framework is to bind in a constitutional 
way the design of code to underlying principles that are re ected in that design, 
regardless of its commercial purpose (and whose presence may therefore logically 
prevent illegitimate commercial purposes from being pursued). Like Odysseus, the 
product designer is ‘bound to the mast’, and the design of her code along with her. We 
saw in Chapter 1 how this idea of the product designer herself being constrained by a 
prior set of ‘constitutional’ design choices can be conceptualised in the position of what 
                                                 




Vismann and Krajewski call the programmer of the programmer (‘PoP’).2 is is an 
under-studied area in the literature; the contribution of this chapter is in part to 
strengthen the practical connection between the PoP and its legal-theoretical 
analogues. 
2. e programmer of the programmer 
I referred in Chapters 1 and 2 to Vismann and Krajewski’s discussion of the ‘structural 
homologies’ between computers and law.3 e vertical model of normative 
relationships (Figure 1 in Chapter 14) hints at the analogy described there: the 
constitution binds the legislature, which promulgates norms that regulate the citizen, 
those norms being legitimated by the democratic process and the formal requirements 
of legality and legisprudential legitimation. is is the top-down aspect of the vertical 
model. By analogy, from a bottom up perspective we have the PoP building into the 
design environment (i.e. the software and tools that designers use) ‘constitutional’ 
limits that bind the product designer’s activities when she uses the software and tools 
of her trade to produce code. is is particularly true of ‘integrated development 
environments’, discussed below, which are the software environments that lie at the 
heart of coding practice. e ‘parliamentary’ or ‘legislative’ work of the product 
designer is thus constrained according to the (dis)affordances and inscriptions 
contained in the design environment, which if de ned according to the digisprudential 
perspective can in turn mean that the normativities embodied in the code she produces 
are also legitimate.  
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As an aside, with respect to democratic participation in the design process, I 
suggested in Chapter 1 that this might be a separate element of the process of design, 
but because it is concerned more with substance than with form it falls outside the 
scope of my enquiry. Rational citizens would presumably never decline the bene ts of 
legality, and therefore, by analogy, neither would end-users decline digisprudential 
legitimation.5 Participatory design approaches are concerned with substantive 
functionality of the code (its output, or ‘external morality’ in Lon Fuller’s 
terminology6), and not necessarily with whether it provides principled foundational 
features of the kind I am arguing for (derived from ‘input criteria’ or ‘internal 
morality’7); we might therefore say that digisprudence is to participatory design 
practices as legisprudence is to the democratic process. Whatever the political outcome 
of a democratic process we expect certain formal features to have been present; so too 
with code – whatever its substantive purposes, we expect it to embody certain basic 
underlying design features. For that reason, I expressly do not consider the role of 
participatory design, although I acknowledge that it is not incompatible with 
digisprudence and, indeed, if the two approaches were to be combined, the resulting 
code would undoubtedly have a very strong claim to legitimacy.  
Returning to the normative (rather than merely descriptive8) perspective on the 
PoP, the product designer is in a sense merely a user, because despite the vast freedom 
she enjoys in de ning her code’s normativity, she is herself constrained by prior design 
decisions made by those PoPs who create the tools of her trade: hardware, 
programming languages, and the software tools used to design new code. e parallel 
even runs to the fundamental level of the CPU’s architecture, where Vismann and 
Krajewski characterise the chip as a ‘sovereign’ and Intel (one of the world’s largest 
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CPU manufacturers) as a ‘legislator’, by dint of the power they wield over the design 
of the internal rules, or ‘instruction sets’, of the processor.9 is is the apotheosis of the 
PoP metaphor, where the ultimate technical constitution is found in the set of low-
level instructions that is de ned by the physical hardware of the chip. Recalling 
Vismann and Krajewski’s de nition, the PoP 
maintains the ultimate power because he or she, as the constructor of the 
programming language itself, de nes what the ‘normal’ programmer, as a user, 
will be able to do. Both types of programmers [sic] establish the conditions of 
using the computer, and, as such, they behave like lawmakers or, rather, code-
makers.10 
Although Vismann and Krajewski are concerned primarily with the homologies 
between legal structure and chip architecture, one can appreciate the broader 
application of their insight about ‘meta-architecture’, and how it mediates the work of 
the designer in the production of end-user-facing code. e idea of establishing the 
conditions under which the ‘normal’ programmer (i.e. the product designer) can go 
about her work brings to mind Hart’s distinction between primary and secondary rules, 
the subject of the next section.  
2.1 From primary and secondary rules to primary and secondary (dis)affordances 
and inscriptions 
inking normatively about the role of the PoP, we can consider how to leverage it to 
impose elements of the ‘constitutional’ framework of digisprudence on product 
designers operating later in the production process. e idea, then, is to push for 
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‘legitimacy by design, by design’, through the structuring, guiding, and restraining of 
product design practices according to the requirements and aims of digisprudence. is 
can (and should) be aimed for whatever the substantive purpose of the code being 
produced or the underlying business model being pursued.  
One can think of this in terms of Hart’s primary and secondary rules. As we 
saw previously, primary rules are those that require a substantive behaviour (or 
forbearance) on the part of the addressee.11 Secondary rules are those that de ne the 
conditions under which the primary rules can be created and changed (and 
adjudicated).12 Secondary rules are thus ex ante and ‘constitutional’, de ning the 
process for creating primary rules and the proper form that they should take.  
e primary rules nd their analogue in the (dis)affordances and inscriptions 
that make their way into the design of the artefact and directly constrain and enable 
the behaviour of the end-user, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2. In the 
digisprudential context, we can envisage including in the design process secondary 
rules that constrain what primary (dis)affordances and inscriptions the designer may 
build into her product’s code. is analysis suggests certain homologies between Hart’s 
thesis, the legisprudential hierarchy, and digisprudence: 
Table 2. Hartian-Legisprudential-Digisprudential homologies 
Hartian norm Legisprudential locus Digisprudential actor (creates) 
- Citizen End-user 
Primary rule Legislature Product designer (Primary 
(dis)affordance/inscription) 
Secondary rule Binding constitution PoP (Secondary 
(dis)affordance/inscription) 
 
                                                 
11  H.L.A. Hart, e Concept of Law (2nd edn., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) pp. 91–93. 




e concept in the central column of a hierarchy of regulative force building up from 
a base ‘constitutive’ foundation maps onto the legisprudential concept of the ‘proxy 
model of legitimation’, discussed in Chapter 3.13 
In terms of operationalisation, where the legislature is constrained by secondary 
rules and the legisprudential principles in traditional law-making, we can imagine in 
the design sphere the ‘legislature’ of the design process (including on a concrete 
technical level the integrated development environment, discussed below) being 
similarly constrained by secondary rules which guide what primary (dis)affordances 
and inscriptions can legitimately be created there.  
Assessing the embodiment of some of the secondary digisprudential 
affordances will involve qualitative judgements – for example whether a given delay is 
sufficient to enable comprehension, or the extent to which oversight is afforded. is 
may be the point at which structured impact assessment might play a role.14 However, 
in addition to those qualitative approaches we can also envisage secondary 
(dis)affordances/inscriptions that are built into the very design environment itself, 
which in turn guide the work of the ‘designer-legislator’ in her creation of primary 
(dis)affordances/inscriptions, in a similar fashion to how the end-user is herself 
regulated by the end-product. e product designer becomes a regulatee, like the end-
user. e substantive primary (dis)affordances and inscriptions thus remain end-user-
facing, while the constitutional secondary (dis)affordances and inscriptions are 
designer-facing. e latter operate, according to the digisprudential perspective, to 
help produce legitimate instances of the former. 
e next section discusses elements of the software development process which 
may be appropriate targets for this kind of ‘meta-normativity’. e rst is the ‘agile’ 
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development process, one of the most prominent contemporary code development 
methodologies, and the other is the class of software systems that designers use to write 
code, known as integrated development environments. 
2.2 Agile development processes 
Gürses and van Hoboken describe the recent shift towards ‘agile’ development 
processes as a ‘paradigmatic transformation in the production of digital functionality’.15 
As we saw in earlier chapters,16 there has been a lack of focus by legal scholars on the 
production of code. Like Goldoni, Asscher, and Hartzog,17 Gürses and van Hoboken 
argue for greater focus to be placed on the production, rather than just the observed 
results, of code. e latter two authors’ analysis pushes the envelope further, however, 
by looking directly at, and gathering empirical data on, code design practices. 
Although their primary focus is privacy and the production of platform-based systems 
rather than individual artefacts, they acknowledge the ‘wider societal implications of 
the agile turn’,18 and as we saw in the second part of Chapter 419 their concern about 
production is equally applicable to the more fundamental question of legitimacy. 
Framed through the perspective of production, Gürses and van Hoboken consider the 
role of agile development processes in the creation of the conditions that we now 
observe. 
According to the Agile Manifesto, agile development processes are 
characterised by a focus on end-users, continuous development and testing, 
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collaboration, and response to change.20 is approach contrasts with the ‘waterfall’ 
paradigm, the code development model that was dominant between the 1970s and 
1990s,21 in which stages of the design process were discrete and sequential, with 
limited recursion and feedback between them.22 ey were thus to an extent somewhat 
brittle: whereas the focus of agile processes is on producing modularised working code 
as early as possible and integrating feedback as it is gathered,23 waterfall processes rely 
on ‘rigorously regimented practices, extensive documentation and detailed planning 
and management.’24 Agile processes are thus cyclical and responsive, while waterfall 
processes move between pre-determined phases that are less exible vis-à-vis 
contingencies and feedback. By nature, agile processes also accelerate the code 
development process because kinks and problems tend to be identi ed and xed ‘on-
the- y’, rather than waiting until later testing phases that might uncover fundamental 
problems that require signi cant code redesign that is expensive and time-
consuming.25  
is idea of incremental cycles that are responsive to changing requirements 
ts in well with the digisprudential framework outlined above.26 In recent work the 
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technology ethics thinktank doteveryone has suggested augmenting agile cycles with 
anticipatory assessments of the potential consequences of design choices, thus enabling 
the mitigation of problems during the design process.27 is chimes with the idea of 
continually assessing modules of code functionality according to whether (and the 
extent to which) they re ect the digisprudential affordances – as with Wintgens’ 
plotting of various proposed legislative norms in Chapter 5,28 a given element of code 
functionality can be assessed according its embodiment of the affordances and whether 
and how it balances them. Rather than assessing or testing the design only once it is 
at or close to the stage of release, when problems are costliest to x, a digisprudential 
perspective can operate continually to adjust production throughout agile cycles, 
pushing the design closer towards digisprudential legitimacy. Given the length and 
complexity of design processes, the enjoinder merely that ‘by design’ of whatever form 
(legitimacy, privacy, or legal compliance more generally) take place at the ‘early stages’ 
of the process is insufficient;29 the proper embodiment of the value-based affordances 
I am describing requires continual assessment and re-assessment throughout the 
process, which cyclical agile methodologies might help to facilitate.  
2.3 Integrated development environments 
Returning to the discussion above of primary and secondary (dis)affordances and 
inscriptions, one place in which this concept might be implemented in a technically 
                                                 
27  S. Brown, ‘An Agile Approach to Designing for the Consequences of Technology’ (doteveryone, 13 
February 2019) <https://medium.com/doteveryone/an-agile-approach-to-designing-for-the-
consequences-of-technology-18a229de763b>. 
28  Chapter 5, section 2 (Mapping the criteria), Figure 1 (Differing norm justi cations (reproduced 
from Wintgens)). 
29  L. Diver and B. Schafer, ‘Opening the Black Box: Petri Nets and Privacy by Design’ (2017) 31 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 68, p. 76; Gürses and van Hoboken, supra n. 
15, p. 592. On the inadequacy of a ‘checklist’ approach to privacy by design, see S. Gürses, C. 





robust way is in the integrated development environment (‘IDE’) used by the product 
designer. In practice the developer does not write out the programming code by hand 
and enter it verbatim into the computer to be executed; the modern approach is to 
enter the source code into an IDE, which compiles it into code that is executable by 
the machine. In addition to this fundamental function, IDEs are also ‘intended to 
assist the software lifecycle process’.30 ey can do this in a variety of ways; software 
applications for writing code vary in complexity and sophistication, from applications 
that are essentially simple text editors which require external tools (e.g. a compiler) to 
produce working code, to more powerful IDEs with in-built compilers, build-
automation tools, version control, debuggers, tools for highlighting syntax and 
suggested code, etcetera. Most IDEs are able to detect problems in the source code 
that is entered, for example syntax errors (identi ed according to the requirements of 
the programming language being used), naming mistakes (e.g. incorrect variable or 
method names), and fatal errors (e.g. logically impossible statements and other 
incorrect programming ‘grammar’). More sophisticated IDEs can auto-complete 
formulaic expressions in the relevant programming language and can keep track of a 
code project’s structure to suggest relevant connections between code modules, on-
the- y as the designer is working (this is sometimes termed ‘intelligent code 
completion’). Some can also suggest more computationally efficient means of achieving 
a particular outcome, for example by detecting that a particular instruction entered by 
the designer might be more efficiently achieved using an alternative mechanism 
provided by the programming language. It is also possible for the IDE to suggest 
points at which the code might be documented, or explanatory comments added,31 to 
                                                 
30  A. Abran et al., Guide to the Software Engineering Body of Knowledge (SWEBOK) (Los Alamitos, 
California: IEEE Computer Society and Angela Burgess, 2004) p. 10-1. 
31  In modern sophisticated IDEs this kind of functionality is included for documenting traditional 





enable other developers to understand what the code is designed to do (below I discuss 
two methods of providing such documentation which also assist in facilitating 
digisprudential contestability). is might be one means by which the transparency of 
blockchain applications especially – as mentioned in the previous chapter’s discussion32 
– could be implemented within the IDE, whereby the software identi es where 
descriptive tags are missing and requires the designer to include them. 
e design of these features – these affordances – can therefore have a 
signi cant impact on how the product designer goes about her job.33 As we have 
already seen, that design is controlled by the notional PoP, who dictates to a great 
extent the scope of action of the product designer. e (secondary) affordances of the 
IDE might therefore feasibly be designed to discourage not only logical or aesthetic 
infelicities in the product designer’s code (as happens at present), but also the inclusion 
of code that is digisprudentially illegitimate. 
Some initiatives exist already that aim to augment the purely logical aspects of 
the coding assistance that IDEs give the designer. For example, recent advances use 
machine learning directly within the IDE to facilitate best practice in the code 
suggestions that are provided to designers. Leveraging the ‘wisdom of the crowd’,34 
sophisticated code predictions can be provided that go beyond merely the static logical 
suggestions based on the syntax of the programming language that are provided by 
standard intelligent code completion. Microsoft, for example, has developed 
‘Intellicode’, a system that uses the open source code from popular projects on its 
GitHub service as training data to re ne the code recommendations provided in its 
                                                 
32  Chapter 5, section 3.3.2.1 (Discussion: blockchain applications). 
33  R.B. Kline and A. Seffah, ‘Evaluation of Integrated Software Development Environments: 
Challenges and Results from ree Empirical Studies’ (2005) 63 International Journal of Human-
Computer Studies 607. 
34  M. Bruch et al., ‘IDE 2.0: Collective Intelligence in Software Development’, Proceedings of the 
FSE/SDP workshop on Future of software engineering research - FoSER ’10 (Santa Fe, New Mexico, 




Visual Studio IDE,35 thus providing suggestions based on usage in real-world projects 
that inevitably includes aesthetic and, potentially, value-based code design choices.36 
If the code which embodies the sorts of legitimacy-creating practices I have discussed 
begins to promulgate widely, such systems might ultimately contribute to a greater 
standardisation of these concepts at the level of source code, perhaps contributing to 
the shift in the ‘institutional fabric’ described by Luger et al.37  
2.3.1 Facilitating contestability in the IDE 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, one of the elements of contestability is affording 
the evidence of the code’s operation that is necessary for its legal effects to be assessed.38 
Not only are legal institutions empowered to make sense of the code (even though they 
have access to expert witnesses), but depending on the approach used it might be 
possible to demonstrate the effects of the code had a different design choice been made 
(this is the case with the Petri net approach, discussed below). I have elsewhere 
explored, with Burkhard Schafer, the possibility of using visual representation to map 
code states onto legal requirements.39 Although that analysis concerned substantive 
doctrinal law, speci cally data protection by design, the approach considered is 
agnostic with respect to the (legal) norms that are intended to be implemented in 
                                                 
35  ‘Visual Studio IntelliCode’ (Microsoft, May 2018) 
<https://visualstudio.microsoft.com/services/intellicode/>. 
36  On values in source code, see for example A. Schlesinger, ‘Feminism and Programming Languages’ 
<https://www.hastac.org/blogs/ari-schlesinger/2013/11/26/feminism-and-programming-
languages>; P. Graham, ‘Beating the Averages’ (2003) <http://www.paulgraham.com/avg.html> 
accessed 20 October 2017; J. Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to 
Calculation (San Francisco: Freeman, 1976) pp. 102–104. 
37  E. Luger et al., ‘Playing the Legal Card: Using Ideation Cards to Raise Data Protection Issues 
Within the Design Process’, Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems (New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2015) p. 464. 
38  Chapter 5, section 2.1 (Contestability as an overarching affordance). 




code.40 e approach entwines the gap between formal proof of technical requirements 
and legal proof in the courtroom setting.  
As an ancillary bene t, the approaches below can also help to facilitate 
democratic participation in the design process. is is, as I have mentioned, explicitly 
not the focus of the thesis, given that the digisprudential framework is concerned more 
with form than with substance. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, such 
participatory design methods are complementary to digisprudence. e two 
approaches below can support them through the provision of a high-level language 
that assists comprehension of complex code by stakeholders in such participatory 
processes. Furthermore, because legitimacy does not end with digisprudence (rather, it 
begins with it), the PoP ought not to preclude or impede other elements of the design 
process that are useful or bene cial for other reasons. As we shall see, then, while the 
approaches below are aimed at attaining legitimacy in accordance with digisprudence, 
they are at the same time supportive of other normatively desirable practices involved 
in the production of code. 
2.3.1.1 Formal veri cation of code versus legal proof 
e importance of transparency and contestability in code governance has led to 
increased interest in the computer science community in formal methods that not only 
guarantee a certain outcome, but do so veri ably, and ideally in a way that allows 
relevant parties to see the ‘why’ of the code’s behaviour. 
From a computer science perspective, the goal is to verify in advance that a 
system will operate according to a prede ned set of characteristics (this is, of course, 
the core of code’s ruleishness). Although this is an important and helpful development 
from the perspective of legal compliance – recall the distinction, made in Chapter 1, 
                                                 




between compliance by design and legitimacy41 – it is not necessarily sufficient to afford 
true contestability. Legal proof and formal veri cation of code share similarities, but 
there are also crucial differences. A legal proof contains not just the substantive 
evidence to support a given conclusion, but also evidence of procedural propriety as 
distinct from that conclusion. In other words, the code may be compliant, but in order 
for legitimate contestability properly to be afforded it must provide evidence of ‘due 
process’ in order for the matter to be proven according to the necessary legal standard. 
Doing justice (i.e. complying) is insufficient; due process requires evidence of the 
procedure that was followed. In other words, justice must be seen to be done. 
Apprehending the right person in a criminal case is only one part of the equation; if 
their confession is obtained without legal representation then it is de facto illegitimate. 
us, due process under the law takes what might have happened to be as important 
as what actually happened. Evidence of this proof must be communicable in a speci c 
way; legitimacy of the legal process requires a form of evidential transparency that goes 
beyond merely telling the ‘whole truth’; it requires that this truth is demonstrated to 
external observers (including the courts) in a form that is intelligible to them. In the 
context of institutional legal processes this idea nds its expression in the principle of 
the public trial.  
Affording true contestability, then, requires enabling the end-user to detect 
code conditions that are susceptible to contest (transparency of operation, discussed in 
the previous chapter42). Crucially, however, it can also be interpreted as requiring the 
demonstration of how the code was developed in the rst place.43 In a sense, the 
documenting of the digisprudential approach (particularly the outcomes of agile cycles 
discussed above) will in itself provide this, but it is also feasible to integrate a measure 
                                                 
41  Chapter 1, section 1.4 (Legitimacy vs. ‘compliance by design’). 
42  Chapter 5, section 3.2.2 (Affordance: transparency of operation). 
43  T.J. Bench-Capon and F.P. Coenen, ‘Isomorphism and Legal Knowledge Based Systems’ (1992) 1 




of this into the IDE through the use of approaches such as Petri net modelling and 
Behaviour-Driven Design. 
2.3.1.2 Petri net modelling 
e Petri net, originally conceived by Carl Petri in 1962,44 is a standardised formal 
modelling approach designed to represent processes in terms of ‘states’ and 
‘transitions’. Petri nets have been applied in many domains, not least in the modelling 
of legal provisions and processes.45 More commonly, the nets are used in the early 
stages of the design of code to map graphically the changing states of the system over 
time. Despite their graphical appearance and apparent simplicity, the ow of a Petri 
net model can be both easily simulated and formally (mathematically) veri ed. ey 
allow for a kind of ‘live documentation’ of the system, describing the functionality of 
the code in a way that is both intelligible to non-technologists but that is also 
isomorphic to the concrete behaviour of the system.46 Prior research has demonstrated 
the automated generation of Petri nets from object-oriented source code47 as well as 
(contrariwise) the automated generation of code from Petri models of intended 
functionality.48 e validation qualities of Petri nets (through formal proofs and 
                                                 
44  C.A. Petri, ‘Kommunikation Mit Automaten’ (PhD, University of Bonn 1962) 
<http://epub.sub.uni-hamburg.de/informatik/volltexte/2011/160/>. 
45  J. Freiheit et al., ‘Lexecute: Visualisation and Representation of Legal Procedures’ (2006) 3 Digital 
Evidence & Elec. Signature L. Rev. 19; J.A. Meldman, ‘A Petri-Net Representation of Civil 
Procedure’ (1977) 19 Idea 123; J.A. Meldman and A.W. Holt, ‘Petri Nets and Legal Systems’ (1971) 
12 Jurimetrics Journal 65. 
46  B. Lin, ‘Software Synthesis of Process-Based Concurrent Programs’, Proceedings of the 35th annual 
Design Automation Conference (ACM, 1998); S.M. Shatz and W.K. Cheng, ‘A Petri Net Framework 
for Automated Static Analysis of Ada Tasking Behavior’ (1988) 8 Journal of Systems and Software 
343.  
47  Lin, supra n. 46; Shatz and Cheng, supra n. 46. 
48  K.H. Mortensen, ‘Automatic Code Generation Method Based on Coloured Petri Net Models 
Applied on an Access Control System’ in M. Nielsen and D. Simpson (eds.), Application and eory 




reachability analysis49) mean we can be sure of isomorphism between the code and the 
net, thus making the graphical representation a valuable evidential tool for making 
intelligible the concrete behaviour of the code. Petri nets can thus balance intuitive 
comprehension and analytical certainty,50 both of which are important for evidential 
purposes. What follows is an extremely brief summary of how Petri nets operate. 
e states and transitions in the model are represented by circles and rectangles, 
respectively. ese are connected with arcs that represent the ow of the process, 
which at any given moment is represented by the distribution of ‘tokens’ across the 
model’s states. ese four basic elements (states, transitions, arcs, and tokens) are the 
essence of all Petri nets:51 
                                                 
49  Diver and Schafer, supra n. 29, p. 82f. 
50  K. Salimifard and M. Wright, ‘Petri Net-Based Modelling of Work ow Systems: An Overview’ 
(2001) 134 European Journal of Operational Research 664, p. 667. 
51  is and the following Petri net models are reproduced from Diver and Schafer, supra n. 29. 




A state containing a token (a dot) currently holds. Multiple states can lead to, or from, 
a given transition, and they can hold simultaneously, as shown below: 
When a transition res, all the states leading to it will lose x tokens, and all the states 
leading from it will gain y tokens, where x and y correspond to the numerical 
weightings alongside each of the relevant arcs (no weighting implies a default of 1). A 
transition can only re – and will always re – where the number of tokens in its 
preceding state(s) is greater than or equal to the weighting of the relevant arc. is is 
demonstrated in Figure 7, where the transitions T1 and T2 are competing, with T2 
‘winning’ because the two states leading to it have the requisite number of tokens to 
trigger that transition: 




is allows for control over the ow of the net, as tokens are distributed across the net 
according to the outcomes of prior transitions. is simple semantics enables complex 
real-world processes to be simpli ed into these graphical representations without 
losing formal validity.52  
Mechanistic elements of complex processes can be abstracted into ‘sub-nets’ 
and then subsequently into transitions, thus mirroring the basic concept of abstraction 
in object-oriented programming.53 Recursive abstraction of this kind allows for the 
modelling of even very complex systems, whilst simultaneously enabling the (legal) 
observer to drill down into the particulars of the code’s logic as required. It can be 
appreciated how these representations might be useful from an evidential perspective, 
should the code ultimately be contested in court.  
                                                 
52  is is necessarily a very basic overview of Petri nets. For a more detailed treatment of their 
application in the legal domain see ibid., and for a theoretical background see either Petri’s thesis 
(Petri, supra n. 44) or T. Murata, ‘Petri Nets: Properties, Analysis and Applications’ (1989) 77 
Proceedings of the IEEE 541. 
53  Bench-Capon and Coenen, supra n. 43, p. 72. 




In prior work with Burkhard Schafer, I demonstrate the normative complexity 
that can be represented by Petri nets.54 For example, the following net shows a model 








                                                 
54  Diver and Schafer, supra n. 29, p. 77 et seq. 
55  Although superseded by the GDPR (Art. 9) the principles demonstrated are still applicable. 




is model of a legal provision can be ‘plugged in’ to an abstracted model of a code 
system, providing a way of communicating between the states generated, and required, 
by each: 
 
As one can appreciate from this example, in order for the software net (right) to 
traverse between states S0 and S4, it must rst pass the test in the legal net (left), which 
is itself contingent on an input from a sub-element of the software net. e idea is that 
the legal net will only permit the code to ‘continue’ (i.e. reach state S4) if there is some 
other condition in place that demonstrates the existence of a legally-required state. In 
the article from which the example is taken, the discussion of the model above 
envisaged a registration form that collects sensitive personal data (in that case, the end-
user’s ethnic origin). is fact was represented by S2, which thus communicated to the 
legal net that a special category of data was being processed, which in turn would 
require one of the Article 8(2) exceptions to apply.56 
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Of course, these latter examples concern compliance with the substantive law. 
is is ‘compliance by design’, which was the subject of that article. Despite this 
difference in focus, the very existence of the model as a form of documentation 
demonstrates the second aspect of contestability that I am concerned with. e formal 
veri cation of the model begets compliance by design, but simultaneously the model 
itself affords contest by providing evidence of operation. One can appreciate the 
exibility and abstraction of this approach, and its ability to model in a single 
representation more than one regulatory modality. 
2.3.1.3 Behaviour-Driven Development 
Another approach that can help to facilitate the aspect of contestability I am here 
concerned with is known as Behaviour-Driven Development (‘BDD’). BDD combines 
aspects of the agile methodology with concrete tools that are used within the IDE. 
Like the Petri net, it facilitates isomorphism between code and a representation that 
is intelligible to non-technologists. In this case, that representation is a natural 
language textual description of the behaviour of the system (hence the title). Dan 
North, the originator of BDD, describes it as an ‘outside-in’ methodology that starts 
from a set of desired outcomes and evolves towards the code features that can achieve 
them.57 Although usually viewed from the perspective of bridging the domains of 
business requirements and code development, the isomorphism of the approach means 
it can operate as a post hoc evidentiary mechanism as much as an ex ante design 
speci cation mechanism.  
                                                 





BDD uses natural language58 templates for de ning code features. ese are 
combined with IDE tools that generate both the framework of code functions from 
those speci cations and the ‘unit tests’ (small, modular tests for individual elements of 
code) that can verify that they behave as expected. Code features are de ned using 
natural language, making them de facto intelligible for evidentiary purposes (and 
indeed, feasibly, for end-users). As mentioned, features in BDD are de ned using a 
natural language template. For example, this feature speci cation describes an online 
shopping basket: 
Feature: Online shop basket 
 In order to buy products 
 As a customer 
 I need to be able to put interesting products into a basket  
Rules: 
 Delivery for basket under £10 is £3 
Scenario: Buying a single product under £10 
 Given there is a "Product X", which costs £5 
 When I add the "Product X" to the basket 
 Then I should have 1 product in the basket 
 And the overall basket price should be £859 
e keywords speci ed in the template (‘feature’, ‘scenario’, ‘given’, ‘when’, and ‘then’) 
are parsed by the IDE to generate the necessary code functions at a level of granularity 
that encourages the designer to write separate chunks of code that implement discrete 
functions. is in turn facilitates more modular testing and veri cation. For example: 
                                                 
58  Known as a ‘ubiquitous language’, or a ‘business readable domain speci c language’. See Martin 
Fowler, ‘Business Readable Domain Speci c Language’ (martinfowler.com, 15 December 2008) 
<https://martinfowler.com/bliki/BusinessReadableDSL.html>. 
59  is and the next example are adapted from ‘Behat Documentation’ (Behat) 
<http://docs.behat.org/en/latest/quick_start.html>. Behat is a set of tools for implementing BDD 





 * @Given there is a(n) :arg1, which costs £:arg2 
 */ 
public function thereIsAWhichCostsPounds($arg1, $arg2) { } 
Without going into the detail of how exactly this works, one can see how the function 
name (‘thereIsAWhichCostsPounds’) has been automatically generated from the 
natural language ‘Given’ line in the feature description. Within the curly parentheses 
– { and } – the designer writes the code that corresponds to that precise element of 
functionality (and nothing else). e small number of arguments ($arg1 and $arg2, 
respectively the product and its cost) means she is constrained in the amount of 
functionality the code she writes within this function can reasonably be written to 
perform. Furthermore, titling the functions in this way tends towards thinking in 
terms of discrete functionalities, which is ideal for modularity (recall the discussion on 
‘tussle’ in the previous chapter), and therefore for testing. e ultimate goal is to 
achieve ‘living documentation’ that is intelligible by non-developers but is 
simultaneously isomorphic with the underlying instrumental code.  
2.3.1.4 Conclusion 
e above examples demonstrate two ways in which the evidentiary aspects of 
contestability can be facilitated partly in the IDE, maintaining an isomorphic 
connection between the underlying code and its documentation. Although the 
designer is ultimately still free to write the code as she sees t (i.e. she can ignore these 
approaches, or override them), they nevertheless suggest one way in which the PoP, as 
represented in the IDE, can encourage the evidential aspect of the affordance of 
contestability. Furthermore, although optional at present, there is no principled reason 
why such approaches cannot be integrated more deeply into the process of IDE-based 





is chapter discussed ‘agile’, one of the dominant code design methodologies in use 
today, setting out how the iterative process of digisprudential legitimation might 
conceivably t within it. Drawing on Hart’s theory of primary and secondary rules 
mentioned earlier in the thesis, the discussion above has strengthened the parallel 
between constitutional and parliamentary law-making on the one hand, and the 
programmer of the programmer (represented inter alia in the affordances of the 
integrated development environment) and the product designer on the other. By 
considering what the (secondary) affordances of the design environment are and ought 
to be, it then becomes possible to conceive of the constitutional binding of the 
(primary) technological normativity that ultimately makes it into the nished product. 
To that end, I discussed the affordances of IDEs, and how these might themselves be 
tailored to t this schema. With respect to the digisprudential affordance of 
contestability, I discussed two candidate mechanisms that can help to satisfy legal 
evidentiary requirements from the perspective of the courts – the latter being as 
important an aspect of contestability as the affordance, to the end-user, of the 







When technologies are always in uencing human actions, we had better try 
to give this in uence a desirable form.1 
1. Introduction 
is multidisciplinary thesis has sought to bring together the practical question of how 
code regulates with a legal-theoretical view of what constitutes legitimate regulation. 
It has contributed both a descriptive legal-theoretical analysis, culminating in the 
concept of computational legalism, and a normative framework – digisprudence – that 
synthesises the latter with design theory in order to suggest a set of affordances that, 
when present, legitimise the code at a ‘constitutional’ level that lies below 
considerations of its commercial purposes or whether or not it complies with the 
requirements of substantive law. e digisprudential affordances therefore serve as a 
guide for the production of legitimate code. e thesis has also considered practical 
elements of the software development process, and how elements of the 
digisprudential framework can be employed there. 
is nal chapter concludes by discussing the relevance of the research carried 
out, before considering each of the research questions that were set out in Chapter 1 
and how the ensuing analysis has answered them. It then goes on to suggest some 
avenues for potential further research that have emerged in the course of carrying out 
this work. 
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2. e relevance of the thesis 
I highlighted in Chapter 1 the tension between law as the paradigmatic normative 
order on the one hand, and code as an alternative order on the other. is speaks to 
fundamental questions of law and of normativity – what it is for an a-legal order to 
arise in parallel with (or even to supplant) democratically-legitimated law, particularly 
when that alternative order is commercially-motivated and bene ts from the ‘legalistic’ 
characteristics of ruleishness, opacity, immediacy, immutability, and pervasiveness. 
When we fail to enquire as to the processes by which private code-based normativity 
is created and imposed, the result is a situation that is deeply problematic on two fronts, 
each of which compounds the other: we have technical rules which are by their very 
nature opaque and instrumental, created through commercial processes that lack 
democratic incentives, rati cation, and oversight. e implications are profound, 
particularly given the ever-increasing role of code in ordering our social, political, and 
economic lives. 
It is clear from the literature that this is a fundamental but under-studied 
problem. While the regulation of code by law is a signi cant eld, it fails adequately 
to account for the myriad ways in which designers impose normativity in practice, 
perhaps without awareness, and likely without full cognisance of the substantive law 
which notionally they should be applying to and through their practices. e 
assumption is also that more law will result in better code. I have argued that the 
translation of legal text into code – assuming the designer is aware of the text in the 
rst place – is problematic, and so there are inevitably gaps between what the law 
expects and what the code actually does. Appealing for more law may help close some 
of these gaps, but it is unlikely to solve the problem at a foundational level, not least 




compliance.2 In the absence of a more computationally-friendly form of legislation,3 
then, designers need – in light of the characteristics of computational legalism – to be 
guided in their creation of code that is not necessarily ‘legal’ per se (although of course 
they should in any case be aiming for compliance by design) but whose design 
embodies constitutional protections that minimise the possibility of substantive 
illegality and facilitate judicial action should such illegality be found. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the legal literature on normative criteria for code is 
very small indeed, and while some legal scholars have either argued for greater 
engagement with other disciplines (particularly design studies, and science and 
technology studies), or have indeed done so themselves,4 my impression is that in the 
main there is, ironically, an element of the legalistic perspective operating, whereby 
lawyers are perhaps less willing to look outside the boundaries and the conceptual 
lenses of their discipline in order to engage with what lies beyond.5 is is unfortunate 
because it is not possible fully to understand the alternative normative order of code by 
observing it only through a legal lens,6 far less is it possible to think productively about 
how to solve the problems, discussed in this thesis, that it raises. 
3. Research questions and contributions 
Chapter 1 gave a broad overview of the thesis’ narrative, its primary theoretical sources, 
and the research questions that the analysis has aimed to answer. is section surveys 
                                                 
2  C. Reed, ‘How to Make Bad Law: Lessons from Cyberspace’ (2010) 73 e Modern Law Review 
903, p. 904 et seq.; J.N. Shklar, Legalism (Harvard University Press, 1964) p. 2. 
3  I consider this possibility in the section on further research, infra. 
4  We saw the primary examples of this in Chapter 4, section 3 (Normative criteria for code-making). 
5  Cf. S. Gutwirth, P. De Hert and L. De Sutter, ‘ e Trouble with Technology Regulation: Why 
Lessig’s “Optimal Mix” Will Not Work’ in R. Brownsword and K. Yeung (eds.), Regulating 
technologies: legal futures, regulatory frames and technological xes (Oxford ; Portland, Or: Hart, 2008). 
6  J.E. Cohen, Con guring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice 




the questions and considers how the ndings of Chapters 2-6 have contributed to 
answering them. 
3.1 Research question 1: How does code in fact regulate end-user behaviour? 
is question was dealt with in Chapter 2, which alongside Chapter 3 constitutes the 
descriptive element of the thesis. As alluded to above, this is a question that cannot be 
answered from within the legal discipline alone – the phrase ‘in fact’ in the question 
alludes to the need to consider what code actually does, a question that cannot be 
answered by law alone. Following the work of scholars such as van den Berg, Leenes, 
and Hildebrandt,7 the chapter engages directly with design theory in order to set out 
the ways in which code architectures impose technological normativity that enables 
and constrains what it is possible for end-users to do. e theories of affordance8 and 
inscription9 are particularly relevant, speaking to the conscious ways in which designers 
shape the interfaces and ‘stories’ of their artefacts in order to affect what behavioural 
possibilities end-users are given. e analysis demonstrates the sheer power of 
designers to enable and constrain behaviour, and even to de ne reality for the end-
user.10 at power is direct and purposive in a way that the text-bound law can never 
be, rendering the latter but ‘a paper dragon in the age of the “digital tsunami”’.11 In 
this way, the chapter showed the extent to which, as a regulator of behaviour, code is 
indeed ‘more’ than law. 
                                                 
7  B. van den Berg and R.E. Leenes, ‘Abort, Retry, Fail: Scoping Techno-Regulation and Other 
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Comparative Perspectives (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013); M. Hildebrandt, ‘Legal and 
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8  Chapter 2, section 2 (Affordance). 
9  Ibid., section 3.4 (Code mediating action). 
10  Ibid., section 3 (Infusing code with normativity). 
11  M. Hildebrandt and B.-J. Koops, ‘ e Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the 




3.2 Research question 2: To what extent are the characteristics of legalistic 
illegitimacy re ected in the normativity of code? 
Taken together, Chapters 2 and 3 can be viewed as the rst signi cant 
multidisciplinary contribution of the thesis. Where Chapter 2 uses design theory to 
analyse the characteristics of code, Chapter 3 considers it through the legal-theoretical 
lens of legalism. is analysis proceeds from the observation that the characteristics of 
code are strikingly similar to those of legalism, and particularly its stronger variant, 
discussed in the legal-theoretical literature12 and in particular depth in the work of 
Wintgens.13 e analysis considers the characteristics of legalism and how they are 
exhibited analogously in code, the overarching observation of the thesis being that 
normative approaches that exist to mitigate legalism in the legal-institutional world 
(particularly Wintgens’ own theory of legisprudence) might be susceptible to application 
in an a-legal context that exhibits similar characteristics. As Chapter 4 details, 
legisprudence is concerned with the creation of legitimate legal normativity, based on 
rules being constituted according to certain formal requirements rather than simply as 
arbitrary exercises of sovereign power. e focus of the latter on the application of rules 
without enquiry as to how they were made is analogous to the way in which 
technological normativity is in many cases simply a given of the code’s design: end-
users can simply ‘take or leave’ the code as they nd it, in much the same way as 
legalism views laws as ‘just there’.  
e computational form of legalism, however, goes further than the legal-
theoretical concept. Not only are computational rules ‘just there’, they are also in most 
cases hidden by the opacity of code, removing the possibility – still present under 
orthodox legalism – of choosing to reinterpret or disobey them. is absence of 
interpretation is further embodied in code’s ruleishness: rst, it only ever operates under 
                                                 
12  See the discussion in Chapter 3, section 2 (What is legalism?). 




precisely the conditions that have been laid down in advance, no matter how closely 
extant conditions might be to the code’s requirements; second, it always operates when 
those conditions exist; and third, its consequences can only ever be those that are 
predetermined in the code. ese characteristics are in turn made more problematic 
by code’s immediacy (the effects are executed in many cases without the end-user 
having the opportunity to comprehend what is happening or to arrest that execution) 
and by code’s immutability (once released, code is not readily susceptible to its 
normativity being altered, unless this possibility is consciously anticipated in its 
design). e pervasiveness of code as a regulator ampli es these characteristics, when 
their aggregation and proliferation are taken into account. e analysis connects these 
characteristics with Wintgens’ discussion of the ‘veil of sovereignty’, which views the 
exercise of legislative power as a mysterious thing, the province of politics rather than 
law.14 is central element of legalism is in evidence in the computational context 
where the ‘sovereignty’ of the designer is veiled by market orthodoxy, the inherent 
opacity of code, and the unwillingness of lawyers to look at the processes of production 
(cf. legislation15).  
e result of all these characteristics is a sui generis form of legalism – what I 
call computational legalism – that is stronger even than that envisaged by Wintgens 
(and others).16 In this way, those elements that are present when law-making is done 
well are conspicuously absent in the context of code as a normative enterprise. 
Expressed another way, code is ‘less’ than (good) law.  
Chapter 3 demonstrates one way in which rule-making in the code sphere can 
be analysed from the perspective of rule-making in the legal sphere. ere are various 
ways this might be done, but in considering the issue from the perspective of legalism, 
                                                 
14  See Chapter 3, section 3.5 ( e veiling of code’s production). 
15  L. Wintgens, ‘Legisprudence as a New eory of Legislation’ (2006) 19 Ratio Juris 1, p. 1 (‘ e way 
law is created through the process of legislation does not appear on the screen of the legal theorist.’). 




I set the stage for importing from the legal sphere to the computational sphere the 
means of combating legalism. 
3.3 Research question 3: Can mechanisms for designing legitimate legal 
normativity be adopted to ensure the design of legitimate technological 
normativity? 
Chapter 4 considers in greater detail two in uential normative theories of law-making, 
namely Fuller’s principles of legality and, as previously discussed, Wintgens’ 
legisprudence.17 It discusses the concept of legality (in contrast to legalism, its 
perversion), and the important distinction between input and output legitimacy,18 
before summarising Fuller’s and Wintgens’ theories.19 e latter part of the chapter 
then shifts to consider the existing literature on normative criteria for the use of code 
as a regulator, observing the important differences between the application of 
procedural (input) and substantive (output) criteria.20 e literature considers only to 
a limited extent the important temporal question of the point in the design process at 
which the desirability or legitimacy of a code’s normativity should be considered. e 
argument that production is the appropriate point to focus on (cf. operation) is made 
by Goldoni21 and Koops,22 but the literature does not develop this argument 
signi cantly, nor does it consider what this might mean practically from a design 
perspective. Questions of input legitimacy are important because computational 
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18  Ibid., section 2.1 (Input and output legitimacy in law). 
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legalism tends towards xed, opaque, and brittle constellations of normativity; the 
appropriate locus of attention is therefore the stage of production, in order to ensure 
that those constellations are legitimate ab initio. is brings us back to Wintgens’ and 
(elements of) Fuller’s theories, concerned as they are with the crafting – the design – 
of legitimate laws, as distinct from what happens in the ex post adjudicative processes 
that apply those laws. e analysis also considers the distinction between substantive 
and formal legitimacy – akin to ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ conceptions of the rule of law – and 
what these mean from the perspective of providing constitutional principles for the 
guidance of design.23 
Having set out the requirements of the normative frameworks for law-making, 
and reviewed the criteria speci ed by legal scholars as to the legitimate use of code, the 
stage is then set for a synthesis in Chapter 5. 
3.4 Research question 4: What might such mechanisms look like in the design 
context? 
Chapter 5 synthesises the analyses in Chapters 2-4 into a framework of affordances 
that can translate the requirements for the legitimation of legal normativity into a 
conceptual apparatus appropriate for their application through the design of code. is 
critical and normative theory of digisprudence (legitimised code) is the most signi cant 
contribution of the thesis. e analysis maps the Fullerian and legisprudential 
principles onto the characteristics of computational legalism that they are conceptually 
linked with, and proposes a set of affordances that can embody the goals of those 
principles and thereby ameliorate the characteristics of computational legalism. ese 
can be used both as a mechanism for critiquing an existing design and as a normative 
guide for what features ought to be built into code during the production process.  
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is analysis is augmented in Chapter 6 by a discussion of the code production 
process and a practical consideration of how the ‘constitutional’ role of the programmer 
of the programmer (‘PoP’) might assist in achieving the aims of digisprudence. Adapting 
Hart’s theory of primary and secondary rules,24 we can conceptualise the PoP as a 
constitutional actor who, via technological normativity, enables and constrains the 
forms of normativity the product designer can in turn create.25 is was especially 
relevant to the affordance of contestability, the legal-institutional element of which 
requires evidential standards that (legitimate) code ought to meet. e chapter 
considers some mechanisms by which the provision of such evidence can be anticipated 
ex ante during the design process. 
4. Further research 
In the course of researching this thesis I have identi ed various potential avenues for 
further work. e thesis covers a wide range of issues and there are therefore many 
possibilities; this section summarises three of the most interesting and salient 
potentials.  
4.1 Drawing law-making and code-making closer together – the future of 
compliance by design 
I have mentioned on a few occasions that this thesis is not about compliance with 
substantive law, but that such compliance is nevertheless a separate and important goal. 
As I set out in Chapter 1, the thesis consciously takes the position that code is a parallel 
normative order, operating separately from the law. Because of this, the creation of 
normativity in that context requires to be legitimate(d), hence the digisprudential 
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framework. is raises the question however of how the parallel orders might in future 
be brought more closely together. As code is increasingly the medium upon which 
other parts of social, political, and commercial life are built, it seems reasonable to 
assume that it will become the target of more and more law. However, laws that fail 
properly to be embodied in the code that they target tacitly undermine law-making as 
an expression of democratic will. is is the problem I referred to early in Chapter 5, 
where the belief in the validity of the rule that animates the use of code transfers into 
a belief that the resulting code is itself valid. e limitations of this belief and the 
resulting negative effects might come to have signi cant negative effects as code 
proliferates every further into society. 
Continuing in the legisprudential spirit, then, one avenue for further research 
is the consideration of how legislators might better couch the terms of the norms they 
promulgate in order that they are more susceptible to application in the design 
environment, speci cally using the design theories I discussed in Chapter 2. Much of 
the work that aims to bridge the gap between code and law views legislative norms as 
a passive source of rules to be grappled with by various computational processes.26 It is 
therefore in a sense legalistic in outlook, because it does not directly question the 
practice of norm creation itself. While the general question of how to develop legal 
norms that are appropriate for application in the technological context is not new,27 I 
do not believe there has been any systematic analysis of how the substantive content 
of those laws (i.e. the primary rules, in Hartian terms) might be expressed in the 
language of affordances, which might render them capable of more direct 
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implementation by designers and manufacturers. Hildebrandt, for example, mentions 
in passing ‘detecting, con guring or designing affordances that are compatible with 
speci c legal norms’,28 but does not discuss the opposite concept of laws that are 
compatible with affordances (i.e. the language and theory of the latter). I have brie y 
considered this idea in other work, derived from this thesis.29  
A nascent literature is developing that views the goal of compliance from the 
perspective of informatics and how designers can be involved in the implementation 
of regulatory goals.30 is may be a useful multidisciplinary starting point for future 
research in this area, identifying in greater detail the kinds of practices that legislators 
ought to have in mind when they design legal norms, and providing qualitative 
empirical evidence for what practices are effective.31 In any event, we have seen how 
the concepts of (dis)affordance and inscription are simultaneously both concrete and 
technology-agnostic; the digisprudential affordances are speci c enough to identify the 
presence or absence of de ned capabilities, but abstract enough to apply across a wide 
spectrum of technologies. is might suggest affordance theory as a good candidate 
for expressing a wide range of substantive legal requirements in terms that lie closer to 
the actual practices of those expected to comply with them. e expressive texture of 
such an approach might be enhanced by the work of theorists like Davis and 
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29  L. Diver, ‘Law as a User: Design, Affordance, and the Technological Mediation of Norms’ (2018) 
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Chouinard, couching affordances in deontological terms apt for legal application,32 
Hartson, who classi es affordances according to their cognitive, physical, sensory, and 
functional characteristics,33 or even Ihde’s various relationships of technological 
mediation.34  
Building on the ‘thin’ concept of digisprudential legitimacy, then, we might 
envisage legislators conceptualising the substance of traditional legislative instruments 
in terms of (dis)affordance and inscription. Indeed, were legislative practice to develop 
in this direction it would be only a small step to ‘convert’ digisprudence into this 
‘design-sensitive’ law, thus narrowing the gap between law and code even further. One 
might imagine a ‘Code Legitimacy Act’, perhaps part of consumer protection law, 
requiring all technologies to embody such standards by default, with the technology-
facing aspects of those bodies of substantive law that require ‘by design’ approaches 
(e.g. copyright or data protection) operating as leges speciales of that Act’s techno-
constitutional regime. Indeed, as mentioned above, it is the current absence of this 
kind of design-sensitive law-making that necessitates the analysis and the practical 
measures put forward in this thesis. 
4.2 Design and private law 
Another avenue for research that I have been unable to explore in the thesis is the 
question of private law-making, i.e. contract, and its relationship with design (recall 
the discussion in Chapter 1 of Relationship (c) and the commixture of law and code35). 
e observation that online contracting is a form of non-state legal ordering is not a 
                                                 
32  J.L. Davis and J.B. Chouinard, ‘ eorizing Affordances: From Request to Refuse’ [2017] Bulletin 
of Science, Technology & Society. 
33  R. Hartson, ‘Cognitive, Physical, Sensory, and Functional Affordances in Interaction Design’ (2003) 
22 Behaviour & Information Technology 315. 
34  D. Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth (Indiana University Press, 1990) ch. 5. 





new one,36 but some of the observations about design, and about code as a regulator, 
have implications within that context that might be worth exploring. Building on the 
discourse around ‘clickwrap’ licensing from the mid to late 2000s, Hartzog has mooted 
the idea of design elements per se being viewed as terms of privately-ordered 
contracts.37 is very clearly intertwines design practice with legal practice, and is 
something that design theory might helpfully inform, in a similar fashion to the role 
for legislators described above. Although Hartzog does not employ such theories, their 
role is implicit in his analysis, where he argues that speci c features of design (such as 
Facebook’s privacy settings, as de ned for the purposes of the end-user by the 
affordances of its interface) ought to be deemed to be part of the contract between the 
end-user and a website’s operator.38  
As with contract terms that are deemed unfair or unconscionable, we can 
envisage affordances that ought to be deemed illegitimate terms of such a design-based 
contract. In his recent book Hartzog discusses ‘promissory design’, or ‘the implicit (and 
sometimes even explicit) promises embedded in and expressed through design.’39 He 
also discusses affordance theory, demonstrating the emergence of this new literature.40 
He questions the apparent disparity between the imposition of liability owing from 
textual contract terms and the comparative lack of accountability for promises 
expressed via design. Given the interface of the website is frequently the only medium 
by which end-users communicate with online providers, their expression of preferences 
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through the con guration of website settings (i.e. by con guring its affordances) 
perhaps ought to constitute a form of agreement. From the perspective of the 
production of those interfaces, the provision of a setting by a provider perhaps ought in 
turn to imply a legal duty on her to ensure the background code operates in accordance 
with (a reasonable interpretation of) the technical state the setting appears to the end-
user to create.41 e role that design plays in end-users’ understanding of the products 
and services they use suggests the potential to explore further the role that design plays 
in foundational legal concepts of negotiation, consensus, and performance. is is 
perhaps especially important in areas where the end-user’s understanding of the 
affordances of the interface has a bearing on their fundamental rights, for example the 
provision of consent to the processing of personal data. It is also an avenue of research 
that could bene t from analysis of how contractual and promissory requirements differ 
between jurisdictions.42 
4.3 ‘Legitimacy Impact Assessment’ 
A growing area of research activity, particularly in the elds of privacy and data 
protection,43 is impact assessment. ese assessments aim to provide ‘a systematic 
process for evaluating the potential effects of privacy of a project, initiative, or proposed 
system or scheme’ and to assist in ‘ nding ways to mitigate or avoid any adverse 
effects’.44 e UK Information Commissioner describes them as a way both to meet 
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data protection obligations and to ‘meet individuals’ expectations of privacy.’45 e 
European Commission has published guidance on their use for the Internet of 
ings,46 and they are a common feature of government procurement processes.47 As 
Clarke observes, one interpretation of why impact assessments have emerged in recent 
years is as a reaction to the ‘increasingly privacy-invasive actions of governments and 
corporations’ in the late 20th century.48 Because of these actions, ‘people want to know 
about organisations’ activities, and want to exercise control over their excesses’, with 
the privacy impact assessment demonstrating a ‘ceding by large organisations of some 
of the substantial power that they exercise over citizens’.49 One can appreciate the 
overlap with the ethos of the current thesis. Key to privacy impact assessment processes 
are their focus on a single project or initiative, their anticipatory (ex ante) nature, their 
wide scope in considering forms of privacy and the actors whose interests might be 
affected, their desire to identify both problems and solutions, and their focus on 
organisational engagement.50 
From a broader perspective, in previous work with Lilian Edwards and Derek 
McAuley I have considered the idea of a ‘social impact assessment’,51 which aims to 
take wider considerations into account than just data protection, for example security, 
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transparency, sustainability, resilience, and interoperability.52 One can of course 
appreciate the overlap between transparency and the equivalent affordance under 
digisprudence.53 ere is scope for research into how the outcomes of the 
digisprudential framework might be integrated into a kind of ‘legitimacy impact 
assessment’, investigating how existing impact assessment methodologies might be 
adapted to formalise the process further than has been possible within the scope of the 
thesis. is research might also consider how such an enterprise would run alongside 
other substantive initiatives aimed at guiding the production of code, for example data 
protection by design,54 value-sensitive design,55 and participatory models for design.56 
As I have previously mentioned, these are not incompatible with digisprudence, it 
being a foundational ‘constitutional’ framework that runs beneath other considerations 
of the characteristics an artefact’s design should include. A consideration of the 
(appropriate) interplay between the baseline constitutional requirements of 
digisprudence and the higher-level substantive outputs of such approaches could be a 
useful starting point for further work. 
4.4 Application to data-driven applications 
An avenue for further research that would be of great contemporary relevance is 
consideration of how the digisprudential affordances might be applied to data-driven 
(as opposed to code-drive) applications. e same goals might be sought, but the 
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means of doing so in such applications would likely differ. e precise contours of the 
affordances would likely change, in particular in relation to the affordances of 
transparency, a topic that at the moment is attracting much attention from scholars 
working in the legal (especially data protection),57 computer science,58 and STS/critical 
studies elds.59 e question of production is of great importance in that debate, given 
that the design of machine learning algorithms can set in motion (negative) path 
dependencies that are exacerbated when those algorithms are trained using data that 
re ect social biases.60 Moving the present work in this direction might also involve 
further consideration of the parties to whom the affordances are directed, particularly 
the affordance of contestability. It may not be necessary for the end-user, at the level 
of the interface, to understand the intricacies of the algorithm with which she is 
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interacting,61 but such information ought to be afforded to e.g. the courts or other 
overseeing institutions. Structuring research on algorithms according to the legal-
theoretical frame I have developed might bring some useful foundational insights to 
bear. 
5. Conclusion 
is chapter has summarised the contribution of the thesis and has considered avenues 
for potential future research. In answering the research questions the thesis has 
contributed to knowledge in its use of multidisciplinary literature to describe both the 
reality and the legal-theoretical implications of code as a regulator. It has also 
contributed a critical and practical theory of digisprudence, developing what is 
currently a very minimal literature bridging the gap between legal theory and concrete 
design practice. 
e approach of the thesis has been to identify fundamental design 
characteristics that ought always to be re ected in code, in order not only that end-
users are provided with mechanisms that enable them to resist its heteronomy, but also 
so that the courts, as the arbiter of last resort, are at all times able to exercise their 
function as guardians of the rule of law.
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